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For the Defence_34-3_Layout 1 13-08-16 10:40 AM Page 20 THE CRIMINALIZATION OF ABORIGINAL PROTESTS IN RECENT HISTORY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR SOVEREIGNTY SUMMER This leads to the second key mechanism in INAC’s management of protests, which bridges its intelligence contribution with an enforcement role. Working with police partners, INAC’s political-legal authority in policy making and the negotiation and settlement of legal challenges can be used to preemptively “mitigate” and prevent protests that may potentially disrupt critical infrastructure, such as blockades of highways or rail lines. According to the 2007 NDA Federal Coordination Framework, two indicators of a successful response to “militant incidents” would be to “isolate the splinter group as an anomaly in efforts to improve relations with First Nations” and to “avoid situations developing which cause others to be attracted to the splinter groups (e.g. confrontations which may be provoked for this purpose).” In 2007, INAC engaged in activities aimed at isolating “militants” and preempting economic disruption, participating in strategic planning and incident management for the NDA. One of the key mitigation activities undertaken by INAC was to use its existing relationships with First Nations leaders and the AFN to shape the branding of the NDA. This was an important part of the integrated federal government management of the 2007 NDA, as identified in the Federal Coordination Framework: “INAC has proposed to the AFN that events be organized around the theme of Building Bridges not Blockades. To this end, they have proposed to the AFN a number of suggested events to build public support and deter militant protests.” The AFN’s promotion of the NDA adopted this suggested theme, stating through its <strong>web</strong>site that it did not seek to hold blockades and protests but “to build bridges — not blockades — with Canadians.” 29 Interestingly, the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC) used the same terminology in its national security threat assessments in describing the position of “some First Nations chiefs.” Of note, the reports, disseminated to government departments and other “stakeholders,” do not mention the involvement of INAC. 30 Leading up to the 2007 NDA, INAC officials, including then-minister Jim Prentice, engaged in meetings with First Nations leaders aimed at persuading them to “stand down their plans” for disruptive actions. 31 INAC’s bureaucratic and political power deriving from its administration of land claims, policy and funding arrangements was deployed as a key strategy in these preemptive strategies of managing protest. This included the announcement of the establishment of the independent Specific Claims Tribunal. Perhaps the most blatant example is evident in a secret DND e-mail exchange prior to the NDA indicating that “INAC has made a significant offer related to Caledonia and plans to make some broader policy announcements in the coming weeks as preventative measures. Everything will be timed carefully” (emphasis added). 32 The offer was a $125 million settlement in four other Six Nations land claims. It was contingent on the protesters ending the DCE reclamation and providing some assurance that there would not be further reclamation actions. 33 Underlying the primary goal of “mitigating” potentially disruptive events, these efforts also work to isolate “militants” while reinforcing the status quo of colonial systems, as reflected in a presentation made by INAC to the RCMP: Incidents led by splinter groups are arguably harder to manage as they exist outside negotiation processes to resolve recognized grievances with duly elected leaders. We seek to avoid giving standing to such splinter groups so as not to debase the legally recognized government. 34 Those who engage in activities outside of the legal-bureaucratic mechanisms of the negotiations and legal systems are positioned as illegitimate in contradistinction to the “legally recognized government” of Aboriginal communities, which are products of the elected band council system imposed through the Indian Act. To maintain the status quo of the state-imposed governance systems, INAC must “seek to avoid giving standing” to those who challenge those systems. Being “harder to manage” by INAC within its own jurisdiction, the door opens for the application of criminal charges and/or the coercive enforcement power of police forces, which becomes “rationalized” by the illegitimate and thus “risky” status of these protesters. Aboriginal activism has been a consistent item included in CSIS and Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre threat assessments ... Critical Infrastructure: The National Security Nexus The operations of law enforcement, security, and other government agencies such as INAC reflect an obvious blurring of Aboriginal activism with criminality and terrorism. The Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC), housed within CSIS, was established in 2004 as part of Canada’s National Security Policy to centralize and coordinate the collection and analysis of information and to produce assessments about terrorist threats to national security. In June 2011, the centre was renamed the Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre. Aboriginal activism has been a consistent item included in CSIS and ITAC threat assessments, which as noted above, draw on INAC among other intelligence contributors. Assessments with different classification levels are distributed to law enforcement agencies, government departments, and other “stakeholders.” For the NDA, ITAC was producing reg- 20 FOR THE DEFENCE • VOL. 34 • NO. 3
