Climate Change and Conflict in Uganda: The Cattle Corridor - FESS ...

Nearly 12 percent of Ugandans are
Muslim (Republic of Uganda 2002),
and the government has been
concerned for some time about the
possible destabilizing influence of
Islamic extremism. At the time of the
1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies
in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam,
Ugandan officials believed that the
U.S. embassy in Kampala also had
been a potential target. Since the
September 11, 2001 attacks on the
World Trade Center in New York,
Uganda has aligned itself with U.S.
efforts to prevent the spread of
terrorism by Islamic radicals. In 2007,
President Museveni sent troops to
Somalia as part of an African Union
peacekeeping force. In apparent
retaliation, on July 11, 2010, 74
people were killed in suicide
bombings at two locations in
Kampala. Al-Shabab, a Somali Islamist
militant group, claimed responsibility
for the attacks. However, President
Museveni reaffirmed his commitment
to anti-terrorism efforts as well as
the continued use of Ugandan forces
in multilateral peacekeeping efforts.
In sum, while President Museveni’s
lengthy tenure as head of state has
provided stability and generally good
economic performance, the relevant
context for the consideration of
climate change and conflict in Uganda
includes already existing vulnerability
to episodes of violence and conflict
related to ethnic tensions, persistent
poverty, deeply embedded
corruption, suspect electoral
competition, weak institutions, the
mismanagement of natural resources,
and poor military command and
control.
To these fault lines can be added the
fundamental problem of flawed
electoral competition. Despite
protests from numerous domestic
and international critics that he has
evolved into yet one more African
“president-for-life,” President
Museveni ran for another term of
office in elections held in February
2011. In December 2009, the U.S.
Congress directed the Secretary of
State to report every 120 days on
key criteria related to the progress of
the 2011 Uganda elections, including
the treatment of opposition
candidates, freedom of assembly, and
freedom of the media. In his State of
the Nation address of June 2, 2010,
President Museveni responded by
saying that: “I would now like to
advise our Development Partners
from Europe and the USA, if they
really want to help Africa as they
keep saying, to concentrate on
energy, roads and the railway and to
some extent, on education and
health. We do not need help on
elections. This is a simple exercise.”
However, in July 2010, the second
mandated “Clinton Report” to
Congress noted that, among other
shortcomings, “the Ugandan
government continued to intimidate
and restrict the activities of
opposition parties,” and “Uganda
authorities used sedition, defamation,
and security laws to prevent media
outlets from criticizing the National
Resistance Movement (NRM)
government and President Museveni.”
Although the political opposition was
divided among various parties, the
potential remained for grievances,
tensions, and conflict as the
presidential campaign intensified. For
many Ugandans, the government
lacked credibility and accountability,
but Museveni’s grip on power
seemed as strong as ever. 10
“...while President
Museveni’s lengthy
tenure as head of state
has provided stability
and generally good
economic performance,
the relevant context for
the consideration of
climate change and
conflict in Uganda
includes already existing
vulnerability to episodes
of violence and conflict
related to ethnic
tensions, persistent
poverty, deeply
embedded corruption,
suspect electoral
competition, weak
institutions, the
mismanagement of
natural resources, and
poor military command
and control.”
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