second deposition <strong>in</strong> which she op<strong>in</strong>ed for the first time that Petitioner’saggravation was permanent <strong>and</strong> not temporary.Constitutions, Statutes, Regulations, <strong>and</strong> Rules: Montana CodeAnnotated: 39-71-407. Where Petitioner’s treat<strong>in</strong>g physician op<strong>in</strong>ed thathis work was the fourth <strong>in</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> five factors which contributed tohis degenerative disk disease, the Court concluded that Petitioner’s workwas not the “lead<strong>in</strong>g cause” as set forth <strong>in</strong> § 39-71-407(13), MCA.Occupational Disease: Proximate Cause. Where Petitioner’s treat<strong>in</strong>gphysician op<strong>in</strong>ed that his work was the fourth <strong>in</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> five factorswhich contributed to his degenerative disk disease, the Court concludedthat Petitioner’s work was not the “lead<strong>in</strong>g cause” as set forth <strong>in</strong> § 39-71-407(13), MCA.Injury <strong>and</strong> Accident: Aggravation: Temporary Aggravations. WherePetitioner’s treat<strong>in</strong>g physician op<strong>in</strong>ed that his condition was a temporaryaggravation <strong>of</strong> his pre-exist<strong>in</strong>g condition, another medical expert op<strong>in</strong>edthat Petitioner’s job duties did not aggravate his back condition, <strong>and</strong>Petitioner acknowledged that he had never been pa<strong>in</strong> free s<strong>in</strong>ce aprevious <strong>in</strong>dustrial accident <strong>and</strong> that he suffers frequent, temporaryexacerbations <strong>of</strong> his condition with <strong>in</strong>nocuous activity, the Court concludedthat Petitioner’s work activities only caused a temporary aggravation <strong>of</strong> hispre-exist<strong>in</strong>g condition <strong>and</strong> that liability for any medical treatment wouldrest with the <strong>in</strong>surer liable for Petitioner’s previous <strong>in</strong>dustrial <strong>in</strong>jury. 1 The trial <strong>in</strong> this matter occurred on January 10, 2012, at the Workers’Compensation Court <strong>in</strong> Helena, Montana. Petitioner Marlon Clapham was present <strong>and</strong>was represented by David T. Lighthall. Joe C. Maynard represented Respondent Tw<strong>in</strong>City Fire Insurance Company (Tw<strong>in</strong> City). 2 Exhibits: I admitted Exhibits 1 through 25 without objection. 3 Witnesses <strong>and</strong> Depositions: The parties agreed that the depositions <strong>of</strong> Clapham,L<strong>in</strong>da Slavik, Robert V<strong>in</strong>cent, M.D., Richard Hibbs, Cole Johanssen, Gregory D. Hutton,M.D., Elizabeth “Liz” McDonald, RN, CCM, <strong>and</strong> two depositions <strong>of</strong> Valerie Chyle, APRN,FNP, can be considered part <strong>of</strong> the record. 1 Clapham was sworn <strong>and</strong> testified.1 I will consider Chyle’s depositions subject to my rul<strong>in</strong>g on Tw<strong>in</strong> City’s <strong>Motion</strong> <strong>in</strong> Lim<strong>in</strong>e.<strong>Order</strong> <strong>Resolv<strong>in</strong>g</strong> Respondent’s <strong>Motion</strong> <strong>in</strong> Lim<strong>in</strong>e <strong>and</strong>F<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> Fact, Conclusions <strong>of</strong> Law <strong>and</strong> <strong>Order</strong> - 2
4 Issues Presented: The F<strong>in</strong>al Pretrial <strong>Order</strong> sets forth the follow<strong>in</strong>g issues: 2Issue One: Whether Petitioner suffered a compensable occupationaldisease <strong>in</strong> his employment with Crown Parts pursuant to §§ 39-71-407(9)<strong>and</strong> (10), MCA.Issue Two: Whether Respondent complied with the statutoryrequirements <strong>of</strong> § 39-71-608, MCA.Issue Three: If Respondent did not comply with the statutoryrequirements <strong>of</strong> § 39-71-608, MCA, whether its noncompliance constitutesa waiver <strong>of</strong> its defenses <strong>and</strong> acceptance <strong>of</strong> the claim.Issue Four: If Respondent did not comply with the statutory requirements<strong>of</strong> § 39-71-608, MCA, whether a penalty should be assessed on allbenefits payable to Petitioner pursuant to § 39-71-2907, MCA.Issue Five: If Respondent did not comply with the statutory requirements<strong>of</strong> § 39-71-608, MCA, whether Petitioner should be awarded hisreasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to §§ 39-71-611 or -612, MCA.Issue Six: Whether Petitioner suffered a non-work related <strong>in</strong>jury on orabout November 27, 2010, which proximately caused his currentcondition.Issue Seven: Whether the non-work related <strong>in</strong>jury on or aboutNovember 27, 2010, severed liability per § 39-71-407, MCA.Issue Eight: Whether Petitioner’s condition was caused <strong>and</strong>/oraggravated by driv<strong>in</strong>g from Stevensville to Bill<strong>in</strong>gs.RESPONDENT’S MOTION IN LIMINE 5 On December 21, 2011, Tw<strong>in</strong> City filed a motion <strong>in</strong> lim<strong>in</strong>e <strong>and</strong> asked the Court toexclude op<strong>in</strong>ions <strong>of</strong>fered by Valerie Chyle, APRN, FNP, dur<strong>in</strong>g her December 16, 2011,deposition. In particular, Tw<strong>in</strong> City objected to two pieces <strong>of</strong> Chyle’s testimony: herop<strong>in</strong>ion that Clapham was not at maximum medical improvement (MMI) when he felt a“pop” <strong>in</strong> his back while prepar<strong>in</strong>g to shovel snow at home, <strong>and</strong> her op<strong>in</strong>ion that2 F<strong>in</strong>al Pretrial <strong>Order</strong> at 13.<strong>Order</strong> <strong>Resolv<strong>in</strong>g</strong> Respondent’s <strong>Motion</strong> <strong>in</strong> Lim<strong>in</strong>e <strong>and</strong>F<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> Fact, Conclusions <strong>of</strong> Law <strong>and</strong> <strong>Order</strong> - 3