Palestinian Unilateralism and Israel's Rights in Arab-Israeli Diplomacy
Palestinian Unilateralism and Israel's Rights in Arab-Israeli Diplomacy
Palestinian Unilateralism and Israel's Rights in Arab-Israeli Diplomacy
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the PLO was headquartered, <strong>and</strong> the <strong>Palest<strong>in</strong>ian</strong>s lacked control of permanent territory <strong>and</strong> were<br />
dispersed across the Middle East. However, a 1988 UN vote upgraded the <strong>Palest<strong>in</strong>ian</strong> presence at<br />
the United Nations from “PLO” to “Palest<strong>in</strong>e,” 9 elicit<strong>in</strong>g U.S. threats to withhold all UN dues if the<br />
United Nations voted on a resolution constru<strong>in</strong>g Palest<strong>in</strong>e as a state. 10<br />
S<strong>in</strong>ce 1988 much changed <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational perception, if not reality, which upgraded <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
support for the has <strong>Palest<strong>in</strong>ian</strong> unilateral statehood quest. The 1995 Interim has Agreement created<br />
a <strong>Palest<strong>in</strong>ian</strong> Authority with governmental control over a <strong>Palest<strong>in</strong>ian</strong> population <strong>in</strong> parts of the<br />
West Bank, <strong>and</strong> established a parliament, courts, stamps, <strong>and</strong>, accord<strong>in</strong>g to Abbas, embassies <strong>in</strong><br />
nearly one hundred countries. 11 Moreover, s<strong>in</strong>ce 2007, Hamas exercised government control over<br />
the Gaza Strip, despite its def<strong>in</strong>ition as a terror organization by Europe <strong>and</strong> the United States.<br />
Notwithst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g the favorable <strong>in</strong>ternational perception of a “Palest<strong>in</strong>e” satisfy<strong>in</strong>g the statehood<br />
requirements of the 1933 Montevideo Conference, which Abbas himself trumpeted <strong>in</strong> a May 2011<br />
New York Times op-ed, 12 even cursory exam<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>in</strong>dicates otherwise. 13<br />
<strong>Palest<strong>in</strong>ian</strong> governmental <strong>and</strong> parliamentary elections were to have been held <strong>in</strong> January 2010.<br />
Their absence has rendered <strong>Palest<strong>in</strong>ian</strong> Chairman Abbas <strong>and</strong> Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Fayyad unelected<br />
<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>valid <strong>Palest<strong>in</strong>ian</strong> leaders. Despite a nom<strong>in</strong>al unity pact between Hamas <strong>and</strong> Fatah, Gaza<br />
is Hamas’s territory <strong>and</strong> is ruled as a separate m<strong>in</strong>i-state from the <strong>Palest<strong>in</strong>ian</strong> Authority (Fatah)<br />
controlled <strong>and</strong> governed parts of the disputed West Bank. Hamas control of Gaza resulted <strong>in</strong> more<br />
than twelve thous<strong>and</strong> rockets fired at Israel s<strong>in</strong>ce the 2005 Gaza withdrawal, while the West Bank’s<br />
anti-terror security operations rely heavily on the Israel Defense Forces, despite the presence of<br />
about three thous<strong>and</strong> <strong>Palest<strong>in</strong>ian</strong> gendarmerie forces.<br />
A Carefully Considered Unilateral Strategy to<br />
Establish “Palest<strong>in</strong>e”<br />
The decision of the current <strong>Palest<strong>in</strong>ian</strong> leadership to pursue a unilateral path to statehood <strong>and</strong><br />
sidestep direct negotiations with Israel was a carefully weighed strategic option adopted well before<br />
the Netanyahu government took power <strong>in</strong> May 2009, although many believe Netanyahu’s “hawkish”<br />
government prompted the ensu<strong>in</strong>g declarations on unilateral <strong>Palest<strong>in</strong>ian</strong> statehood by Abbas <strong>and</strong><br />
Fayyad <strong>in</strong> the first six months of 2011.<br />
This is not the case. The <strong>Palest<strong>in</strong>ian</strong> leadership came to a strategic decision to pursue a unilateral<br />
path to statehood follow<strong>in</strong>g the collapse of the 2008 Annapolis peace process between Abbas <strong>and</strong><br />
<strong>Israeli</strong> Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Ehud Olmert. It was not, as is commonly thought <strong>in</strong> Western circles, a<br />
response to settlement policies of the Netanyahu government. 14 In fact, six months before the end<br />
of the Annapolis process, which co<strong>in</strong>cided with Olmert’s resignation <strong>in</strong> November 2008 due to<br />
corruption charges, the <strong>Palest<strong>in</strong>ian</strong> leadership already began to speak of a “Kosovo option” for<br />
“Palest<strong>in</strong>e,” <strong>in</strong>vok<strong>in</strong>g Kosovo’s February 2008 unilateral declaration of <strong>in</strong>dependence from Christian<br />
Serbia. 15 The United States <strong>and</strong> two-thirds of the European Union recognized Kosovo with<strong>in</strong> weeks<br />
of its unilateral declaration, thus energiz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Palest<strong>in</strong>ian</strong> leaders. 16<br />
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