NIST.SP.800-161

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Special Publication 800-161 Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Federal Information Systems and Organizations ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ can present opportunities for ICT supply chain compromises. 3 For example, an adversary may have the power to insert malicious capability into a product or to coerce a manufacturer to hand over the manufacturing specifications of a sensitive U.S. system. Note that it is impossible to completely eliminate all risks. Currently, organizations, and many private sector integrators and suppliers use varied and not yet standardized practices, which make it difficult to consistently measure and manage ICT supply chain risks across different organizations. ICT Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) is the process of identifying, assessing, and mitigating the risks associated with the global and distributed nature of ICT product and service supply chains. 1.1 PURPOSE The purpose of this publication is to provide guidance to federal agencies on identifying, assessing, selecting, and implementing risk management processes and mitigating controls throughout their organizations to help manage ICT supply chain risks. The processes and controls identified in this document can be modified or augmented with organizationspecific requirements from policies, guidelines, and other documents. This publication empowers organizations to develop ICT SCRM mitigation strategies that are tailored to their particular mission/business needs, threats, and operational environments. The publication does not provide contract language or a complete list of ICT SCRM methods and techniques that mitigate specific supply chain threats. 1.2 SCOPE This publication provides guidance to federal agencies on managing ICT supply chain risks to their information systems and organizations. The processes and controls described in this publication build on federal agency guidance and are for federal agencies to consider and implement. While entities outside of the federal government may decide to consult this publication as a source of good practices, the publication does not contain any specific guidance for those entities. The guidance and controls in this publication are recommended for use with high-impact systems according to Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 199, Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems [FIPS 199]. However, because of interdependencies and individual needs, agencies may choose to apply the guidance to systems at a lower-impact level or to specific system components. Agencies should carefully consider the potential costs of applying ICT SCRM controls beyond highimpact information systems and weigh the costs against the risks to the organization of not applying ICT 3 This document defines an ICT Supply Chain Compromise as: An occurrence within the ICT supply chain whereby an adversary jeopardizes the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of a system or the information the system processes, stores, or transmits. An ICT supply chain compromise can occur anywhere within the system development life cycle of the product or service. CHAPTER 1 PAGE 2
Special Publication 800-161 Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Federal Information Systems and Organizations ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ SCRM controls. Implementing these controls will require financial and human resources, not just from the agencies directly but also potentially from their systems integrators, suppliers, and external service providers that would also result in increased costs to the acquirer. ICT SCRM controls support risk management, and should be considered in the context of the agency’s or organization’s unique missions, operational environments, and risks. In applying the processes and controls, organizations may decide to include requirements that they include in their policies, acquisition guidelines, and procurement documents. In this document, the word organization refers to the federal agency. In the context of this document, the acquirer is the federal agency. Federal agencies are a diverse set of organizations with different missions, structures, and sizes. The guidance in this publication applies across the federal sector, and therefore this publication does not differentiate between the terms federal agency and organization, and uses those terms interchangeably. 1.3 TARGET AUDIENCE ICT SCRM is an organization-wide activity that should be directed under the overall agency governance, regardless of the specific organizational structure. At the organization level, ICT SCRM activities should be led by the risk executive function, described in [NIST SP 800-39], and implemented throughout the organization by a variety of individuals in different roles. The audience for this publication is federal agency personnel involved in engineering/developing, testing, deploying, acquiring, maintaining, and retiring ICT components and systems. These functions may include, but are not limited to, information technology, information security, contracting, risk executive, program management, legal, supply chain and logistics, acquisition and procurement, other related functions, and system owner. Other personnel or entities are free to make use of the guidance as appropriate to their situation. 1.4 BACKGROUND ICT SCRM encompasses activities in the system development life cycle, including research and development (R&D), design, manufacturing, acquisition, delivery, integration, operations, and disposal/retirement of an organization’s ICT products (i.e., hardware and software) and services. ICT SCRM lies at the intersection of security, integrity, resilience, and quality, as depicted in Figure 1-1. Security provides the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information that (a) describes the ICT supply chain (e.g., information about the paths of ICT products and services, both logical and physical); or (b) traverses the ICT supply chain (e.g., intellectual property contained in ICT products and services), as well as information about the parties participating in the ICT supply chain (anyone who touches an ICT product or service throughout its life cycle); Integrity is focused on ensuring that the ICT products or services in the ICT supply chain are genuine, unaltered, and that the ICT products and services will perform according to acquirer specifications and without additional unwanted functionality. Resilience is focused on ensuring that ICT supply chain will provide required ICT products and services under stress or failure; and Quality is focused on reducing vulnerabilities that may limit the intended function of a component, lead to component failure, or provide opportunities for exploitation. This publication addresses the overlap of the four pillars of ICT SCRM - security, integrity, resilience, and quality - as depicted in Figure 1-1. The publication does not address the entire body of knowledge of these disciplines that is depicted by the non-overlapping areas of the circles in Figure 1-1. CHAPTER 1 PAGE 3
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NIST.SP.800-161

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