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Pennsylvania <strong>law</strong> provides that the occurrence rule is used to determ<strong>in</strong>e when the statute of<br />

limitations beg<strong>in</strong>s to run <strong>in</strong> a <strong>legal</strong> <strong>malpractice</strong> action. Under the occurrence rule, the statutory<br />

period commences upon the happen<strong>in</strong>g of the alleged breach of duty. Bailey v. Tucker, 533 Pa.<br />

237, 621 A.2d 108 (1993). The trigger for the accrual of a <strong>legal</strong> <strong>malpractice</strong> action is not the<br />

realization of actual loss but the occurrence of a breach of duty. Under the “occurrence rule” the<br />

time the statutory period commences upon the happen<strong>in</strong>g of the alleged breach of duty. Wachovia<br />

Bank, N.A., supra.<br />

Pennsylvania favors strict application of the statutes of limitation and public policy<br />

considerations do not warrant toll<strong>in</strong>g of statute of limitations on <strong>legal</strong> <strong>malpractice</strong> action past the<br />

time the client could have reasonably been aware of attorney’s breach, despite any dilemma aris<strong>in</strong>g<br />

from possibility that client could potentially have to simultaneously litigate underly<strong>in</strong>g case and<br />

prosecute <strong>legal</strong> <strong>malpractice</strong> premised on the underly<strong>in</strong>g claim, given overrid<strong>in</strong>g public policy of<br />

avoid<strong>in</strong>g stale claims. Wachovia Bank, N.A, supra.<br />

The appeal of the underly<strong>in</strong>g action upon which the claim of <strong>malpractice</strong> is based does not<br />

operate to toll the statute of limitations. Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Ferretti, 935 A. 2d 565 (Pa.<br />

Super. 2007); Robb<strong>in</strong>s & Seventko v. Geisenberger, 449 Pa. Super 367, 674 A. 2d 244 (1996).<br />

An exception to the occurrence rule is the equitable discovery rule which will be applied<br />

when the <strong>in</strong>jured party is unable, despite the exercise of due diligence, to know of the <strong>in</strong>jury or its<br />

cause. “The po<strong>in</strong>t of time at which the <strong>in</strong>jured party should reasonably be aware that he or she has<br />

suffered an <strong>in</strong>jury is generally an issue of fact to be determ<strong>in</strong>ed by the jury...Only where the facts<br />

are so clear and reasonable m<strong>in</strong>ds cannot differ may the commencement of the limitations period be<br />

determ<strong>in</strong>ed as a matter of <strong>law</strong>.” Knopick v. Connelly, 639 F.3d 600 (3d Cir. 2011); Coregis Ins.<br />

Co. v. Baratta & Fenerty, Ltd., 264 F.3d 302, 307 (3d Cir. 2001) (quot<strong>in</strong>g Sadtler v. Jackson-Cross<br />

Co., 402 Pa. Super. 492, 587 A.2d 727 (1991)).<br />

Accord<strong>in</strong>gly, the statute of limitations <strong>in</strong> a <strong>legal</strong> <strong>malpractice</strong> claim is tolled when the client,<br />

despite the exercise of due diligence, cannot discover the <strong>in</strong>jury or its cause. Robb<strong>in</strong>s & Seventko<br />

v. Geisenberger, 449 Pa. Super 367, 674 A. 2d 244 (1996). The statute will beg<strong>in</strong> to run when the<br />

client is put <strong>in</strong> a position to discover the <strong>in</strong>jury and its cause, either through <strong>in</strong>quiry or retention of<br />

a new <strong>law</strong>yer. Knowledge can also arise when an adverse action is taken aga<strong>in</strong>st the client, either<br />

through a court order or through a third party action. Knopick v. Connelly, 639 F.3d 600 (3d Cir.<br />

2011). However, cont<strong>in</strong>uous representation of a pla<strong>in</strong>tiff does not toll the limitations period.<br />

Glenbrook Leas<strong>in</strong>g Co. v. Beausang, 839 A.2d 437 (Pa. Super. 2003).<br />

The doctr<strong>in</strong>e of fraudulent concealment also serves to estop the defendant from assert<strong>in</strong>g the<br />

bar of the statute of limitations. The doctr<strong>in</strong>e provides that the defendant may not <strong>in</strong>voke the statute<br />

of limitations, if through fraud or affirmative concealment, he causes the pla<strong>in</strong>tiff to relax his<br />

vigilance or deviate from his <strong>in</strong>quiry <strong>in</strong>to the facts. The pla<strong>in</strong>tiff must demonstrate fraud or<br />

concealment by clear, precise and conv<strong>in</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g evidence. While it is for the court to determ<strong>in</strong>e<br />

whether an estoppel results from established facts, it is for the jury to say whether the alleged<br />

remarks constitut<strong>in</strong>g fraud or concealment were made. Glenbrook Leas<strong>in</strong>g Co. v. Beausang, 839<br />

A.2d 437 (Pa. Super. 2003).<br />

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