Bilateral Trade Agreements â Issues and Concerns for ... - Equations
Bilateral Trade Agreements â Issues and Concerns for ... - Equations
Bilateral Trade Agreements â Issues and Concerns for ... - Equations
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<strong>Bilateral</strong> <strong>Trade</strong> <strong>Agreements</strong>: <strong>Issues</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Concerns</strong> <strong>for</strong> India 27<br />
3.1 Fools rush in where angels fear to tread<br />
Tread warily on the Indo-Singapore Comprehensive Economic Cooperation<br />
Agreement (Ceca)<br />
The Financial Express, Bangalore, Saturday, November 13, 2004<br />
TK Bhaumik<br />
THE idea of an Indo-<br />
Singapore Comprehensive<br />
Economic Cooperation<br />
Agreement (Ceca) was<br />
r e c e i v e d w i t h g r e a t<br />
excitement when it was first<br />
mooted jointly by the heads<br />
of the two governments. The<br />
joint cask <strong>for</strong>ces (JTF), setup<br />
to study the scope <strong>and</strong> lay the<br />
broad structure, had also<br />
acted with determination <strong>and</strong><br />
speed. The report of the task<br />
<strong>for</strong>ce was produced within<br />
the prescribed deadline. Since<br />
then, however, the spur<br />
seems to have been lost<br />
somewhere during the<br />
negotiation process.<br />
The deadlines <strong>for</strong><br />
conclusion of negotiations<br />
have been missed several<br />
times <strong>and</strong> negotiations are<br />
continuing. I am not<br />
particularly worried about<br />
missed deadlines. On the<br />
contrary, neither the<br />
Singapore side, nor the Indian<br />
side, should rush to conclude<br />
the negotiations. The<br />
negotiations should result in<br />
a kind of agreement that is<br />
beneficial to both <strong>and</strong><br />
something that serves the<br />
mutual interests. To achieve<br />
this objective, prolonged<br />
negotiations should not be<br />
viewed as a sign of<br />
difficulties.<br />
M o s t f r e e t r a d e<br />
a g r e e m e n t s ( F T A )<br />
negotiations take time <strong>and</strong><br />
are not concluded in a rush.<br />
The North American Free<br />
<strong>Trade</strong> Agreement (Nafta)<br />
negotiations, <strong>for</strong> instance,<br />
took about seven years. Good<br />
agreements are usually wellnegotiated<br />
agreements that<br />
take care of all the concerns.<br />
What is of concern to me is,<br />
however, visible signs of<br />
negotiating fatigue, <strong>and</strong> some<br />
kind of frustration, about the<br />
Ceca.<br />
The hitch has been<br />
presumably around the rules<br />
of origin criteria in particular,<br />
b u t t h e r e a r e m o r e<br />
fundamental issues involved<br />
in the current deadlock on<br />
negotiations that need to be<br />
understood.<br />
First, the idea of Ceca<br />
was imposed from the top.<br />
It is not an idea whose need<br />
was felt at the bottom<br />
layers of the stakeholders.<br />
For the latter, it was given<br />
to accept <strong>and</strong> assimilate.<br />
Second, the joint task <strong>for</strong>ce<br />
also was left with little time<br />
<strong>for</strong> a wider consultation<br />
with the cross-section of<br />
stakeholders.<br />
The JTF was more<br />
concerned about the deadline<br />
than consultations. When the<br />
negotiations began, the<br />
I n d i a n s i d e o f t h e<br />
stakeholders were asking<br />
“Why Singapore”<br />
The idea of Ceca was<br />
the first ever bold initiative,<br />
after the announcement of<br />
lndia’ s Look East policy in<br />
1992, <strong>and</strong> a political signal<br />
to India’s commitment to<br />
p<strong>and</strong>er to the expectations of<br />
the Asean leaders. Earlier,<br />
India had committed itself to<br />
bring its tariffs down to<br />
Asean level. The choice of<br />
Singapore as a Ceca<br />
partner was a matter of<br />
official recognition of the<br />
role played by Singapore in<br />
the recognition that we had<br />
received from the Asean in<br />
the post-Cold War period.<br />
The idea of lndo-Singapore<br />
Ceca is, in this context, a<br />
political, though not<br />
politically motivated,<br />
decision. There were, of<br />
course, genuine strategic<br />
angles as well in the choice<br />
of Singapore as a Ceca<br />
partner.<br />
In retrospect, two things<br />
can be said about the Ceca.<br />
First, it is an FTA-plus<br />
agreement, meaning thereby<br />
that the two economies had<br />
decided to engage themselves<br />
in total economic integration<br />
<strong>and</strong> much beyond what was<br />
possible in a normal free<br />
trade agreement. The idea<br />
was to extend the integration<br />
process to almost all aspects<br />
of bilateral economic<br />
relationship.<br />
This brings us to the<br />
second aspect of Ceca i.e. Its<br />
WTO-plus character. It again<br />
means two things. One, it<br />
talks of areas such as<br />
investment, competition<br />
policy, environment, etc that<br />
are not currently under the<br />
WTO. Two, in those areas<br />
where there are WTO<br />
agreements, it talks of<br />
e x t e n s i v e f o r m s o f<br />
cooperation agreements e.g.<br />
WTO-plus agreement on<br />
Trips. From this angle, Ceca<br />
is highly ambitious <strong>and</strong><br />
broad-based in scope;<br />
something <strong>for</strong> which the<br />
Indian stakeholders are<br />
probably not ready. They<br />
are not quite clear as to how<br />
Ceca is going to benefit them.<br />
So far as the FTA<br />
component of Ceca is<br />
concerned, the feeling here<br />
is that if free trade has to take<br />
place, a higher value addition<br />
norm has to be in place to<br />
keep the possible flooding of<br />
goods from third countries<br />
under check. This has given