Here - Nixon Tapes

Volume 40, lssue l, April 2009

PassportThe Nmtsletter of the society for Histdrians of American Foreign RelationsEditorial Office:Mershon Center for International Securitv Studies1501 Neil AvenueColumbus OH 113201passport@osu.edu67+292-1681. (phone)61,4-292-2407 (fax)Executive DirectorPeter L. Hahn, The Ohio State UniversitvEditorMitchell Lemer, The Ohio State University-NewarkProduction Editorfulie RojewskiEditorial AssistantsMatt Yates, The Ohio State UniversityRyan Irwiry The Ohio State UniversityCover Photo"candid photo of President Nixon at his desk in the oval office" Jrne 23,1972, photo courtesy ofNational Archives and Records Administration, WHPO C946,1(1g).Editorial Advisory Board and Terms of Appoinhnent:Andrew Prestory University of Cambridge (2N7-2009)W. Taylor Fain, University of North Carolina-Wlmington (2008-2010)Elizabeth Kelly Gray, Towson University (2009-2011)_ Passporf is published three times per year (April, Septernber, fanuary), by the Society for Historians of AmericanForeign Relationq and is distributed to all members oi the Society. Submissionshouli be sent to the attention of theeditor, and a.r'e acceptable in all formats, although electronic copyby email to passport@osu.edu is preferred. Submissionsshouldfollow the guidelines arHculated in the Clr icago nianual of Style.'Manuscripts accepted for publicaHontvill be edited to conform to Passport stylq space limitations, and othei requirements. The author is resionsible foraccuracy and for obtaining all permissions necessary for publication. Manuscripts $'ill not be returned. Inter€stedadvertisers can find relevant information on the web ie http:/ /www.shafr.org/newsletter/passportrates.htm,cancontact the editior. The opinions exp*r*ff13flr#i:do not necessarily reflect the opinioniof SHAFR or ofThe editors of Passport wish to acknowledge the generous support of rhe ohio state university,The Ohio State University-Newarlg and the Mershon Centei-for Intemational SecuriW Studi6i.@2009 SHAFR

PassportThe Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign RelationsVolume 40, Number 7, April 20f9In This Issue4 John W. Dean III and the Watergate Cover-Up, RevisitedLuke A. Nichter10 The CIA and Declassification: the Role of the Historical Review PanelRobert fervisL5SHAFR Visits Falls ChurchFrank Costigliola and Paul Kramer76 A Roundtable Discussion of William C. Inboden's Religion and AmericanForeign Policy, 7945-796O: The SouI of ContainmentLloyd C. Gardner, Laura A. Belrnonte, David Zietsrna Se*r lacobs,and Williarn C. Inboden34 Promoting International Education: An Academic Vice-President'sApproachKenneth W. Rea36 SHAFR Council Meeting Minutes40 The Diplomatic Pouch51 The Last WordPeter L. HahnPasspor'' AprilzoogPage 3

]ohn W. Dean III and the WatergateCover-!p, RevisitedLuke A. Nichter1\n Super Bowl Sunday- set the standard for Nixon tapetra$caiption. His permanent loss ofL/lffifiI['f*ff^hearing is the price he paid so thatthat otherwise unimportant detail generations could leam from hisvividly-l picked up the Nao Yorft groundbreaking work. NumerousTinres from my driveway and was critics have raised obiections-notsurprised to find a front-page all of them legitim ab-to Abuse olarticle about Watergate. After all, Pouer and to Kutler's earlier bookthis is 2009, not 194. The article, The Warc of Watergafe, but Klingman'stohn Dean at lssue in Nixon Tapes article, which was submitted forFeud" by Patricia Coheo explored publication to the American Historicalaccusations of misrcpresentation Reurao, is the most pointed and theleveled at a prominent scholar most prcminent of these critiques.6of Watergate,ln it KlingmanStanley Kutler,accuses Kutlerby historian Peter Working in the pre-digitalof knowinglyKlingman. Itera with difficult analog conflating twoquickly set off a cassette audiotapeg Kutler set tape transcriptsheated debate in the standard for Nixon tape from March 16the blogosphere.l transcription. His permanent loss 1973, both ofStan Katz of of hearing is the price he paid so which containedPrinceton's that generations could learn from