TOWN OF CASTLE ROCK v. GONZALES: THE ... - Stetson University

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File: Hasanbasic.362.GALLEY(d).doc Created on: 9/25/2007 2:29:00 PM Last Printed: 9/26/2007 10:35:00 AM884 <strong>Stetson</strong> Law Review [Vol. 36state arbitrarily deprived her of this property right by having anunofficial policy of refusing to enforce such orders. 22The United States District Court for the District of Coloradodismissed Ms. Gonzales’ complaint, holding that because the restrainingorder required police to have probable cause, which“implicitly requires . . . discretion,” the Colorado restraining orderstatute was discretionary, and thus Ms. Gonzales had no FourteenthAmendment “property” interest in its enforcement. 23 TheUnited States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed,holding that the restraining order imposed a mandatory enforcementduty on police officers, and that Ms. Gonzales had a constitutionalproperty entitlement to have it enforced, of which shewas deprived without procedural due process. 24 In a split 7–2 decision,the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit’s decisionand held that the Colorado police officers did not have a duty toenforce the restraining order, that Ms. Gonzales had no propertyinterest in having the restraining order enforced, and that thepolice officers did not infringe upon Ms. Gonzales’ due processrights by their refusal to enforce the order. 25This Article will examine the Court’s analysis in Castle Rockand attempt to dispute persuasively the findings of the majority.Part II will provide an overview of past caselaw that either directlyor indirectly affected the issues confronted by the Court inCastle Rock. Part III will discuss the reasoning of the majority,concurrence, and dissent in Castle Rock. Part IV will criticallyanalyze the Court’s findings, arguing that the majority misconstruedthe effect of the restraining order and decided a federalconstitutional issue with very little legal support or precedent.22. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 755.23. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 2001 U.S. D. LEXIS 26018 at *14 (D. Colo. Jan. 22,2001). Notably, the district court did not find that the enforcement order was discretionarydue to its statutory language. Although the district court made the same judgment as theSupreme Court in Castle Rock, the district court’s analysis of the Colorado restrainingorder provision did not mirror the Supreme Court’s analysis at all. In fact, the districtcourt referred to the shall arrest/seek warrant provisions as “obligations” on the policeofficers, but simply found that those obligations were not mandatory because they wereinvoked only upon probable cause. Id. In contrast, the Supreme Court stated that probablecause was not an issue, but nevertheless held that the shall arrest/seek warrant languageitself was not strong enough to create a mandatory duty on police officers. Castle Rock, 545U.S. at 760.24. Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1117.25. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 760, 768.
File: Hasanbasic.362.GALLEY(d).doc Created on: 9/25/2007 2:29:00 PM Last Printed: 9/26/2007 10:35:00 AM2007] Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales 885Next, this Part will discuss the negative consequences that theCastle Rock precedent may create, including unnecessary and uninformedSupreme Court decisions, weakened state legislatures,and particular disadvantages to women. Part V will discuss thepossibility of fashioning a state-law remedy to the constitutionalproblem that was framed in Castle Rock. Finally, Part VI will concludethat the best remedy in Castle Rock lies in between the opinionsof the majority and dissent.II. HISTORICAL AUTHORITYThe central issue in Castle Rock—whether or not a state restrainingorder statute created a property entitlement to enforcement—wasan issue of first impression for the Court. 26 However,many sub-issues that were critical to the outcome of theCastle Rock decision did have precedent to provide guidance. Suchissues included whether or not deference should be given to lowerfederal courts’ interpretations of state law within their jurisdiction,27 how to interpret restraining order statutes with mandatoryenforcement language, 28 and what factors have historically beenused to determine whether or not a property entitlement exists. 29Additionally, the Court addressed the issue of whether or not anindividual may be entitled to state protection under substantive,rather than procedural, due process in a prior case. 3026. See id. at 755 (discussing the fact that the Supreme Court “left a similar questionunanswered” in DeShaney, due to the petitioner’s failure to preserve the issue on appeal).27. See id. at 757 (demonstrating the majority’s view that deference to lower federalcourts as to state law “can be overcome”); id. at 775 (giving examples of cases applyingdeference) (Stevens, J., dissenting).28. See id. at 782–783 (discussing cases with similar statutes at issue from other jurisdictions)(Stevens, J., dissenting).29. See id. at 766 (showing the majority’s view that cases have implicitly requiredproperty entitlements to have some ascertainable monetary value); id. at 789–790 (listingseveral cases that have interpreted the requirements of property entitlements) (Stevens,J., dissenting).30. See id. at 755 (stating that “[w]e held that the so-called ‘substantive’ component ofthe Due Process Clause does not ‘require the State to protect the life, liberty, and propertyof its citizens’” (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195)).
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