What is Practical Knowledge? - Prof. Dr. Christoph Lumer

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Lumer: What Is Practical Knowledge? 20Finally there are feeling-induced intrinsic valuations (Lumer 1997, sect. 3; 2000, pp. 477-493). Ifthe various emotions and corporal feelings we have are sufficiently strong they induce specificintrinsic desires that are a response to the respective feelings. Rage e.g. induces an intrinsic desireto punish the object with which one is furious; pity induces the intrinsic desire to have the otherperson's situation improved; happiness induces the intrinsic desire that other persons share thishappiness etc. Feeling-induced intrinsic valuations are created automatically by the respectivefeelings and their intensity co-varies positively with these feelings, however with some delay. Thisimplies that once the feeling has faded away the feeling-induced intrinsic desire vanishes too.How does the strategy for identifying practical knowledge deal with these empiricallypresent criteria for intrinsic valuation? The three criteria are parts of the psychologically possibleways to decide. So we have to choose among them according to the 'stability with respect to newknowledge' and 'mere temporal stability' criteria. Now, following the just given description of thethree criteria for intrinsic valuation, it is obvious that feeling-induced intrinsic valuations are nottemporally stable. Therefore, they have to be discarded as a normatively unacceptable way toestablish intrinsic valuations. Furthermore, simple hedonism is not stable with respect to newknowledge because, as a reaction to acquiring knowledge about the possibilities of manipulation, itis replaced by corrected hedonism. This implies that simple hedonism must also be discarded.Finally, corrected hedonism for its part seems to be stable and should, therefore, be adopted as theonly normatively acceptable way to establish personal intrinsic valuations. As a consequence wecan define '(personal) intrinsic desirability' in a corrected hedonist manner. (The intrinsicdesirability of x for a person s is y iff x is a feeling of s and if y corresponds to the corrected integralof x's sensed intensity over time.) This definition and its justification as well as its correctapplication are the first pieces of practical knowledge identified by the analytic-synthetic approach.With the help of this definition of 'intrinsic desirability' and applying the just sketchedstrategy to the other parts of our ways of deciding, we then can define the most precise notion of a'prospect desirability' of states of affairs and thereby also the 'prospect desirability' of actions andthe predicate 'that an action a for the subject s is the best among a certain set of options a°'. Inaddition, less precise but easier to apply secondary notions of a 'best option' should be defined andrules for their use be established etc.What, finally, would prudential practical knowledge then be? The knowledge that a certainoption for oneself is the best one in one of the normatively defined meanings of 'good' would be thecentral and primary prudential practical knowledge. In addition, the knowledge about the mostimportant premises of such optimality judgements would be less central, prudential practicalknowledge, e.g. the knowledge about the value of the single options or about importantconsequences of these options. Furthermore, the knowledge about which decision criterion tofollow in a certain situation would be practical knowledge. Finally, all the meta-knowledge that hasan impact on determining the various definitions of 'prospect desirability' and of 'intrinsicdesirability' as well as the knowledge that leads to determining the rules for applying these conceptswould be prudential practical knowledge, e.g. the knowledge about the possibility of manipulating
Lumer: What Is Practical Knowledge? 21feelings or the knowledge about the instability of feeling-induced intrinsic desires. All this ispractical knowledge because under empirically realizable epistemic conditions and as a centralelement of deliberation it motivates at least a bit to act or to abstain from acting in a certain wayand, in addition, from a prudential normative perspective it should motivate so. Here I could notenlarge upon moral knowledge. However, section 4 roughly outlined how foundationally internalistconcepts of the moral good and our duties may be justified. Knowledge about these criteria andtheir justification as well as knowledge about what is morally good or obligatory, according tothese criteria, is practical knowledge as well.ReferencesAllais, M. (1953): Le comportement de l'homme rationnel devant le risque. Critique des postulats etaxiomes de l'école américaine. In: Econometrica 21. Pp. 503-546.Bentham, Jeremy (1780/1789): An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Ed. byJ. H. Burns; H. L. A. Hart. London; New York: Athlone Press 1970. London: Methuen1982. lxx; 343 pp.Boyd, Richard N. (1988): How to Be a Moral Realist. In: Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (ed.): Essays onMoral Realism. Ithaca; London: Cornell U.P. Pp. 181-228.Brandt, Richard B (1979): A Theory of the Good and the Right. Oxford: Clarendon. xiii, 362 pp.Brink, David Owen (1986): Externalist Moral Realism. In: Southern Journal of Philosophy,Supplement 24. Pp. 23-41.Brink, David O[wen] (1989): Moral realism and the foundation of ethics. Cambridge [etc.]:Cambridge U.P. xii; 340 pp.Brink, David Owen (1997): Moral Motivation. In: Ethics 108. Pp. 4-32.Camerer, Colin [F.] (1995): Individual Decision Making. In: John H. Kagel; Alvin E. Roth (eds.):The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Pp.587-703.Clemen, Robert T.; Terence Reilly (2001): Making hard decisions with Decision Tools. Duxbury:Pacific Grove. xxv; 733 pp.Dancy, Jonathan (1993): Moral Reasons. Oxford; Cambridge, USA: Blackwell. viii; 274 pp.Dancy, Jonathan (2000): Practical Reality. Oxford: Oxford U.P. xii; 187 pp.Davidson, Donald (1980): A Unified Theory of Thought, Meaning, and Action. In: Idem: Problemsof Rationality. Oxford [etc.]: Clarendon Press 2004. Pp. 151-166.Gigerenzer, G[erd]; R[einhard] Selten (eds.) (2002): Bounded Rationality. The Adaptive Toolbox.Cambridge, Mass.; London: MIT Press. xv; 377 pp.Hume, David (1739/1740): A Treatise of Human Nature. Ed., with an Analytical Index by L. A.Selby-Bigge. 2nd ed. with text revised and variant readings by P. H. Nidditch. Oxford:Clarendon 1888; 2 1978. xix; 743 pp.
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