discussionsWoodrow Wilson his groundbreaking work. between PresidentSchool called theNixon and CounselTimes article ato the President"non"u*,."2Iohn Dean called it the John Dean about managing thework of "Wate4gate revisionisb."3 Watergate cover-up. Kutler didHowevex, acknowledging the by now indeed append an excerpt from awell-defined lines of demarcation moming conversation in the Ovalwith rcspect to Watetgate, Joan Office7 io a trarscriptS that beginsHoff admonished fellow bloggers with an excerpt from an entirelythat "what this dispute over the different telephone conversationNixon tapes really demonstrates is from the evening of the same day.9the need for an authoritative set of That fact is no longer in dispute,transcriptions which the govemment although it is unclear how or whyshould have undertaken years ago."4 Kutler conflated these conversations.After all, nowhere in this controversv Klingman aqgues that as a resultdid actual evidmce featureof Kutler's conflation and selectiveprominently either in the Times editing Dean appeared to be mucharticle or in the discussion following less involved in the cover-up than hethe article's publication.really was.At the heaft of the latest installment Other critics, including l.enof a decadeold debate is the work Colodny (Si/enl Coap), Russ Bakermost oftm cited on the Watergate (Family of Seoets), and foan Hoffportion of the Nixon tapes,(Nixon Reconsfulered) have alsoKutler's Abuse of Potoer.s Working accused Kutler of misrepresentingin the pre-digital era with difficult Watergate in Aba6e of Pouer.Theanalog cassette audiotapes, Kutler case they and Klingman make isPage 4complicated, but there are three maincnarges:1. The Nixon tapes for the periodbeginning March 13, 1973 are criticalto our understanding of how theWhite Hous€, including Dearlplanned and managed the entirecover-up.lo ltris period begins withNixon first learning on March 13of White House involvement inthe Watergate break-in and endswith the famous "Cancer on thePresidency" conversaHon on March21. The "Cancef conversation isNixon's "Rubicon moment " in thatit set Dean on ar irreversible pathfrom Nixon's defender-h-chief towhistleblower-in-chief. Within weeksDean hired his own criminal defunseattomey, was dismisse4 and inJune began his marathon testimonythat expedited the unraveling of theNixon presidency. ln Abuse of Pottnr,Kutler leaves out critical Nixon/Dean conversation material fromMarch 13, 1Z and 20. All of theseconversationt coincidentally or not,werc devastatint to Dean. They showthat not only was Dean one of theoriginal planners of the "intelligenceoperaHon" that led to the breakinbut that he hired Liddy in partbecause of Liddy's successful breakinat the office of Daniel Ellsberg'spsychiatrist. In Kutler's defense,sorne of these conversations werc notpart of his lawsuit to force release ofthe "Abuse of Goverffnent Powe/'Nixon tape segments.2. As noted in Patricia Cohen'sNew York Times article, Kutler's criHcscfaim that he confl atfrs, in Abus ofPoroer, two distinct conversations thatoccurred nine hours apart on March76,7973.Passrror, April 2009

3. Finally, and this is whereKutler's critics move from evidenceto speculation, they aqgue that hedeliberately omitted and conflatedsome conversations and that heharbors some motive for dointso. While this distortion does notchange what we know about thebreak-in and only marginallyaffucts our understanding of thepr€sidenfs role in the cover-up,Kutler's critics argue that Dean'srole on the path to "Cancer" has notreceived a proper exposition and thatKutler's presentation of the criticalweek leading up to the "Cancer"conversation is skewed. As toalletations that he made Dean appearmore benign on the path to "Cancer"than he really was, Kutler admits thathe is friends with Dean but notes thatthe friendship blossomed only afterthe publication of Abuse of Pozoer . Ol.course, this is the weakest part of theaqgument made by Kutler's critics.Without evidence of any acts ofcommission or omission, Kutler mustbe taken at his word.The articf e in ahe NeTo Yotk Timesobviously piqued