War Texting - iSEC Partners

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Basebands Accept Hayes AT• For network requests▫ AT+UHTTPC▫ AT^SISS▫ AT^USORF• For Incoming/Outgoing SMS▫ AT+CMGL▫ AT^SMGL
The Payload May Be Encrypted• If the payload is encrypted▫ Finite ways the Application can generate a key• IMSI• GSM Timestamp• IMEI• Static Secret• Value from Network (Data or SMS)• Some applications don’t even encrypt
Page 1 and 2: War TextingWeaponizing Machine 2 Ma
Page 3 and 4: whatis iSEC Partners?
Page 5 and 6: No, really.• Cellular enabled pil
Page 7 and 8: But, it’s helping people.• Alzh
Page 11 and 12: Everything will be a computer
Page 13: I would have owned ATMs, but…
Page 16 and 17: Attack methods• Firmware Over The
Page 18 and 19: FOTA• A methodology for▫ Devisi
Page 20: FOTA Conclusion?
Page 24: Long Range Baseband Attacks• Bene
Page 30 and 31: So, what should we do?
Page 32: Find Architectural Commonalities•
Page 37 and 38: How do we extract it?• Use datash
Page 41 and 42: Next, we reverse.
Page 43 and 44: Some light Hardware Hacking?
Page 45 and 46: Revenge (REVerse ENGinEering)• uC
Page 50: Disassembling & Emulating = Easy•
Page 53 and 54: Point of Reverse Engineering?• De
Page 55 and 56: Building a Fingerprint
Page 57 and 58: Why Device Profile?• SMS is Noisy
Page 60 and 61: Quick Example: iPad on AT&T• Prov
Page 62 and 63: Overall Strategy?• Identify targe
Page 64 and 65: Zoombak “Advanced GPS Tracker”
Page 66: Intercept Initial AT Command Set•
Page 70: Zoombak Network Fingerprint• HLR
Page 73: Zoombak Overall Result?
Page 77 and 78: Strategy• Target industry• Doc
Page 81 and 82: Embedded Security is Hard.
Page 83 and 84:
All tools can be downloaded…• h
Page 85:
“Even if my collar bones crush or
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War Texting - iSEC Partners

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