Public Sector Reform - Norman Flynn's

Concept Paper: Public Sector Reform – An IntroductionBox 2: Public Management Culture Change in SingaporeSingapore was run as a typical ‘developmental state’, with politicians and the civil service promotingnational development through the private sector and through over 500 ‘Government Linked Companies’.Social policy and savings were managed through a nearly unique Central provident Fund, a fullyfunded social security fund. The Economic Development Board, set up before independence, wasthe main instrument promoting private sector investment. In the early 1990s the Prime Minister led aprocess of transforming the civil service by adapting a ‘service culture’. A series of reforms was implemented,including aligning salaries to those paid in the private sector, in order to attract good peopleto the civil service and to avoid corruption, a performance appraisal scheme with bonuses for highachievement, quality control circles. In the mid 1990s two further reforms were introduced: a serviceimprovement unit was set up in the Prime Minister’s Office to pursue improvements in productivity andquality throughout the public service, budgeting and various aspects of personnel management weredecentralised to departments and agencies. Budgeting was to be based on the production of outputsand results, the personnel systems were to be modified to produce service and quality orientation.These reforms were consolidated into ‘PS21’, Public Service for the 21 st Century, a scheme for producingservice excellence and continuous improvement. Together, the initiatives on quality, performanceand service constitute a system-wide cultural change.There are state formations in which parallel structures occur alongside the official organs of the state: theCommunist party in China and the Islamic hierarchy in Iran are two examples. Reforms that threaten the existence orauthority of the parallel structures are unlikely to succeed, whilst changes require the approval of the religious or partyapparatus. Outsiders need to understand which of the hierarchies, and which individuals within them, are de factoresponsible for decision-making in relation to reform. In the case of patrimonial states, discussed later, the question ismore complex: the outsider needs to understand the networks and the important points in the networks.In Weberian states, where the position of the state employees is defined and protected by law, including constitutionallaw, reforms that require changes in behaviours by public servants may require legislation before they can be implemented.Reforms that require an increase in discretion or initiative, or that require the introduction of markettypemechanisms will be more difficult in states running on Weberian principles of hierarchy and control byrules and law. In addition to the formal, legal constraints that such an arrangement implies, this type of bureaucracycreates a culture of its own: the individuals internalise a belief that their function is to occupy their position and applylaws and rules. If a reform requires them to take initiative, behave in ways not governed by rules, or exercise increaseddiscretion, all of these behaviours will be constrained by underlying beliefs.18