Chinese Economic Development

xxii Introductionneeded to be transformed simultaneously in order to achieve modernity. Out ofthis analysis was born the Cultural Revolution.Accordingly, precisely because Mao gave such importance to state, culture andsuperstructure, it makes no sense to assess the course of Chinese developmentin narrowly economic terms. The mature Mao was many things, but he was notan economic determinist: culture was no superstructural epiphenomenon whichresponded passively to changes in the economic base. On the contrary, culturalchange was a necessary precondition for economic modernization. We will neverunderstand the purpose – still less appreciate the significance – of late Maoismfor the Chinese countryside unless we recognize that point. Furthermore, as weshall see, it is state and cultural failure over the last decade which is beginningto undermine China’s economic and social progress. Unless reversed, this failuremay ensure that it is India, not China, which becomes the next Asian giant. Themodernization of China is not only an economic enterprise but also a projectwhich requires a fundamental reshaping of society and a reordering of priorities.Mao understood that very well. His successors may understand it too, but theybaulk at what it means.This book also differs from much of the recent literature in that it provides anextension discussion of the Maoist era. It is not fashionable to do this any more.Very little has been written in recent years about the economics of either the 1950s,or the 1960s and 1970s. Instead, most of the scholarly literature on Chinese politicaleconomy published over the last two decades (it is less true of the narrowlypolitical literature; the Culture Revolution itself has attracted renewed attention)has restricted its compass to the years after Mao’s death. True, such works oftenstart with a background chapter in which the Chinese economy has been broughtto the brink of collapse by the mid-1970s. But it is readily apparent that the interestof the author lies elsewhere; it is the post-1978 years, so the subtext proclaims,which demand our attention, not the wasted years of Mao. Maoism is an unfortunateinterlude in the pages of contemporary scholarship, a period best forgotten.This neglect of Maoist era is unfortunate for two reasons. First, a great dealof information has been released on the Maoist era over the last two decades,yet very little of this has been properly assessed. If we are to appreciate whathas happened in China over the last half century, we have to understand whathappened before 1978. Second, the Maoist era is a fascinating one, much moreso than the decades after Mao’s death. This is because the development strategypursued over the last thirty years has been remarkably orthodox. To be sure, aswe will see, it has not been a model of capitalist economic development, at leastuntil 1997. Nevertheless, the focus of policy has been on promoting economicgrowth, and on doing so by exclusively economic means. It is hard to get veryexcited about this; capitalist economies are two a penny. The same cannot be saidabout Maoism, which was a unique attempt at social and economic transformation.Moreover, whatever one may feel about the Maoist strategy, it was nothing if notambitious in intent and breathtaking in scope. Few leaders have sought to remaketheir country in the way that Mao did. To be sure, it was an era of catastropheas well as triumph. But Mao at least recognized the scale of the challenge, and