Electoral systems and the protection and participation of minorities

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greater than 10 per cent of the population the over/underdivision is 8/9.When it comes to representation by electoral systemthe 20 PR cases (of List, MMP and STV) perform best,although only under MMP (New Zealand and Germany)are minorities, on average, over-represented (and this isdriven by New Zealand). However, if one removes Estoniaand Latvia from the List PR group, the averageover-representation of a minority moves to a system highof 0.9. This gives us a better picture of the general trendunder List PR, because those two cases so dramaticallyunder-represent Russian-speakers that they skew the entireresults. This is more due to lack of voting rights for Russiansin the Baltic states than the effect of List PR. Theworst system on average for minority groups is SNTV,but again this is driven by the single case of Afghanistanin 2005.A more nuanced analysis of Table 1 finds that: (1)white people are consistently over-represented when theyare a small minority in a former colonial possession(Namibia, Polynesia, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe).(2) Small but economically powerful communities ofSouth Asians are often slightly over-represented in Africa(although not in Fiji and the UK). (3) When consociationalregimes are based on List PR elections (as theyusually are), significant minority players can be over-represented(e.g. French-speakers in Belgium andSwitzerland; whites, coloureds and Indians in SouthAfrica).Regionally, minority groups are more likely to be overrepresentedin Western Europe and North America (14groups were over-represented, 12 under-represented) thanin the Asia-Pacific region (4/8) or Eastern/Central Europe(4/7). While the eight minorities in African states in Table1 (five countries) are all over-represented to some degree.Some of the most vibrant minority representation can befound in the large district closed List PR systems of theNetherlands and South Africa, where members of minoritiessit on the government and opposition benches, in bigand small parties. The 15 minority MPs in the Dutchparliament in 2006 were born in Curaçao (1), Suriname(4), Morocco (3), Iran (1), Turkey (5) and Portugal (1),and they are distributed between six parties: CDA (4), GL(4), PVDA (3), VVD (2), D66 (1), LPF (1). In SouthAfrica’s first two democratic elections, minority white,coloured and Indian MPs were included in both the governingAfrican National Congress (ANC) and oppositionparties. In 1994 and 1999 the ANC was catapulted tovictory on the back of a vote which was overwhelminglyrooted in the black South African community, but inboth parliaments white MPs constituted 10–15 per centof the ANC’s caucus. Only half of the Zulu TraditionalInkatha Freedom Party MPs were Zulu, the others beingwhite and Indian South Africans.Even though they use an FPTP system, Canada displaysa significant number (21) of minority MPs (notincluding Francophone Canadians) who cut across partyboundaries: there are 12 Liberals, 6 Conservatives, 2 BlocQuébecois and 1 NDP.In a natural experiment in Britain and Ireland, theMMP system does not perform quite as well as the NewZealand case might suggest. Currently the United Kingdomoperates MMP elections for the Scottish and Welshand London Assemblies, List PR for elections to theEuropean Parliament and FPTP for the House of Commons.Northern Ireland uses STV to elect its Assemblyand List PR for Euro elections. As Table 4 shows, thereare five Asian MEPs (6.4 per cent) elected by List PR,which compares well to their 2.9 per cent populationshare. There is a record high of 10 (1.5 per cent) AsianMPs in the House of Commons elected by FPTP, butonly a single British-Asian Assembly member in the Scottish,Welsh and London Assemblies combined. Incontrast, there are only five (0.8 per cent) Afro-CaribbeanMPs at Westminster, a single London Assembly member,and none in Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland. TheEuropean Afro-Caribbean and Asian MPs demonstrateparty balance – two Labour, two Conservative, one LiberalDemocrat; in the House of Commons thirteenAfro-Caribbean and Asian Labour MPs are joined by twoTories, while both Afro-Caribbean and Asian LondonAssembly members are Labour.Table 3: Ethnic diversity of South African National Assembly 1994–9AfricanWhiteColouredIndian1994 numbers1994 %1999 numbers1999 %% population20852232587513032104261329742109338225314 ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND THE PROTECTION AND PARTICIPATION OF MINORITIES
Table 4: Minority representation in the United Kingdom 2006Ethnicity(% of population)Assembly – No. (%)(Scotland: 129, Wales: 60, London: 25)European– No. (%) (78)Commons– No. (%) (646)MMPSTVList PRFPTPScotlandAsian (1.4)Afro (0.2)00––0010WalesAsian (1.1)Afro (0.2)00––0000LondonAsian (14.1)Afro (10.1)1 (4.0)1 (4.0)––0023N. IrelandAsianAfro––000000EnglandAsianAfro––––5072TotalAsian (4.4)Afro (2.0)1 (0.5)1 (0.5)005 (6.4)010 (1.5)5 (0.8)NOTE: FIGURES FROM 2001 CENSUS; 2003 SCOTTISH, WELSH AND NORTHERN IRISH ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS; 2005 UK HOUSE OF COMMONS ELECTIONS. ENGLAND EXCLUDES LONDON.Communal/reserved seats 18When minorities fail to ‘naturally’ make it into legislaturesthrough the regular electoral competition, they canbe guaranteed some representation through reserved ‘communallybased’ seats. Historically, the practice of seatreservation, or gerrymandering, for distinct ethnic groupshas long existed. The recognition and desire for somedegree of pre-arranged descriptive representation is not anew thing – nor is it a construct unencumbered by pastmis-use. In the mid twentieth century, many coloniallyadministered territories reserved seats for indigenousgroups, either as a transitional mechanism, a strategy ofdivide and rule or, less subtly, as a sop to keep them frompower. Anglophone possessions ceded a modicum ofpolitical influence by giving a minority of the legislativeseats to the majority population – notably in India,Kenya, Nyasaland and Tanzania. The apartheid governmentin South Africa took the logic of electoralconfinement to the extreme in their Tricameral parliamentof the 1980s, which had separate houses of parliament forColoureds, Whites and Indians but, tellingly, not for themajority black South African population.After the Second World War, separate communal rollswith reserved seats became integral parts of power-sharingsolutions to end internal conflicts; for example, Lebanonin 1943, Cyprus in 1960 and Zimbabwe in 1980. Suchsolutions were ‘rediscovered’ in the 1990s in the compartmentalizedethnic arrangements of peace pacts in Bosniaand Kosovo. At the beginning of the twenty-first century,the aura around reserved communal seats and specialmechanisms has swung to a point where it is seen as moreprogressive to reserve seats or ensure by some method thatminorities are descriptively represented in legislatures. Theaura of paternalism and tokenism, however, continues totaint such affirmative action mechanisms.The use of reserved seats and special arrangements inparliaments around the world is widespread. Table 5 lists32 countries (or autonomous territories) reserving seatsfor communal/minority groups, or where some specialmechanism is in place. One can add to these cases thePalestinian Authority and the Tibetan government inexile. Another two nations, Ukraine and the UnitedStates, engage in explicit race-conscious districting andat least four, Denmark, Finland, Tanzania and the UnitedKingdom, have historically over-represented definedethnic territories in their popularly elected lower houses(this is above and beyond the practice of federal nationsover-representing smaller territorial units in their upperhouses).ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND THE PROTECTION AND PARTICIPATION OF MINORITIES15
Page 6 and 7: to fully realize minority interests
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Page 34 and 35: ReferencesBaldwin, C., Minority Rig
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