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18 THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL WORKSIn view of the ‘layered’ character of Popper’s epistemological works,it does not seem appropriate to examine them one by one. Such aprocedure would involve inevitable repetitions and threaten to createchronological confusion, for Popper updated and revised his writings notonly when they were first published many years after their originalcomposition, but also when the world impact of his thought made neweditions necessary over a period of time. It therefore seems preferable togive an account of the epistemological theory that Popper constantlyupheld over a number of decades, whilst indicating the significantadditions or revisions made to the theory. Mention will also be made—especially in the chapter below dealing with the metaphysical works—of any allusions to be found in his writings of the later period, when hereworked his epistemology in evolutionist terms.The reader should finally be warned that towards the end of thepresent section, we shall touch upon an essay which, though conceivedas a work of political philosophy, also constitutes a bridge betweenPopper’s epistemology and his strictly political thinking. This, ofcourse, is The Poverty of Historicism, which the author once describedin a strong spirit of self-criticism as ‘one of my stodgiest pieces ofwriting’ (UQ: 114). The title alludes to Marx’s Poverty of Philosophy,itself an ironical play on Proudhon’s Philosophy of Poverty. Just asMarx intended his text as a critique of Proudhon, so does Popper aim tocriticize Marx and his historicist philosophy. But on the same occasion,he elaborates a methodology of the historical and social sciences, withwhich he had not previously concerned himself in writing because hisattention had been focused on the natural sciences.THEORY OF KNOWLEDGETo begin, let us consider what Popper meant by theory of knowledgeduring the 1930s: he argued that it constituted ‘a general doctrine of themethod of empirical science’ or a ‘general theory of method’ (BG:423); it was ‘the theory of the knowledge and science of science’ (BG:424). As we shall see, Popper came to consider his theory to be lesslimited in scope, and eventually defined it not only as a methodology ofscience but as a theory valid for any form of knowledge and learning,although science always remained his main point of reference, theparadigm of rational knowledge. In a lecture prepared for delivery atStanford in August 1960, the philosopher stated that his ‘interest is notmerely in the theory of scientific knowledge, but rather in the theory ofknowledge in general’ (CR: 216).