For the Defence_34-3_Layout 1 13-08-16 10:40 AM Page 21 THE CRIMINALIZATION OF ABORIGINAL PROTESTS IN RECENT HISTORY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR SOVEREIGNTY SUMMER ular assessments related to “Aboriginal Protests – Summer 2007.” The first of these was released on May 11, 2007 and produced weekly until the week of June 25 when they were produced daily until a few days after the NDA on June 29. 35 The ITAC threat assessments were identified in a DND e-mail as being “where the best info is housed” pertaining to the NDA and Aboriginal protest. 36 According to the preamble of these reports, “The right of Canadians to engage in peaceful The framing of Aboriginal struggles as national security issues delegitimizes the underlying issues while simultaneously legitimizing potentially coercive police enforcement activities and intelligence gathering ... protest is a cornerstone of Canada’s democratic society. ITAC is concerned only where there is a threat of politically-motivated violence, or where protests threaten the functioning of critical infrastructure.” When political action is tied to a perceived potential for violence or disruption of “critical infrastructure,” it becomes classified as a (potential) terrorist threat. Starting in 2007, ITAC reports began using a new threat category of “multi-issue extremism,” lumping together animal rights groups, Aboriginal activism, environmental groups, anti-capitalists and others critical of government policy. 37 Both the Caledonia reclamation and the Tyendinaga blockades were regularly highlighted items of concern in ITAC reports. Caledonia was also the subject of several CSIS threat assessments. 38 A similar pattern of ITAC intelligence production occurred for summer 2008 beginning in April. 39 The classification of these events as terrorist threats demonstrates the implications of Canada’s post-2001 national security policy and the Anti-terrorism Act for widening the security net to capture those who participate in forms of political activism such as blockades and reclamations. As critics argued before passage of the Act, these actions could be construed as threats to critical infrastructure and would formalize existing inclinations of government, law enforcement, and media to frame Aboriginal activism as terrorism. 40 The Anti-terrorism Act granted all law enforcement agencies enhanced investigative powers, particularly in relation to surveillance, in cases of “terrorism” offences. Significantly, the enhancement of powers comes through decreased external (judicial) oversight. Aboriginal groups engaging in “disruptive” protest are likely to be subjected to intrusive forms of investigation. 41 Implications Although recent protests have generally been met with restraint from police agencies, it is important to consider the less visible management strategies undertaken by government, intelligence and police agencies. The framing of Aboriginal struggles as national security issues delegitimizes the underlying issues while simultaneously legitimizing potentially coercive police enforcement activities and intelligence gathering as evidenced with the Six Nations reclamation and the NDA. The rationale of ITAC’s reporting on “Aboriginal protest” echoes that which underlies the inclusion of “civil unrest” within INAC’s emergency management monitoring activities. In both cases, this blurring hinges on the threat to critical infrastructure. Government and industry have long been aware of the capacity of Aboriginal peoples to leverage their potential for economic disruption, which has led to the expansion of the national security apparatus to protect physical and economic critical infrastructure. The establishing of formal partnerships, processes and structures provides the foundations for “operations creep” as participants in this national security apparatus extend their operations to forms of political contention that have no direct, evident threat to critical infrastructure. The Government Operations Centre (GOC) of Public Safety Canada was established as a centralized hub for federal situational awareness relating to critical infrastructure. Its reports are disseminated widely to government, police, intelligence agencies as well as the US Department of Homeland Security. With the recent INM events, GOC situation reports have been reporting on events such as flash mobs, horse rides, teach-ins, fundraisers, community gatherings and an open house on Victoria Island during Chief Theresa Spence’s hunger strike – events with little to no implication for critical infrastructure. The main source of reporting for these reports is INAC. 42 The documentation of these events could be understood as part of the broader concerns about managing the INM movement in terms of the political threat posed to the Canadian government because of the high international profile of the movement. The government’s current strategies in managing the unfolding INM movement are very much informed by an awareness of longer-term implications. As noted in a secret Government of Canada planning exercise for future protests, “success breeds success” and the success of INM in mobilizing media attention will “[inform] future protest organizers and the success of their endeavours.” 43 Shiri Pasternak is a PhD candidate in Planning at the University of Toronto. Her research responds to significant political shifts occurring in the nature of property rights in Canada, arguing that the widespread adoption of privatization practices by all levels of government is both prefigured and enabled on an ongoing basis by colonial strategies of Aboriginal dispossession and displacement, policies spatialized and deployed through planning practices. Tia Dafnos is a PhD candidate in Sociology at York FOR THE DEFENCE • VOL. 34 • NO. 3 21
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