Industrial Homicide - United Mine Workers of America

the explosion, Massey made the illegal air
change. Ventilation controls in the LBB area
of the mine and at Ellis Construction Section
were compromised and a part of a regulator
was torn out. This change resulted in air being
pushed from the North Portal fan, then
traveling up the North Mains and North
Mains Parallels to the lower end of LBB. The
air then split at LBB with an undetermined
amount traveling in both directions (citation
attached).
After Massey made the illegal air
change at the construction site, just days
before the explosion, miners were
complaining about a lack of air, air reversals
and extremely hot conditions.
The Union maintains that once the
air change was completed at the Ellis
Construction site, the mine from that point
inby to the active working sections was being
ventilated by return air.
Some of the air exiting the Ellis
Construction site was coursed inby to the
active working sections, placing all the active
sections on return air. Members of the crew
immediately noticed the change when they
arrived at the Ellis Construction Section on
Monday, April 5, 2010. Roof Bolter Joshua
Williams stated that he asked the boss about
the air reversal, but received no explanation
(GIIP at page 19).
Other crew members returning to the
mine on April 5 noticed the air had reversed
in some areas and was almost stagnant in
others. Some of the miners questioned the
lack of ventilation. One noted, “It was hot in
there, miserably hot” (GIIP at page 16).
Because the configuration of UBB’s
ventilation plan was designed on a “push-pull
system,” the UMWA believes that when the
North Portal fan used to help ventilate the
active working sections was compromised,
the ventilation system was rendered
ineffective. Based on the UMWA’s
investigation and a review of Massey’s
violation history, illegal and intentional air
changes were a common practice at the mine.
The Bandytown fan continued to
operate, pulling air from the mine. This
explains the fact that air reversed in the Glory
Hole area where Construction Foreman Mike
Kiblinger noted, “Thursday before the
explosion... the dust was blowing out of the
mine. When he returned on Monday, the
crew was cutting the overcast, and the dust
was blowing into the mine..” (GIIP at page
19).
The decrease in velocity resulted in
the longwall gob not being pressurized as
required. Lacking the necessary air velocity
along the face inevitably permitted methane
to migrate onto the face. At the same time the
restrictions in the bleeder entries compounded
the problem. It is the UMWA’s opinion that
this is the most likely explanation for the
presence of significant methane in the area to
cause the ignition and subsequent explosion.
The investigation showed that poor
ventilation must have been a common
problem on the longwall. The investigation
revealed a burnt remnant of a brattice cloth
hanging from shield 173 towards the tailgate
drive where a methane sensor was mounted.
The curtain o-rings and tie wires indicate it
was hung from the shield towards the face to
a point just inby the tailgate methane sensor.
This would direct all the airflow towards the
sensor, diluting the methane at that point and
eliminating its ability to detect the actual
amount of methane on the face.
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