The Apollonian Eye and the Dionysian Ear - PsyBC

THE APOLLONIAN EYE AND THE DIONYSIAN EAR 341
right and left brain hemispheres, that is, “Semantic memory is a left-brain
function (e.g., memorizing the Declaration of Independence). In contrast,
right-brain memory encompasses the whole experience—visual, spatial,
sensory” (Levinson, 2003, p. 238). Using these distinctions, Levinson then
argues, “Right brain to right brain imagery may well be, in itself, mutative,
but to nail home the experience, to convert it into insight (i.e., to organize
this chaotic right-brain visual imagery into a narrative, a coherent story),
left brain input is required” (p. 239). But, then, he concludes, “Whether
“coherent narratives” have much to do with clinical improvement is another
story” (p. 239).
This far into Levinson’s argument, I find myself in agreement. But his
subsequent solution seems to repeat the difficulty that Jung found in
Nietzsche’s attempt to reconcile Apollonian and Dionysian tendencies,
that is, Levinson creates another set of Apollonian forms. For example,
Levinson (2003) says, “In contrast to interpretations, which are content
and theory-dependent, logical and linear, the following visual images are
spatial, pattern-dependent, and independent of content” (p. 239). While
this might be true, in order to explain how “the square, the plane, the circle
and the helix” are of utility to the subjectivity of the analyst, Levinson
has to provide “coherent narratives” that he previously argues may not
have much to do with clinical improvement.
There are two problems with Levinson’s approach. The first is that
while his images are spatial they are discrete forms, abstractions for
processes; in other words, they are symbolic representations. They may
describe spatial, pattern-dependent and not content-dependent processes,
but then, so do Freudian, Kleinian, and self psychological concepts. Just
think for a moment about transference, projection, and vertical and horizontal
splitting. Each of these terms meets Levinson’s requirements for
visual imagery. In fact, Levinson’s contribution can be extremely helpful
to the analyst in organizing a coherent narrative out of visual, acoustic or
somatic registrations. But it is still a conversion or transduction of nonnarrative
forms of registration into narrative. While this move is ultimately
necessary to the ongoing psychic equilibrium of any analyst, it does not
necessarily include a micro focus on the exquisite and clinically rich
process of attending to “indications” of non-narrative forms of registration
of faintly conscious stimuli to which infant research points as central to
the process of affective communication and with which the “intuitive” and
“sensation” forms of registering experience, construct a sense of self and
otherness.