THE SOVIET-AFGHAN WAR Colin Rhys Hill - The Concord Review

54 Colin Rhys Hill
The Mujahideen understood the war from a constructivist
perspective. Resisting foreign invasions was a bedrock of Afghanistan’s
culture. In fact, invasion was perhaps the sole event
that could unite the various independent tribes and ethnicities
of Afghanistan. Historically, it was the foreign invader who would
retreat in defeat. The Mujahideen were accurate in this belief, but
they failed fully to comprehend the costs. A realist might have understood
that the terrible price exacted upon the Afghan people
would lead to almost constant warfare over the next two decades. A
liberal would have understood the need for cooperation amongst
the Mujahideen after the war. Instead, the various factions fought
for power in Kabul, and were ultimately overwhelmed by the
foreign-led Taliban. Thus the Mujahideen won a tragic victory.
Incorporating purer realist and purer liberal considerations might
have led to a different outcome. But the Mujahideen approached
the war from a constructivist perspective.
The Soviet-Afghan War is far more complex than it first
appears, but it is amazing how little the various factions knew about
each other. All sides had limited views of the conflict and blinded
themselves by not accounting for other ideological beliefs. Each
faction paid a price for this nearsightedness, this failure to view
the complete picture. The Soviet-Afghan War is a cautionary tale
for those countries and citizens who act behind ideological blinders
and do not seek a full understanding of a conflict. Perhaps,
it should be added that these citizens and countries should also
seek a full understanding of their recent past. However, if they
do not do so, they are forewarned: prepare for unintended consequences.