92intention to return to work part-time at SFDG on March 17, 2011. (Id. 30, 31.) On March 8,2011, SFDG’s lawyer responded by letter to Maremont’s attorneys advising <strong>the</strong>m that SFDG hadfilled Maremont’s position after her fa<strong>the</strong>r directed SFDG employees not to contact Maremontunder any circumstances. (Id. 32.) By March 17, 2011, a public relations firm known as “JoChicago” had hired Maremont. (Id. 33.)SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDSummary judgment is appropriate “if <strong>the</strong> movant shows that <strong>the</strong>re is no genuine disputeas to any material fact and <strong>the</strong> movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P.56(a). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if “<strong>the</strong> evidence is such that a reasonablejury could return a verdict for <strong>the</strong> nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). In determining summary judgmentmotions, courts must view facts “in <strong>the</strong> light most favorable to <strong>the</strong> nonmoving party only if <strong>the</strong>reis a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). The party seeking summary judgment has <strong>the</strong> burden of establishing that<strong>the</strong>re is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). After “a properly supported motion for summaryjudgment is made, <strong>the</strong> adverse party ‘must set forth specific facts showing that <strong>the</strong>re is a genuineissue for trial.’” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (quotation omitted).ANALYSISI. Lanham Act Claim – Count IIn Count I of her Second Amended Complaint, Maremont alleges a false associationclaim, also known as a false endorsement claim, under <strong>the</strong> Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §6
931125(a)(1)(A). As <strong>the</strong> Seventh Circuit explains, one basis of liability under <strong>the</strong> Lanham Actincludes “false representations concerning <strong>the</strong> origin, association or endorsement of goods orservices through <strong>the</strong> wrongful use of ano<strong>the</strong>r’s distinctive mark, name, trade dress or o<strong>the</strong>rdevice.” L.S. Heath & Son, Inc. v. AT & T Info. Sys., Inc., 9 F.3d 561, 575 (7th Cir. 1993).“False endorsement occurs when a person’s identity is connected with a product or service insuch a way that consumers are likely to be misled about that person’s sponsorship or approval of<strong>the</strong> product or service.” Stayart v. Yahoo! Inc., 651 F.Supp.2d 873, 880 (E.D. Wis. 2009). Morespecifically, a “false endorsement claim based on <strong>the</strong> unauthorized use of a [person’s] identity isa type of false association claim, for it alleges <strong>the</strong> misuse of a trademark, i.e., a symbol or devicesuch as a visual likeness, vocal imitation, or o<strong>the</strong>r uniquely distinguishing characteristic, whichis likely to confuse consumers as to <strong>the</strong> plaintiff’s sponsorship or approval of <strong>the</strong> product.”Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1110 (9th Cir. 1992).In <strong>the</strong>ir motion for summary judgment, Defendants argue that Maremont does not havestanding to bring her false endorsement claim. To have standing to bring a false endorsementclaim under <strong>the</strong> Lanham Act, a “party need not be in direct competition with a defendant tochallenge a defendant’s practices under <strong>the</strong> Act,” instead, “[a]ll a commercial party needs tobring suit under <strong>the</strong> Act is a ‘reasonable interest to be protected’ against activities that violate <strong>the</strong>Act.” Dovenmuehle v. Gilldorn Mortgage Midwest Corp., 871 F.2d 697, 700 (7th Cir. 1989)(citations omitted); see also Waits, 978 F.2d at 1110. In short, to satisfy <strong>the</strong> prudential standingrequirement for a false endorsement claim under <strong>the</strong> Lanham Act, a plaintiff must show an intentto commercialize an interest in her identity. See Dovenmuehle, 871 F.2d at 700; Stayart, 651F.Supp.2d at 881.7
- Page 1 and 2: 47ALI-ABA Topical CoursesTrade Secr
- Page 3 and 4: 49Michael L. Banks (argued)Morgan,
- Page 5 and 6: 51quality and cost, labor issues, a
- Page 7 and 8: 53continued working for Bimbo notwi
- Page 9 and 10: 55to work for a competitor. Moreove
- Page 11 and 12: 57Following Botticella’s departur
- Page 13 and 14: 59D. Procedural HistoryAfter Bottic
- Page 15 and 16: 61consequently, also is the primary
- Page 17 and 18: 63a. Information in Bimbo’s code
- Page 19 and 20: 651. Air Products and Inevitable Di
- Page 21 and 22: 67sale of on-site gas during his em
- Page 23 and 24: 69regardless of those secrets’ te
- Page 25 and 26: 71hired to provide information he o
- Page 27 and 28: 73would be “virtually impossible
- Page 29 and 30: 75preliminary injunction on its tra
- Page 31 and 32: 77The Superior Court subsequently s
- Page 33 and 34: 79have rested on its interpretation
- Page 35 and 36: 815. Adverse Inference Based on Bot
- Page 37 and 38: 83needed in the interim to protect
- Page 39 and 40: 85which he or she is best suited.
- Page 41 and 42: 87IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COU
- Page 43 and 44: 89made in their Rule 56.1 statement
- Page 45: 91during Maremont’s absence, a gu
- Page 49 and 50: 95damages based on their representa
- Page 51 and 52: 97Therefore, the Court denies both
- Page 53 and 54: 99judgment as to Count III of the S
- Page 55 and 56: 101CONCLUSIONFor the these reasons,
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- Page 93 and 94: 139Sasqua Group, Inc. v. Courtney,
- Page 95 and 96: 141Sasqua Group, Inc. v. Courtney,
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143Sasqua Group, Inc. v. Courtney,
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145Sasqua Group, Inc. v. Courtney,
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149Sasqua Group, Inc. v. Courtney,
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153Sasqua Group, Inc. v. Courtney,