INTRASTATE PREEMPTION

2007] INTRASTATE PREEMPTION 1153Boise. 196 A majority of the Idaho Supreme Court handily invalidated Boise’sordinance as invalidly conflicting with state law. 197 While the Boise City Codewas more stringent with respect to emergency vehicle drivers, requiring themto display flashing lights and sound their sirens, it was less stringent withrespect to drivers of all other vehicles, in that it did not require them to yield toemergency vehicles that only flashed lights or sounded sirens, whereas statelaw required them to yield in either instance. Barsness, like Rantapaa,demonstrates that the rather formalistic “more stringent” test can sometimesprovide limited direction in preemption cases.2. “Occupation of the Field”In addition to “prohibit/permit,” a frequent argument made by opponents oflocal ordinances is that a city has legislated in a field “fully occupied” by statelaw. 198 The more pervasively and thoroughly the legislature has regulated afield, the argument goes, the more likely it is that the state legislature“intended” to completely occupy that field and not allow for local regulation,even if the legislature never expressly declared such an intent. 199 Opponents of196 Id.197 Id. A dissenting justice, however, argued that the Boise City Code was valid becauseit was simply more stringent than state law on the matter of what conduct was required ofemergency vehicles Id. at 1046-47 (Bistline, J., dissenting) (finding no conflict in the laws“because emergency vehicles may easily comply with both”).198 See, e.g., City of Tucson v. Consumers for Retail Choice, 5 P.3d 934, 937 (Ariz. Ct.App. 2000); O’Connell v. Stockton, 162 P.3d 583 (Cal. 2007); Bd. of County Comm’rs ofDouglas County v. Bainbridge, Inc., 929 P.2d 691, 709 (Colo. 1997); Dempsey v. City ofDenver, 649 P.2d 726, 727-28 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982) (finding an intent to occupy the field ofemployee compensation); Modern Cigarette v. Town of Orange, 774 A.2d 969, 977-78(Conn. 2001); City of Buford v. Georgia Power Co., 581 S.E.2d 16, 17 (Ga. 2003); Goodellv. Humboldt County, 575 N.W.2d 486, 493 (Iowa 1998); Sch. Comm. of York v. Town ofYork, 626 A.2d 935, 939 (Me. 1993); Allied Vending, Inc. v. City of Bowie, 631 A.2d 77,87 (Md. 1993); Multnomah Kennel Club v. Dep’t of Revenue, 666 P.2d 1327, 1332 (Or.1983); Barnhill v. City of N. Myrtle Beach, 511 S.E.2d 361, 363 n.2 (S.C. 1999); SummitWater Distribution Co. v. Mountain Reg’l Water Special Servs. Dist., 108 P.3d 119, 123(Utah Ct. App. 2005).As in the case of conflict preemption, criminal defendants charged under local lawfrequently seek to argue for the local law’s invalidation under occupation of the field. See,e.g., Horton v. Oakland, 82 Cal. App. 4th 580 (2000), overruled by O’Connell, 162 P.3d at590-92; Pierce v. Commonwealth, 777 S.W.2d 926, 928 (Ky. 1989); People v. Llewellyn,257 N.W.2d 902, 903 (Mich. 1977). In a few states, such as North Carolina, criminal casesprovide most of the grist for the implied preemption mill. See Greene v. City of Winston-Salem, 213 S.E.2d 231, 236 (N.C. 1975).199 See, e.g., City of Northglenn v. Ibarra, 62 P.3d 151, 163 (Colo. 2003); HillsboroughCounty v. Fla. Rest. Ass’n, 603 So. 2d 587, 591 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Anamizu v. City& County of Honolulu, 481 P.2d 116, 118 (Haw. 1971); Lexington Fayette County Food &Beverage Ass’n v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov’t, 131 S.W.3d 745, 750 (Ky.2004); Talbot County v. Skipper, 620 A.2d 880, 885 (Md. 1993); People v. Llewellyn, 257