the interestof many scholarg but they havereserved iudgment, pending furtherevidence. Most people I believewerc as surprised as I was to seethis article on the front page of theIinas, and they simply want toknow whether this issue is worthpaying attention to and whethertherc is anything "new" in this longstandingfeud. The real story, whichhas been missed up to this point, isthat we now have the technology tos€ate improved transcriptions ofthe tapes and disseminate them andthe original audio recordings widely.It is therefore time for a completereevaluation of Watergate, and it isto be hoped that the Times articlewill prompt such a reevaluation,focusing in particular on the week ofMarch 13 and the path to "Cancer."This rcexamination should do whatlournalist David Frost was unableto do in the 1970s and what StanleyKutler was unable to do in the 190s.As someone with the necessarybackground in the Nixon tapes, Ifelt that I had a responsibility to tryto explain the dispute to a wideraudience, and when I was asked toPnssF i April 2009do so, I agreed without reservation. Icertainly do not seek to insert myselfin a debate that began before I startedgraduate school. I happen to believethat Klingman's fight against Kutleris misplaced and that the real story isnot Kutler, although he plays a rolein it. But readershould come to theirown conclusions. To help them dothat I have assembled all the uncutaudio files and conversations fromthe six Nixon/Dean conversationsnow under scrutiny from the week ofMarch 13. For reasons of space, I havecondensed the hours of audio andhundreds of pages of transcripts here.Much of this material is being madereadily available to the public for thefirst time.March 13, 1973, 12142-2:00 p.m.Oval Office 87&.014; Richard Nixon,John W. Dean IIl, H.R. HaldemanllDean informed the presidentthat the week of March 13 might beperhaps the single most importantweek of the cover-uo.l2 Theconversation began is a generaldiscussion about why it would notbe in the oresidenfs inter€sto allowlive testimony of Nixon aides beforethe Ervin Watergate committee.Nixon and Dean wanted to prctectaides Dwitht Chapin and ChuckColson, then in the private sector,because of the likelihood that theinvestigation would more quicklyDenetrate the White House. Thediscussion tumed towards otherWhite House vulnerabilities. TheCampaign to Re-Elect the President(CREEP) had paid a minor toinfiltrate "peace groupg" a schemethat had r€cently unraveled because"he apparently chatted about itaround school," Dean surmised."It's absurd. It reallv is. He didn't doanything illegal."l3'Dean also toldNixon that a speech supporting theadministration would be plantedin Senator Barry Goldwater's officefor deliverv on the Senate floor. "lfsin the mill/' Dean said.l4 Nixonasked Dean if he needed any helpfrom the Intemal Revenue Service,ostensibly to maintain disciplinewhile managing the cover-up. Deanresponded that he already had accessto the IRS and had a mechanismto bypass Commissioner JohnnieWalters.l5 Referring to himself in thethird persoryl6 Dean informed thepresident for the first time that Chiefof Staff H.R. Haldeman had advanceknowledge of Donald Segrctti's"prankster-type activities."u Toslow the FBI's investigation. Deansuggested restructu ring the FBIISand emphasized the need to movethe focus of the investigationimmediately from the Nixon WhiteHouse to Democrats and pastadministrations.l9 After complainingto the Dresident about "dishonest"media'reporting that was "out ofsequence," Dean explained theconvoluted way in which GordonLiddy received his Watergate breakinfunds. Liddy's error, Dean saidwas unnecessarily involving a thirdparty in the cashing of checks, whichleft a traceable record.zu Anotherproblem for the White House wasformer CREEP treasurer HughSloan. Dean said he was "scared,""weak" and had "a compulsion tocleanse his soul bv confession."2lDean also stated his preference toanswer all Ervin committee inquirieswith "sworn interrogatories" ratherthan live testimony, sinc€ writtenresponses could be "artfullv"ans*ered.22 Finally, Dean ircdictedthe direction