42 INTERCHANGE FEESto be beneficial after the fact only when estimated benefits are well above estimated costs beforethe fact. 27<strong>The</strong>re is accordingly no sound basis for adopting a regulation that before the fact seems as likelyto harm consumers as to benefit them. <strong>The</strong>refore, it is not reasonable for the Board to implementthe proposed rules given that it cannot support a prediction that the rules would make consumersbetter <strong>of</strong>f <strong>and</strong> that its own staff acknowledges that it is possible that the rules would make consumersworse <strong>of</strong>f.Our analysis indicates that imposing the proposed rules would not be the coin toss between“consumers win <strong>and</strong> consumers lose,” as the staff’s conclusion that it was “hard to anticipate”might suggest. In fact, consumers <strong>and</strong> small businesses who use checking accounts would likelylose tens <strong>of</strong> billions <strong>of</strong> dollars in the 24 months after these rules would take effect.III. DEBIT CARDS LOOK LIKE A MARKET SUCCESS, NOT AMARKET FAILUREDebit cards have been embraced by both merchants <strong>and</strong> consumers <strong>and</strong> look like a real successstory for the American economy. <strong>The</strong>y have enabled consumers to reduce the number <strong>of</strong> paperchecks they write. Debit cards have provided a convenient payment method for physical <strong>and</strong> onlinetransactions that does not require the use <strong>of</strong> credit. As former Board Vice Chairman DonaldKohn noted in 2006, “[c]onsumers seem to view debit cards as a natural progression from cash <strong>and</strong>checks because they are a convenient electronic means <strong>of</strong> making payments without incurring theadditional debt <strong>of</strong>ten associated with credit card use.” 28Consumers use debit cards in part to help manage their budgets, 29 as they tend to use thesecards to pay for daily necessities such as groceries, gasoline, <strong>and</strong> drugstore purchases. 30 Debit cardshave enabled consumers to conveniently pay for these items electronically, without using cumbersomepaper checks. Virtually all depository accounts now come with a debit card. According tothe Federal Reserve’s 2009 Survey <strong>of</strong> Consumer Payment Choice, 77.6 percent <strong>of</strong> consumers hada debit card. 31 Consumers surveyed by Federal Reserve that year also reported that debit cards are27See, generally, A.E. Kahn, <strong>The</strong> <strong>Economics</strong> <strong>of</strong> Regulation, II (New York: Wiley, 1971), ch. 7 <strong>and</strong> W.K. Viscusi, J.E. Harrington,<strong>and</strong> J. M. Vernon, <strong>Economics</strong> <strong>of</strong> Regulation <strong>and</strong> Antitrust, 4th Ed (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), ch. 10 (“Viscusi et al. 2005”).28Donald L. Kohn , “Evolution <strong>of</strong> Retail Payments <strong>and</strong> the Role <strong>of</strong> the Federal Reserve,” presentation At the WesternPayments Alliance 2006 Payments Symposium, Las Vegas, Nevada, September 11, 2006, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kohn20060911a.htm29Drazen Prelec <strong>and</strong> George Loewenstein (1998), “<strong>The</strong> Red <strong>and</strong> Black: Mental Accounting <strong>of</strong> Savings <strong>and</strong> Debit,” MarketingScience, 17:1.30Kevin Foster, Erik Meijer, Scott Schuh, <strong>and</strong> Michael A. Zabek (2010), “<strong>The</strong> 2008 Survey <strong>of</strong> Consumer Payment Choice,”Federal Reserve Bank <strong>of</strong> Boston, Public Policy Discussion Papers, at table 23 (“Foster et al 2010”).31Schuh, Scott, “Basic Facts about U.S. Consumer Payment Choice,” Presented at the MPD Payments Innovation Institute,Harvard Faculty Club, Cambridge, MA, November 5, 2010 (“Schuh November 2010 Presentation”).
