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REPLY BRIEF ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS ...

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Case 2:10-cv-12767-GCS-MKM Document 29 Filed 01/31/11 Page 2 of 6<br />

1282, 1296 (1991): ATo establish infringement, two elements must be proven: (1) ownership of<br />

a valid copyright and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.@<br />

(Boldface added.) The Feist Court emphasized that only original content is protectable: “As we<br />

have explained, originality is a constitutionally mandated prerequisite for copyright protection.”<br />

499 U.S. at 351. The principal Sixth Circuit case on proof of copyright infringement, Kohus v.<br />

Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 853 (6 th Cir. 2003), follows the Feist rule on originality: “Not all<br />

„copying‟ is actionable, however: it is a constitutional requirement that a plaintiff bringing an<br />

infringement claim must prove „copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.‟<br />

Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361, 111 S.Ct. 1282, 113 L.Ed.2d 358<br />

(1991) (emphasis added).” Under the Sixth Circuit‟s test for infringement, the “substantial<br />

similarity” analysis does not compare the accused work and the copyrighted work in their<br />

entireties; rather, only the “protectable elements” of the copyrighted work are compared to the<br />

accused work. Kohus, 328 F.3d at 855.<br />

Remark does not identify any original content of any work in its pleading; only some<br />

“common expressive and distinctive elements” distilled from a cloud of unregistered works. See<br />

FAC 8 and 9. Remark then purports to compare “expressive elements,” not original elements,<br />

in its multitude of unregistered works with Adell Broadcasting‟s accused commercials. By using<br />

this erroneous legal standard, Remark fails to plead a claim upon which relief can be granted.<br />

On pages 7-9 of its opposition brief, Remark argues that the Supreme Court in Reed<br />

Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010) “rejected” the rule that only the new matter in<br />

a derivative work is protectable. Remark seriously misstates the holding of Reed Elsevier; the<br />

Supreme Court made no such rejection. The “rule” is statutory, 17 U.S.C. §103(b) (“The<br />

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