Reading List - University of Toronto Scarborough

Strategic interaction (game theory)* Gibbons, R. (1997), “An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory”, The Journal of EconomicPerspectives, 11(1): 127-149* Palacios-Huerta, I. (1996), “Professionals Play Minimax”, Review of Economic Studies, 70(2): 395-415* Thaler, R.H. (1988), “Anomalies: The Winner’s Curse”, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2(1):191-202Axelrod, R. (1980), “Effective Choice in the Prisoner’s Dilemma”, Journal of Conflict Resolution,24(1): 3-25Bosch-Domènech, A., Montalvo, J.G., Nagel, R. and Satorra, A. (2002), “One, Two, (Three),Infinity, ... : Newspaper and Lab Beauty-Contest Experiments”, American EconomicReview, 92(5): 1687-1701Cho, I-K. and Kreps, D.M. (1987), “Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria”, The Quarterly Journalof Economics, 102(2): 179-221Dal Bó, P. (2005), “Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: experimental evidence frominfinitely repeated games”, American Economic Review, 95(5): 1591-1604Fehr, E. and Gächter, S. (2000), “Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity”, TheJournal of Economic PerspectivesKandori, M. (1992), “Social Norms and Community Enforcement”, The Review of EconomicStudies, 59(1): 63-80Kovash, K. and Levitt, S.D. (2009), “Professionals Do Not Play Minimax: Evidence from MajorLeague Baseball and the National Football League”, MimeoKreps, D.M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J. and Wilson, R. (1982), “Rational Cooperation in theFinitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma”, Journal of Economic Theory, 27(2): 245-252Kreps, D.M. and Wilson, R. (1982), “Reputation and Imperfect Information”, Journal of EconomicTheory, 27(2)Myatt, D.P., Shin, H.S. and Wallace, C. (2002), “The Assessment: Games and Coordination”,Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 18(4): 397-417Myerson, R.B. (1999), “Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory”, Journal ofEconomic Literature, 37(3), 1067-1082Selten, R. (1975), “The Chain Store Paradox”, Theory and Decision, 9(2): 127-159Information* Akerlof, G.A. (1970), “The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the MarketMechanism”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3): 488-500* Farrell, J. and Rabin, M. (1996), “Cheap Talk”, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10(3): 103-118* Spence, M. (1973), “Job Market Signaling”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87(3): 355-374Crawford, V.P. and Sobel, J. (1982), “Strategic Information Transmission”, Econometrica, 50(6):1431-1451Diamond, P.A. (1971), “A Model of Price Adjustment”, Journal of Economic Theory, 3(2): 156-168Lazear, E.P. (2000), “Performance Pay and Productivity”, American Economic Review, 90(5): 1346-1361Klein, B. and Leffler, K.B. (1982), “The Role of Market Forces in Assuring ContractualPerformance”, The Journal of Political Economy, 89(4): 615-641