<strong>The</strong> Economic Principles for Establishing Reasonable Regulation 43more widely accepted than checks by merchants. 32 As indicated previously, in 2009, consumersmade 36.6 billion debit card transactions, with a total value <strong>of</strong> $1.421 trillion.Merchants have also embraced debit cards. Many merchants have installed PIN pads so thatconsumers who wanted to pay with their PIN codes could do so. According to the acquirers whoresponded to the Board’s survey conducted in late 2010, 22 percent <strong>of</strong> merchant locations areable to accept PIN debit transactions <strong>and</strong> it is our underst<strong>and</strong>ing from knowledgeable sourcesin the industry that these account for about 80 percent <strong>of</strong> volume. 33 Since May 2003, retailershave been able to choose whether or not they wanted to take signature debit cards in addition tocredit cards. 34 It is our underst<strong>and</strong>ing from conversations with knowledgeable industry observersthat virtually no merchants accepting credit cards have decided to forgo debit cards. Becausefewer people are pulling out their checkbooks to pay, checkout lines move faster for everyone.Competition authorities, courts, <strong>and</strong> economists <strong>of</strong>ten look at output, prices, innovation, <strong>and</strong>quality <strong>of</strong> service to assess how well a market is working. 35 On all these metrics it appears that thedebit card business has performed well. 36Debit card output has increased dramatically. <strong>The</strong> number <strong>of</strong> transactions on debit cardsgrew at an average rate <strong>of</strong> 17.8 percent per year between 2000 <strong>and</strong> 2009, while the dollar value <strong>of</strong>transactions increased at an average annual rate <strong>of</strong> 18.4 percent during that decade. <strong>The</strong> fraction <strong>of</strong>households that use a debit card increased from 17.6 percent in 1995 to 67 percent in 2007 basedon the Board’s Survey <strong>of</strong> Consumer Finance. 37 More recently, the Survey <strong>of</strong> Consumer PaymentChoice conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank <strong>of</strong> Boston found that 77.6 percent <strong>of</strong> consumershad debit cards in 2009. 38Debit card prices have fallen for consumers. At the beginning <strong>of</strong> the 2000s many bankscharged consumers fees for using their debit cards. By the end <strong>of</strong> the 2000s few consumers paidfor using their debit cards, <strong>and</strong> about two-thirds <strong>of</strong> debit cards came with rewards that providedconsumers with value for using their cards. 39Debit card features <strong>and</strong> services have exp<strong>and</strong>ed for consumers. Introduced to most US consumersin the mid-1990s, debit cards began to acquire a range <strong>of</strong> value-added services beginning32Foster et al 2010, at table 27.33<strong>The</strong> Proposed Rules, at p. 81725.34Prior to that date MasterCard <strong>and</strong> Visa required merchants that entered into contract to accept their cards to honorall cards that consumers presented with their br<strong>and</strong>s on them regardless <strong>of</strong> whether they were debit or credit cards.Wal-Mart <strong>and</strong> other merchants wanted to be able to take credit cards but not signature debit cards. <strong>The</strong> card networksagreed to this as part <strong>of</strong> a settlement <strong>of</strong> the lawsuit.35We are not suggesting that any <strong>of</strong> these metrics provides definitive evidence about whether there is or is not a marketfailure <strong>of</strong> some sort. <strong>The</strong>y are <strong>of</strong>ten used, however, as indicators <strong>of</strong> market performance along with other metrics.36In addition published signature debit card interchange rates for merchants have been roughly constant since mid-2004<strong>and</strong> for most networks published PIN debit card interchange fee rates have changed much since mid 2005. See <strong>The</strong> FedEconomists (2009), at figure 3.37Loretta J. Mester (2009), “Changes in the Use <strong>of</strong> Electronic Means <strong>of</strong> Payment: 1995-2007,” Business Review, pp. 29-37.38Schuh November 2010 Presentation.39“2009 Debit Card Rewards – Consumer Insights,” Consumer Loyalty Study , First Data, April 2009.
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CONTRIBUTORSHoward ChangPrincipal w
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BIBLIOGRAPHYAckerberg, Daniel A., a
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Bibliography 211Chakravorti, Sujit
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Bibliography 213Gans, Joshua S., an
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Bibliography 215Katz, Michael L., a
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Bibliography 217Rochet, Jean-Charle
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