Plutonium Mountain - Belfer Center for Science and International ...

explosions conducted in the tunnels had actually detonated, Litvinov said they had not. This
added a new concern: the plutonium (or highly enriched uranium) that remained in the test tunnels
from those duds, especially now that it appeared the scavengers were re-entering some of
the previously-sealed test tunnels.
Lastly, Litvinov told Hecker that some of the tests had been carried out in large tank-car sized
metal containers known as “Kolbas.” 42 Where were they now Still in place, at Semipalatinsk.
Some were deep inside the tunnels at Degelen Mountain, others were outside.
These discussions with the scientists convinced Hecker that any hope of dealing with the plutonium
at Semipalatinsk would have to involve the Russians. They had the knowledge of what tests
had been carried out and what might have been left behind. “What tunnels actually still contained
stuff that we should be worried about” Hecker recalled asking. “Without the Russians, we have
no chance whatsoever. It would be like looking for a needle in a haystack.”
It would not be easy. Even in 1998, seven years after the Soviet collapse, suspicions from the
Cold War still ran strong. While at Chelyabinsk-70, Hecker went to see Evgeny Avrorin, who
had twice served as scientific director of the laboratory. Although he had extensive contacts with
westerners over the years and had come to Los Alamos to help the lab celebrate its 50 th anniversary
in 1993, Avrorin was still cautious and suspicious. The nuclear weapons laboratories had
been secret kingdoms for so long that the mindset was hard to change.
Hecker showed the photographs from Semipalatinsk to Avrorin, and implored him to support
some effort to deal with the plutonium. Hecker recalled that Avrorin replied, “It sounds like intelligence
to me.”
Hecker added,
What he was concerned about is that the work that they did there… the plutonium chemistry,
the plutonium isotopics, are classified secret in Russia. …The type of test that they did,
whether it was in the tunnels, whether it was in the Kolbas—that’s all part of their trade, of
the nuclear weapons trade. They don’t want to give out that information. And Avrorin was
concerned that I was doing this for intelligence collection.
Hecker recalled telling Avrorin that he was not spying but was concerned about the nuclear materials
spread across the steppe, unprotected. Nonetheless, the Chelyabinsk-70 scientists decided
to hold back, to see if Moscow allowed the project to move ahead, and to let Arzamas-16 go first.
They eventually joined the project.
Next, Hecker came back to the United States and briefed high-level officials in the government
about what he had found. He showed them photographs of the unmanned guard gate, of the
trenches, and maps of the various sites at Semipalatinsk where the fissile material might be located.
He urged them to join Russia and Kazakhstan in an effort to do something about the proliferation
risks at Semipalatinsk.
Hecker warned them that the amount of recoverable plutonium was not trivial. He said there
was perhaps as much as 200 kilograms, or about 441 pounds, enough for at least a dozen nuclear
weapons and maybe more, given the quality of the material. And it was all lying about,
42
“Kolba” is a term of art in chemistry to refer to containment chambers.
16
Plutonium Mountain: Inside the 17-year mission to secure a dangerous legacy of Soviet nuclear testing