THE ROYAL AIR FORCE - Air Power Studies

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Other sources give slightly different figures but most agree that the Luftwaffe deployed an effective strength of a little over 900 Bf 109 fighters out of an establishment of some 1,000 aircraft. This comprised the bulk of their single seat fighter force – approximately 150 aircraft remained in other theatres, including Germany, to defend against possible Bomber Command attacks. 34 By comparison, Fighter Command could field 52 squadrons of Hurricanes and Spitfires – some 1,100 aircraft in total. Thus, in terms of single seat fighters, the opposing air forces were fairly evenly matched, albeit that Fighter Command was outnumbered more than 3:1 in overall terms. Fighter Command Order of Battle – 11 August 1940 35 Establishment Strength Serviceability Hurricanes 723 721 656 Spitfires 366 374 334 Total 1,089 1,095 990 …in terms of single seat fighters, the opposing air forces were fairly evenly matched, albeit that Fighter Command was outnumbered more than 3:1 in overall terms 25
26 Figure 3:SingleSeat Fighter Strength July - December 1940 Of course, these figures only provide an opening balance. Not unexpectedly, the strength of the respective air forces altered over the course of the summer and autumn as attrition took its toll. However, when we look at the overall picture, Figure 3, it is evident that Fighter Command steadily fielded more single seat fighters as the Battle progressed. In fact, as the Royal <strong>Air</strong> Force grew stronger so the Luftwaffe grew weaker. 36 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 Figure 4 : Single Seat Fighters - Operational Losses 1939 - 1940 Sep-39 Oct-39 Luftwaffe Fighter Command Nov-39 Dec-39 Jan-40 Feb-40 Mar-40 Apr-40 May-40 Jun-40 Jul-40 Aug-40 Sep-40 Oct-40 Nov-40 Dec-40 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0 Luftwaffe Fighter Command Jul-40 Aug-40 Sep-40 Oct-40 Nov-40 Dec-40 What makes this all the more surprising is that Fighter Command’s operational losses were significantly higher than those suffered by the Luftwaffe’s fighter force. This was equally true for the Battle of France as it was for the Battle of Britain (Figure 4). Thus, for the 4 months, July-October 1940, Fighter Command lost over 900 Hurricanes and Spitfires destroyed on operations 37 compared to 600 Bf 109s recorded by the Luftwaffe Quartermaster returns. 38
Page 1 and 2: THE ROYAL AIR FORCE AIR POWER Revie
Page 3 and 4: Royal Air Force Harrier GR7: Carrie
Page 5 and 6: In the fifth article, Vincent Orang
Page 7 and 8: AIR POWER and JOINT DOCTRINE: An RA
Page 9 and 10: 2 Air power could not have won the
Page 11 and 12: In Chapter 11 of AP 3000, the autho
Page 13 and 14: 6 AAP 1000 defines Basic Air Power
Page 15 and 16: sorties; according to the Official
Page 17 and 18: 10 contractorisation have so deplet
Page 19 and 20: 12 18 The British way in war is tak
Page 21 and 22: LOGISTICS and the BATTLE OF BRITAIN
Page 23 and 24: 16 …single seat fighters would ne
Page 25 and 26: 18 “Battle of Britain 1940 - Repa
Page 27 and 28: 20 PRODUCTION The expansion of the
Page 29 and 30: Such experiences were not unique to
Page 31: In quality and general professional
Page 35 and 36: It could be argued that a better te
Page 37 and 38: 30 …at the peak of the Battle, Fi
Page 39 and 40: Accordingly, the Luftwaffe’s rela
Page 41 and 42: SUMMARY 34 Figure 15 : Fighter Comm
Page 43 and 44: 11 These wastage figures were to so
Page 45 and 46: The RISE AND DEMISE of the STUKA
Page 47 and 48: 40 The Junkers 87 had been designed
Page 49 and 50: commence the dive. Immediately befo
Page 51 and 52: 44 …operating with little hindran
Page 53 and 54: As the dive-bombers had pulled out
Page 55 and 56: were first detected on radar, the f
Page 57 and 58: The assault on Sebastopol opened on
Page 59 and 60: 52 Having lined up on his prey, Rud
Page 61 and 62: Electronic Fire
Page 63 and 64: 56 A REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS
Page 65 and 66: The Gulf War seems to have reaffirm
Page 67 and 68: 60 INFORMATION WARFARE With the adv
Page 69 and 70: 62 ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO INFORM
Page 71 and 72: to erect a launcher and only 6 minu
Page 73 and 74: 66 The lethality, speed and scope o
Page 75 and 76: 68 Defence suppression is becoming
Page 77 and 78: Conventional weapons can strike, al
Page 79 and 80: 47 De La Billiere, General Sir Pete
Page 81 and 82: Cutting through the Political Jungl
Page 83 and 84:
These humiliating facts did not ple
Page 85 and 86:
78 Americans respected Tedder for h
Page 87 and 88:
80 One September evening in Tunis t
Page 89 and 90:
The military arguments were complic
Page 91 and 92:
therefore needed Romanian imports a
Page 93 and 94:
The Argentine Gazette Part Two LAS
Page 95 and 96:
4. I would like to express my most
Page 97 and 98:
the transatlantic liner ‘Canberra
Page 99 and 100:
Port Stanley, 26th May 1982 Year 1
Page 101 and 102:
94 29. At no time did the English I
Page 103 and 104:
96 Port Stanley, 30th May 1982 Year
Page 105 and 106:
I ask that you forgive such excesse
Page 107 and 108:
We should not just defeat the Enemy
Page 109 and 110:
102 One Sea Harrier of 801 Sqn was
Page 111 and 112:
Regarding the Enemy 104 He has lear
Page 113 and 114:
106 Father impose his Catholic mora
Page 115 and 116:
BALLOONS What have they ever done f
Page 117 and 118:
110 It is important to stress at th
Page 119 and 120:
Meanwhile, following the outbreak o
Page 121 and 122:
CONTROL OF THE AIR “Anyone who ha
Page 123 and 124:
116 The Germans learned the hard wa
Page 125 and 126:
118 …balloons would be floated ov
Page 127 and 128:
has been put forward on at least on
Page 129 and 130:
operating an aerostat system was en
Page 131 and 132:
EW READING NEW READING NEW READING
Page 133 and 134:
EW READING NEW READING NEW READING
Page 135 and 136:
UNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REU
show all

THE ROYAL AIR FORCE - Air Power Studies

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?