UC Riverside Undergraduate Research Journal

Augustan Era Policy on the Rhine Frontier from 34 B.C.E.-16 C.E.
Kyle McStay
set out from Mainz and again attacked the Chatti. After
fierce fighting along the upper Main River, he defeated the
Marcomanni, who afterwards migrated eastward. The army
then turned north, crossed the Weser, and reached the Elbe
River. Drusus became the first Roman commander to achieve
this. For unknown reasons, Drusus did not cross the Elbe, but
turned back toward the Rhine. At some point he suffered a
broken leg, and died before his army reached the river. 22
Tiberius took over command after the death of
Drusus, and launched a new campaign in 8 B.C.E. during
which, according to Velleius Paterculus, he traversed every
part of Germania with no loss to his own army. 23 But
what had Drusus and Tiberius actually accomplished? It
seems clear that these five campaigns had been invasions,
not conquests. The same tribes were attacked year after
year, indicating that those tribes remained unconquered
at the end of each campaign. For the time being however,
the Germanic tribes east of the Rhine were unwilling to
continue to fight the Romans, so it is probable that Drusus
and Tiberius had at least succeeded in weakening the tribes
and intimidating them into accepting peace; Augustus’
strategy appeared to have worked.
By this time, Augustus’ thoughts seem to have been
turning away from simply securing Roman control of Gaul
and towards incorporating Germania into the Empire. The
willingness of the Germanic tribes to make peace and
to remain peaceful, at least for the time being, appear to
have convinced Augustus of the safety of Gaul and that
Germania could be made into a province as well. Evidence
to support the claim that Augustus was now turning towards
the peaceful incorporation of Germania into the Empire is
provided by the erection of an Altar of Roma and Augustus
at Cologne (Oppidum Ubiorum) around 8 B.C.E., similar
to the altar that had been erected at Lyons during the winter
of 11-10 B.C.E. The altar signified allegiance to Augustus,
and as Tacitus tells us, the priest of the cult was a member
of the Cherusci tribe, 24 another indication of the believed
loyalty of the Germanic tribes.
Further offensive operations were deemed
unnecessary, and Augustus was content with the planting
of garrisons and the construction of additional fortifications
along the Rhine and also along the Lippe. The cessation
of preemptive invasions is further evidence that Augustus
was now concerned with making Germania into a proper
province, not with securing Roman control of Gaul.
Germania seemed to be pacified, and indeed, Dio states
that the area was slowly Romanizing with the presence of
Roman garrisons, the growth of cities, the establishment of
markets, and the introduction of peaceful assemblies. 25 The
culmination of Augustus’ new policy of integration came in
6 C.E., with the appointment of Publius Quinctilius Varus
to the governorship of Germania.
Varus’ career before being appointed governor of
Germania was largely one of administration; 26 that he had
not had extensive military experience is itself a strong
indication that Augustus believed Germania to be ready
to be fully integrated into the Empire. No other reason
presents itself which can adequately explain why he would
have appointed a man such as Varus to a governorship that
had, until 6 C.E., been held exclusively by viri militares
(military men). 27 It would appear that Varus had been
appointed to do what he was accustomed to, which was to
introduce peacetime administration. 28
Correspondingly, Varus set out to speed up the
process of Romanization. According to Dio and Velleius
Paterculus, Varus began levying taxes and exercising judicial
powers to which the Germanic tribes were not accustomed,
nor were they disposed to accept this new imposition of
authority. 29 The Germanic tribes began to lull Varus into a
false sense of security by appearing to submit to his judicial
authority, so that, as Velleius Paterculus states, “he came to
look upon himself as a city praetor administering justice
in the forum, and not a general in command of an army
in the heart of Germany.” 30 In September of 9 C.E., word
was brought to Varus that a revolt had broken out far from
the Rhine. This was done to lure Varus deep into enemy
territory, while simultaneously allowing him to believe
that he was traveling through friendly territory, so that he
might become lax on the march, which is apparently what
occurred. 31 Accordingly, Varus set out with all three legions
of his army, six cohorts of auxiliary infantry, and three alae
of auxiliary cavalry, a force totaling about 21,000 infantry
and 1,500 cavalry. 32
This force was taken by surprise somewhere in the
Teutoburg Forest, terrain that made it almost impossible
for the Romans to deploy, thus negating all of their tactical
strengths. According to Dio and Velleius Paterculus, the
battle was a four day nightmare of ambushes and vicious
close quarters fighting during which the Romans constantly
tried to regroup and escape back to their bases along the
32 UCR Un d e r g r a d u a t e Re s e a r c h Jo u r n a l