Laughlin v. Nouveau Body & Tan - The Appellate Record

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Case: 09-10622 Document: 00511064454 Page: 18 Date Filed: 03/29/2010No. 09-10622the oblique action, the creditor exercises a right belonging to the debtor in thedebtor’s name. In the revocatory action, the creditor acts in his own name toenforce his own rights. . . . We construe the [renunciation annulment action tobe] a revocatory action.”) (citations omitted; emphasis added).13Thesestatements reinforce the notion that article 967 does not recognize or createrights in the renouncing successor.Third, the procedure of the article 967 action does not disturb ourinterpretation of article 967. Louisiana courts require that the creditor whoseeks an annulment petition the court to reopen the succession. See Neuhauser,579 So. 2d at 439 (“[The creditor] petitioned the court to reopen the successionof the [decedent] alleging that the creditor was a judgment creditor of the[renouncing successor].”); id. at 442 (“‘When the creditors wish to be authorizedto accept a succession, which their debtor . . . has renounced to their prejudice,they must present a petition to the judge of the place where the succession isopened . . . .’” (quoting former article 1071)); Succession of Wagner, 746 So. 2d696, 697 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (creditor “filed petitions to annul [successor’s]renunciation” in trial court and the trial court annulled the renunciation,13The Louisiana Supreme Court has also analogized the renunciation annulment actionto a “revocatory action” under article 2036 of the Louisiana Civil Code. See Neuhauser, 579So. 2d at 440; D.A. Pearce–Reggio, Note, Succession of Neuhauser: Death of a Creditor’sClaim, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1101, 1109 (1992) (“[T]he [Louisiana Supreme C]ourt adhered to theprevailing view that an action to annul a debtor’s renunciation falls within the ambit of therevocatory action.”); see also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2036 (“An obligee has a right to annul anact of the obligor, or the result of a failure to act of the obligor, made or effected after the rightof the obligee arose, that causes or increases the obligor’s insolvency.”). And we have notedthat “under Louisiana and federal bankruptcy law, the trustee may avoid [a debtor]’s transfers. . . by stepping into the shoes of a[ ] . . . creditor who could have avoided those transfers bymeans of a revocatory action.” Traina v. Whitney Nat’l Bank, 109 F.3d 244, 246 (5th Cir. 1997)(emphasis added). We derived this authority from § 544(b) of the bankruptcy code whichstates that a “trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property or anyobligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable under applicable law by a creditor holdingan unsecured claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1). Given the posture of the present case, however,we need not consider whether the trustee has the power under § 544(b)(1) to bring an article967 action.18
Case: 09-10622 Document: 00511064454 Page: 19 Date Filed: 03/29/2010No. 09-10622allowing creditor to accept the inheritance). The court overseeing the successionthen determines whether the annulling creditor may accept the renouncedinterest, in the debtor’s name. See Neuhauser, 579 So. 2d at 440 (“‘The creditorsof the heir who . . . renounces an inheritance . . . can be authorized by the judgeto accept it, in the name of the debtor and in his stead.’” (quoting predecessorto article 967)); id. at 442 (“‘If . . . it is proved to the judge that the debtor . . . hasrenounced [the succession] to the prejudice of his creditors, [the judge] is boundto authorize the creditors to accept it in his stead.’” (quoting predecessor toarticle 967)). To effect the acceptance, ‘the judge has the duty “‘to causeimmediately to be made an inventory of the effects of the succession, to appointan administrator to manage them, sell them, and pay the creditors.’” Id.(quoting predecessor to article 967). Satisfaction of the creditors thus comesfrom the succession estate, by petitioning the court, not the renouncing debtor,for relief. This procedural form is consistent with the interpretation that therenouncing successor does not have rights in the succession post-renunciation;the renouncing successor has, by definition, renounced his interest and thatinterest has “accrete[d] to those persons who would have succeeded to them ifthe successor had predeceased the defendant.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 964. Theprocedure of the article 967 action does not clearly suggest that the articlerecognizes or create rights for the renouncing successor in the renouncedinheritance interest.Article 967 does not clearly recognize or create rights in the renouncingsuccessor. Thus, we cannot say that the relation back fiction is disturbed by thatarticle.Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the Louisiana law isdistinguishable from the Texas law at issue in Simpson, with respect to ourpresent inquiry. Given such ambiguity and the fact that we must construe the§ 727(a)(2) exceptions to discharge strictly against the creditor and liberally infavor of the debtor, we follow Simpson and hold that Laughlin did not transfer19
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Laughlin v. Nouveau Body & Tan - The Appellate Record

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