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TOYOTA FAILED TO COMPLY WITH STANDARDSOperating System Standards“OSEK” is an international standard API! Specifically designed for use in automotive software! Multiple suppliers of OSEK operating systems! Compliance tests ensure compatibility across versionsBut Toyota’s Rx-OSEK850 version is non-standard!!!! Was not certified as OSEK compliant! Certified products for V850 were available by 200228Barr Chapter RegardingToyota’s Operating Systems
TOYOTA FAILED TO COMPLY WITH STANDARDSAutomotive Industry Coding GuidelinesMISRA-C – motor industry software reliability coding rules for C! By 2004, “the successes and global use of MISRA-C across automotive,aerospace, medical, and other industries has been staggering.”! “In Japan, we have worked with representatives of JSAE, JAMA, …”From 2002-2004, Toyota said in public they followed MISRA-C! But NASA reported > 7,000 violations of some of the rules (p. 29)! I checked the full set and found > 80,000 in violations in 2005 Camry L4Toyota’s coding standard only has 11 MISRA-C rules! And 5 of those are violated in the actual source code29Barr Chapter RegardingToyota’s MISRA-C Violations
Page 3 and 4: BOOKS BY MICHAEL BARR1ed: 1999; 2ed
Page 5 and 6: MY REVIEW OF TOYOTA’S SOURCE CODE
Page 7 and 8: ELECTRONIC THROTTLE CONTROLfdadg7
Page 9 and 10: SAFETY-CRITICAL SYSTEMSNot all embe
Page 11 and 12: SUMMARY OF 2005 CAMRY L4 CONCLUSION
Page 13 and 14: NASA DID NOT RULE OUT UA BY SOFTWAR
Page 15 and 16: 15ETCS SOFTWARE MALFUNCTION
Page 17 and 18: TOYOTA’S OPERATING SYSTEM (OSEK)1
Page 19 and 20: MEMORY CORRUPTION AND TASK DEATH0Bi
Page 21 and 22: SOFTWARE CAUSES OF MEMORY CORRUPTIO
Page 23 and 24: TOYOTA’S SPAGHETTI CODETOY-MDL049
Page 25 and 26: STACK ANALYSIS FOR 2005 CAMRY L4OSE
Page 27: TOYOTA’S MAJOR STACK MISTAKESToyo
Page 31 and 32: TOYOTA FAILED TO COMPLY WITH STANDA
Page 33 and 34: NASA’S SOFTWARE AREAS OF CONCERNN
Page 35 and 36: LAYER 1: MIRRORING OF CRITICAL VARI
Page 37 and 38: UA VIA MEMORY CORRUPTIONTask X deat
Page 39 and 40: LAYER 2: DTCs AND FAIL-SAFE MODESNA
Page 41 and 42: TOYOTA’S DEFECTIVE WATCHDOG DESIG
Page 43 and 44: TOYOTA FAILED TO REVIEW MONITOR CPU
Page 45 and 46: MONITOR CPU IS LAST LINE OF UA DEFE
Page 47 and 48: TOYOTA’S INADEQUATE SOFTWARE PROC
Page 49 and 50: NASA SOUGHT WHAT BARR GROUP FOUND
Page 51 and 52: INDIVIDUAL TASK DEATH OUTCOMES(Watc
Page 53 and 54: UA FOREVER IF BRAKE ON AT TASK DEAT
Page 55 and 56: OTHER SIMILAR INCIDENT CRITERIAVehi
Page 57: TOYOTA’S EXPERT HAS NOT REBUTTEDM

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