Inspires - Department of Politics and International Relations ...

TheoryPracticeandStuart White examines theproper relationship betweenPolitical Theory and the realworld of politicsWhat is the proper relationshipbetween political philosophy andpolitics? Should political philosophyinform political action? Should politicalphilosophy learn from political action? Orare the two best thought of as unconnectedenterprises?These questions have begun to move tothe fore in contemporary political theory.One school of thought, which one can termdeliberative democrats (exemplified byJoshua Cohen, of Stanford University), seesan important role for philosophy in politics.Another, the realist school, is much moresceptical. For the realists (such as RaymondGeuss, of the University of Cambridge), aphilosophical politics is illusory and possiblydangerous.Let’s start with the deliberative democrats.In the background of much deliberativedemocratic thinking stands the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in particular The SocialContract (first published in 1762). Accordingto Rousseau, a state has legitimacy (only)when two conditions hold: (1) laws are madeon the basis of an inclusive decision-makingprocess in which all citizens have an equalright to participate; and (2) laws reflect asincere judgment as to what best promotes thecommon good of the citizen body. By commongood, is meant the shared basic interests ofthe citizenry (for example, in life, liberty andeconomic opportunity), taking each citizen’sinterests as having equal standing with thoseof any other. Because, according to this view,the legitimate exercise of state authority mustbe by reference to a judgment about thecommon good, and the common good is anormative concept which needs unpacking,the legitimate exercise of state authority has aphilosophical dimension.12Rousseau seems to presume that there isalways a single right answer to the questionof what best promotes the common good.Today’s deliberative democrats do notpresume this, on the whole, but they insist thatdemocratic citizens seek to justify laws andpolicies to one another in ethical terms. Fromthis standpoint, political philosophers can beunderstood as ‘democratic underlabourers’.Their work in analysing core normativeconcepts such as liberty and equality iswork that can, in principle, assist the demosin its ethical deliberations. The politicalphilosopher is not an expert who seeks to be a‘philosopher-king’, subverting popular self-rule.Rather, the political philosopher generatesresources for citizens to use in their practice ofpopular self-rule.Much of the recent work in academic politicalphilosophy, such as the theories of socialjustice developed by John Rawls (in A Theoryof Justice first published in 1971) and RonaldDworkin (in Sovereign Virtue first publishedin 2000), can be understood as democraticunderlabouring in this sense. The theoriesprovide resources which citizens can useto get a handle on the normative questionswhich lie at the root of policy questions. Forexample, if citizens are trying to address thequestion of how far the community should taxits members to provide welfare benefits andpublic services, they might look to Dworkin’stheory to get some guidance.Joshua Cohen, a prominent deliberativedemocrat, points out how important ‘politicalmorality’ is in democratic politics:Consider the response of Alberto Mora,the US Navy’s general counsel, to hisdiscoveries about the cruel treatment ofprisoners sanctioned by the Bushadministration in conducting its ‘war onterror’. Mora thought – and acted on thethought – that ‘cruelty’ and torture, thoughdifferent, are ‘equally pernicious’. ‘If crueltyis no longer declared unlawful…it altersthe fundamental relationship of man togovernment. It destroys the whole notionof individual rights. The [US] Constitutionrecognizes that man has an inherentright, not bestowed by the state or laws,to personal dignity, including the right tobe free of cruelty. It applies to all humanbeings, not just in America – even thosedesignated as ‘unlawful enemy combatants’.If you make this exception, the wholeConstitution crumbles’. Here we have anargument – concise and clear, whethercorrect or incorrect – about the equivalencein political morality of cruelty and torture,concluding that torture and cruelty are bothto be condemned as violations of a rightto personal dignity. Thoughts such as this,which prompted Mora to concerted action,belong as much to our political life as thepressures that led to the abuses he soughtto halt…(Joshua Cohen, Philosophy, Politics, Democracy(Harvard University Press, 2009), p.2).