Perrelli v. Pastorelle - Appellate Law NJ Blog

the pool of accident-victim insurance funds to which he or she did not contribute, and to provide an incentive to
comply with compulsory insurance laws. (pp. 10-13)
5. Given N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a)’s purpose, there is no doubt that the Legislature wanted to assure that all
automobiles were covered by compulsory insurance by precluding those who do not have required coverage from
recovering from others merely by having someone else drive their car. Because statutes should be read to give sense
to the legislation as a whole, it is helpful to review other sections of title 39 on compulsory automobile insurance.
N.J.S.A. 39:6A-7(b)(1) precludes collection of PIP benefits by a person who owned a vehicle “that was being
operated without” PIP coverage. That statute has been held to preclude benefits even when the accident occurred in
someone else’s insured vehicle. Another law, N.J.S.A. 39:6B-2, provides that a motor vehicle owner “who operates
or causes to be operated a motor vehicle” without liability insurance is guilty of an offense. (pp. 13-15)
6. In Dziuba v. Fletcher, 382 N.J. Super. 73 (App. Div. 2005), aff’d o.b., 188 N.J. 339 (2006), the plaintiffs were
passengers in the defendants’ insured automobile when an accident occurred. The Appellate Division held that the
plaintiffs could not recover PIP benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-7(b)(1) because they regularly drove their own
uninsured vehicles around the time of the accident, but they were not barred by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) from making
a claim for economic and non-economic losses because “the uninsured vehicle must be the vehicle involved in the
accident to preclude its owner” from recovery. It was the fact that the uninsured vehicle was not involved in the
accident, and not whether the culpably uninsured person was “operating” it at the time of the accident, that led to the
Appellate Division’s conclusion which the Court affirmed. (pp. 15-18)
7. In State v. Schumm, 146 N.J. Super. 30 (App. Div. 1977), aff’d o.b., 75 N.J. 199 (1978), the defendant-passenger
was convicted of violating N.J.S.A. 39:6B-2’s compulsory insurance requirement, even though he was not an
“operator” as defined by N.J.S.A. 39:1-1, because he “caused” the vehicle “to be operated” when he knew it was
uninsured. While N.J.S.A. 39:6B-2 uses “causes to be operated” language, the case underscores the legislative
purpose of chapter 6. The panel noted -- and the Court agreed -- that the purpose is to keep uninsured vehicles off
the road to protect the public and to penalize those responsible by denying them statutory protection. In Caviglia v.
Royal Tours of America, 178 N.J. 460 (2004), the Court emphasized the Legislature’s intent to ensure that injured,
uninsured drivers do not collect from accident-victim insurance funds to which they did not contribute. Thus,
N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) requires that a vehicle owner comply with compulsory insurance laws or lose the right to sue
for damages. The incentive to comply is just as powerful if the culpably uninsured is the driver or passenger in his
own uninsured vehicle. (pp. 18-20)
8. A literal reading of “while operating” as used in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) to only bar recovery if the individual was
driving would be contrary to the public policy as described in Caviglia and allow the culpably uninsured person to
violate the law and not suffer its consequences. The Court holds that the preclusion of recovery contained in
N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) applies to the owner of an uninsured vehicle whether injured as a driver or passenger. (pp. 21-
22)
The denial of summary judgment is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division for
entry of judgment dismissing the complaint.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LONG, LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, RIVERA-SOTO, and
HOENS join in JUDGE STERN’s opinion.
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