ISE SOHO Vulnerability Catalog Published - Independent Security ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Verizon FIOS Actiontec Model MI424WR-‐GEN3I <strong>Vulnerability</strong>: Cross-‐Site Request Forgery CVE: CVE-2013-0126 Description The Verizon FIOS Actiontec MI424WR-GEN3I router is susceptible to several Cross- Site Request Forgery attacks, which allows an attacker to forge HTML forms and execute actions on behalf of the target user. <strong>ISE</strong> created a proof of concept that when executed by an unsuspecting user, adds an administrator account and enables remote web and telnet management services. Attack Requirements ♦ The victim must have an active web application session on their FIOS router. ♦ The victim must follow a link crafted by an attacker (e.g., by clicking the link directly, or through some other mechanism such as redirection from a malicious site). ♦ The victim must have administrator permissions to render and execute the forged HTTP. Details All HTML forms present in the Verizon FIOS Actiontec MI424WR-GEN3I are susceptible to Cross-Site Request Forgery. Impact If an unauthenticated remote attacker is able to fool an authenticated user into clicking a malicious link, the attacker is able to launch an attack that has the capability to compromise the router. Recommendations to the Vendor ♦ Including an unpredictable token in each HTTP request submitted to the web server can prevent Cross-Site request forgery. At a minimum, these tokens should be unique to each user, but it is recommended that each HTML form contain unique tokens. ♦ In addition to HTML form tokens, HTTP referrer checking should be enabled.. ♦ Additional information for vendors regarding immediate and long term fixes for these issues can be found here: http://www.securityevaluators.com/content/casestudies/routers/#recommendationsVendors 6
Solution ♦ There currently is not a solution to this problem. ♦ DO NOT STAY LOGGED INTO THE ROUTER'S MANAGEMENT INTERFACE. ♦ Restrict access to WAN services such as remote management to prevent an attacker from gaining access if an attack is successful. Proof of Concept Exploit HTML FILE #1 Actiontec Verizon FIOS CSRF -‐ Adding Administrator User Please sit tight while we upgrade your router function CSRF1() {window.open("http://10.0.1.101/verizonFIOS2.html");};window.setTimeout(CSRF1,1000) function CSRF2() {document.verizonActiontec.submit();};window.setTimeout(CSRF2,1000) HTML FILE #2 Actiontec Verizon FIOS CSRF2 -‐ Add User w/ No Pass Confirmation 7
Page 1 and 2: Vulnerability Catalog Revision 1 SO
Page 3 and 4: Vulnerability: Cross-‐Site Sc
Page 5: Summary ISE has performed extensiv
Page 9 and 10: ♦ Advisory/Video: http://infosec4
Page 11 and 12: TRENDnet TEW-‐812DRU Vulnerab
Page 13 and 14: Disclosure Timeline ♦ 4/11/2013
Page 15 and 16: Vulnerability: Multiple Buffer O
Page 17 and 18: JavaScript or HTML code in the vict
Page 19 and 20: ♦ There currently is not a soluti
Page 21 and 22: } function _enable23(){ document
Page 23 and 24: TRENDnet TEW-691GR and TEW-692GR
Page 25 and 26: Proof of Concept Exploit TP-
Page 27 and 28: Details ♦ The router will need to
Page 29 and 30: ♦ 3/20/2013 - Contacted TP-Link
Page 31 and 32: Netgear WNDR4700 Vulnerability:
Page 33 and 34: all files stored on the external st
Page 35 and 36: References ♦ Advisory/Video: http
Page 37 and 38: Attack Requirements ♦ The attacke
Page 39 and 40: Figure 2 - WNDR4700 XSS #1 39
Page 41 and 42: Figure 4 -‐ WNDR4700 XSS #
Page 43 and 44: Linksys WRT310v2 Vulnerability:
Page 45 and 46: function PwN() {doc
Page 47 and 48: ♦ Advisory/Video: http://infosec4
Page 49 and 50: Figure 7 - EA6500 Malicious Co
Page 51 and 52: Solution ♦ There is no solution t
Page 53 and 54: Figure 9 - EA6500 DOM XSS Disc
Page 55 and 56: Content-‐Type: application/jso
Page 57 and 58:
D-‐Link DIR-‐865L Vulnera
Page 59 and 60:
document.DLINK.submit() Disc
Page 61 and 62:
Description The D-Link DIR-865L rou
Page 63 and 64:
♦ Additional information for vend
Page 65 and 66:
♦ 7/26/2013 - Public Disclosure R
Page 67 and 68:
these issues can be found here: htt
Page 69 and 70:
♦ Validate HTTP Basic Authenticat
Page 71 and 72:
Vulnerability: Authentication Byp
Page 73 and 74:
Impact If an unauthenticated attack
Page 75 and 76:
these issues can be found here: htt
Page 77 and 78:
attacker from gaining access if an
Page 79 and 80:
var wan_type=0; var wan_mac_addr
Page 81 and 82:
attacker from gaining access if an
Page 83 and 84:
Solution ♦ There currently is not
Page 85 and 86:
Disclosure Timeline ♦ 2/11/2013 -
Page 87 and 88:
var bEncPassword=1; var auto_che
Page 89 and 90:
Solution ♦ There is no solution t
Page 91 and 92:
studies/routers/#recommendationsVen
Page 93 and 94:
Solution ♦ There is no solution t
Page 95 and 96:
studies/routers/#recommendationsVen
Page 97 and 98:
# The ASUS RT-‐AC66U contai
Page 99 and 100:
try: print """ [*] Attempting
Page 101 and 102:
Disclosure Timeline ♦ 7/26/2013 -
show all

ISE SOHO Vulnerability Catalog Published - Independent Security ...

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?