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their political economy, and to strenghen Atlantic ties.22 Regardless of the arguments
supporting either a ‘continental commitment’ or an ‘empire by invitation,’ it
is clear that American involvement in Europe was multi-faceted and moreover that
the Marshall Plan cannot be considered in isolation from these other factors.
This section has dealt with the attacks of revisionist historians that the
Marshall Plan was an instrument of American imperialism. While it is something
of a truism to note Milward’s comment that “the idea that the United States
sought no extra political gain in return for Marshall Aid is nonsense,” the level of
what the United States expected in return is an issue of historical debate.23 The
fundamental American foreign policy objectives of securing a stable, prosperous
Europe did precipitate close American involvement within the economic affairs
of Europe. However, the argument that America sought something resembling
satellite states for itself in Europe is flawed in the sense that dividing Europe into
spheres of influence was a means to an end of peace and stability, not an end in
itself. Acting as a great power, the United States sought to maintain the balance of
power in Europe, the division of Europe into Eastern and Western blocs being an
unfortunate side effect of such superpower behaviour that has defined the history
of global realpolitik.
While by 1949 the United States might have pursued a series of policies
(not limited to the Marshall Plan) which had resulted in such a sharp division in
Europe between capitalist and communist geopolitical blocs, it would be an oversight
to attribute the development of this arrangement solely to imperialistic overtones
of the Marshall Plan. As political scientist Marc Trachtenberg notes, such
a bloc system took half a decade to manifest itself into its Cold War form, and
cannot be explained simply through an American motivation to divide Europe.24
Furthermore, the notion that the decisive split between Eastern and Western
Europe occurred solely because of American actions does not allow any agency
to be attributed to the Soviet Union, and the actions of its own leaders defending
their perceived interests in the years immediately following the war.25
Remarks and Conclusions
When Kennan’s conception of the doctrine of “containment” is considered, the
Marshall Plan can be viewed as one part of a “grand strategy” of American foreign
policy to promote its national interest and economic prosperity. After the Second
World War, the United States saw its former ally the Soviet Union as a threat to
both of these objectives, and sought a reorientation of policy to counter this threat.
The warning by Kennan of an inherently expansionist Soviet Union suffering
from a “neurotic view of world affairs” only strengthened the resolve of the United
States to secure Western European integration and ecomomic restructuring in an
attempt to buttress against any Soviet advance. Kennan conceived of “containment”
as being an “adroit and vigilant application of counterforce along a series of shifting
geographical and political points.”26 In this respect, policymakers in Washington
saw the implementation of the Marshall Plan as an economic application of counterforce.
To this end, the purpose of American involvement in Europe was not an
imperial project of forcing political and economic influence, but integral to a Cold
War rhetoric and geopolitical strategic doctrine that demanded the United States
keep Western Europe free from communism and respective Soviet power.
This essay has sought to posit two interrelated claims: firstly, that the
United States did conduct its foreign policy towards Europe under an “altruistic
strain” towards the continent; and, secondly that the United States was successful
in forming an “empire by invitation” in Western Europe. These claims have been
explained with constant reference to the Marshall Plan, the policy that sought to
reshape the post-war European economic climate to prevent the Soviet sphere of
influence stretching beyond its satellites in Eastern Europe.
With reference to the assertion of an “altruistic strain,” American foreign
policy objectives towards Europe in the immediate post-war world have been established.
The Marshall Plan represented one instrument in the fight to contain communism,
and protect the states of Western European from falling under its influence.
The United States recognised the need for the security of Western Europe and
to ensure its resurgence as an economic powerhouse. These objectives would be of
great benefit to the United States in consolidating its position as the most powerful
nation on earth. Therefore, this unique position of the United States, coupled with
the extraordinary benefits of pursuing a policy of economic assistance to Western
Europe, allowed for a degree of altruism and goodwill in American foreign policy.
The notion that the United States created an “empire by invitation” in
Western Europe as a result of the Marshall Plan remains a contested issue. This
revisionist approach to early Cold War history has come with many flaws, not least
that it can paint American policy as the determining force of the events of 1945-
49, rather than a factor informing the contested development of such events. It is
difficult to rationalise the Soviet takeover of Eastern Europe, the Berlin Blockade,
and the formation of Cominform, as being reducible to a reaction on the part of
the Soviet Union to counter an American imperialist agenda. It is important to
acknowledge that both superpowers acted in an assertive, expansionist fashion
that ensured the inevitable division of Europe by virtue of an Iron Curtain. By way
of conclusion, the assertion of Cox and Kennedy-Pipe that the Marshall Plan was
not “quite what it seemed,” and that it caused the division of Europe can be called
into question.27 Ultimately, it is more appropriate to view the Marshall Plan as
a pragmatic acknowledgement of divisions in Europe that were already taking
place, and that the Marshall Plan drew attention to and modified these divisions
rather than directly causing them.28
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