Conscious Realism and the Mind-Body Problem - UCI Cognitive ...

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114 Hoffmanlutionary considerations suggest that they might be functionally similar,since we are of the same species. This is the reason this paper sometimesemploys the phrase “species-specific user interface”. But evolutionaryconsiderations also suggest that our interfaces will differ slightly in function,since random variations are essential for the operation of naturalselection. Functional coherence, then, between our user interfaces is notunexpected. However, the scrambling theorem establishes that functionalcoherence, or even functional identity, does not logically entail identity,or even similarity, between our conscious experiences (Hoffman 2006).9. ConclusionAbraham Pais, describing his interactions with Einstein, wrote (Pais1979, p. 907):Einstein never ceased to ponder the meaning of the quantum theory. . . We often discussed his notions on objective reality. I recall thatduring one walk Einstein suddenly stopped, turned to me and askedwhether I really believed that the moon exists only when I look atit.MUI theory says that the moon you see is, like any physical objectyou see, an icon constructed by your visual system. Perception is notobjective reporting but active construction. A perceptual constructionlasts only so long as you look, and then is replaced by new constructionsas you look elsewhere. Thus the answer to Einstein’s question, accordingto MUI theory, is that the moon you see only exists when you look atit. Of course the moon Jack sees might continue to exist even when themoon Jill sees ceases to exist because she closes her eyes. But the moonJack sees is not numerically identical to the moon Jill sees. Jack sees hismoon, Jill sees hers. There is no public moon.Something does exist whether or not you look at the moon, and thatsomething triggers your visual system to construct a moon icon. But thatsomething that exists independent of you is not the moon. The moonis an icon of your MUI, and therefore depends on your perception forits existence. The something that exists independent of your perceptionsis always, according to conscious realism, systems of conscious agents.Consciousness is fundamental in the universe, not a fitfully emerging latecomer.The mind-body problem is, for the physicalist, the problem of gettingconsciousness to arise from biology. So far no one can build a scientifictheory of how this might happen. This failure is so striking that it leadssome to wonder if Homo sapiens lacks the necessary conceptual apparatus.For the conscious realist, the mind-body problem is how, precisely,conscious agents create physical objects and properties. Here we have a
Conscious Realism and the Mind-Body Problem 115vast and mathematically precise scientific literature, with successful implementationsin computer vision systems.To a physicalist, the conscious-realist mind-body problem might appearto be a bait and switch that dodges hard and interesting questions:What is consciousness for ? When and how did it arise in evolution ? Howdoes it now arise from brain activity ? Now, the switch from the ontologyof physicalism to the ontology of conscious realism changes the relevantquestions. Consciousness is fundamental. So to ask what consciousnessis for is to ask why something exists rather than nothing. To ask howconsciousness arose in a physicalist evolution is mistaken. Instead we askhow the dynamics of conscious agents, when projected onto appropriateMUIs, yields current evolutionary theory as a special case. To ask howconsciousness arises from brain activity is also mistaken. Brains are complexicons representing heterarchies of interacting conscious agents. Soinstead we ask how neurobiology serves as a user interface to such heterarchies.Conscious realism, it is true, dodges some tough mysteries posedby physicalism, but it replaces them with new, and equally engaging,scientific problems.Nobody explains everything. If you want to solve the mind-body problemyou can take the physical as given and explain the genesis of consciousexperience, or take conscious experience as given and explain the genesisof the physical. Explaining the genesis of conscious experience fromthe physical has proved, so far, intractable. Explaining the genesis of thephysical from conscious experience has proved quite feasible. This is goodnews: We do not need a mutation that endows a new conceptual apparatusto transform the mind-body problem from a mystery to a routinescientific subject, we just need a change in the direction in which we seekan explanation. We can start with a mathematically precise theory ofconscious agents and their interactions. We can, according to the normsof methodological naturalism, devise and test theories of how consciousagents construct physical objects and their properties, even space andtime themselves. In the process we need relinquish no method or resultof physicalist science, but instead we aim to exhibit each such result as aspecial case in a more comprehensive, conscious realist, framework.AcknowledgmentsFor helpful comments on previous drafts I thank Mike Braunstein,Mike D’Zmura, Michael Gokhale, Perry Hoberman, David Hoffman, JulieKwak, John Pyles, Barron Ramos, Whitman Richards, Kim Romney, JaySaul, Ian Scofield, Carol Skrenes, and Ken Vaden. I also thank two anonymousreviewers whose comments helped greatly to clarify the paper. Themathematical formulation of conscious realism was developed in collaborationwith Bruce Bennett and Chetan Prakash. To both I am most
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Page 32 and 33: 118 HoffmanGibson J.J. (1950): The
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