that the investigationwould take.a "l don't think the thingwill get out of hand," he said, butthose in danger included CharlesColson John Mitchell, GeorgeStrachan, Dwight Chapin, and, byextension, H.R. Haldeman and JohnEhrlichman. Dean also wamed of a"domino situation" if bank recordswere traced.24 For example, he toldthe presidenthat bank recordswould show that the administrationhad been paying someone to tailSenator Edward Kennedy for "almosttwo vears." The tail began "withinsix hlurs" of Chapp"qiiddick.sln concluding the conversatior!Dean said he would work withaide Richard A. Moor€ to work outa plan to broaden the focus of theinvestigation beyond the NixonWhite House.26March 16 1973, 10:31F11:10 a.m.Oval Office 881-003; RichardP.rge 5

Nixon, fohn W. Dean III, Ronatd L.ZiegIeFDean reminded the presidentof the need to get the focus of theinvestigation off the Nixon WhiteHouse. "We have to get off thedefensive. We have to broaden,, Deansaid.a Nixon and Dean agreed that afalsified documenthat appear€d tobe an independent assessment of theWatelgate cover-up would be helpful."l have drafted such a document,back in December," Dean stated.Nixon wanted to make sure thedocument appear€d to be "a WhiteHouse statement, not [a] presidmtialstatement." Dean clarified that he hadoriginally drafted sudl a statement inan act of contingency planning afterthe 1972 elections. Dean said that itmight be time to recirculate his reportagaiq which was based on "written,sworn affidavits."29 Howevel Deanwamed of the limits of such a reportmidway thr,ough the investigation."Some questions you can't answer, orif you do, you get people in trouble.,,Therefore, to avoid perjuringthose who have already providedtestimony, a new more generalfalsified document had to be d€ated.Dean stated his prefercnce for thecreation of "a good master plan" thatwould be morc comprehensive thanhis previous report.sMarch 16, 1973, 8:14-8:23 p.m.White House Telephone GIZ-134Ridtard Nixon, fohn W. Dean IIt3lIrr a phone call later that same day,Presidmt Nixon agreed with Dean'searlier suggestion to work withRichard A. Moore on a new falsifiedr€port as discussed earlier that day.32Dean warned the president that sucha report cBuld make perjurcrs outof some witnesses:could "openup a new grand jury" and "wouldcause difficulty for some who'veaheady testified."s Dean stated hispreference for two rcports: the firstaw tten report based on "swornaffidavits" that was "not a totalanswer" intended for the Ervincommittee and the public,s anda second oral report only for thepresidento inform him of additionalvulnerabilities of which he mightPage 6not have been aware.s AlthoughDean informed Nixon of WhiteHouse involvement in the cover-upon March 13, Dean noted that theconclusions of his written rcport"were based on the fact that therewas not a scintilla of evidence in theinvestigation that led anywhere tothe White House."s Relieved, Deaninformed the president that the FBIfiles that Ervin would receive wouldnot include grand iury minutes,which was a lot more thorouqhthan the FBI had been.37 Deai alsorecommended that his written reportbundle Watergate with the previouslydisclosed "prankster-Wpe activities',of Segretti.38March 77 , 1973, l:2ts2:10 p,m.OvaI Office 882-llQ RichardNirory fohn W. Dean III, H.RHaldenan39President Nixon reminded Deanthat his falsified report shouldconclude that no one from the WhiteHouse was involved, based on"Dean's eva.luation."s Dean statedthat he wanbed to go even furtherthan that: Nixon should hold ameeting with Ervin and disclose thatCREEP had a legitimate "intelligenceoperation in place" based on"handwrittery"swom statements"and that the White House had cutitself off from anything illegal.+tDean then revealed that he knewabout the "intelligence operation"six months beforc the Watergatebreak-in.e The initial meetin'g thatset up the operation was attended byDean, Mitchell, Jeb Magruder, andLiddy. Dean told Haldeman that theoperation should be kept "ten miles"from the White House. Nixon thenasked Dean who he thought wasprcsently most vulnerable.€ Deannoted that he himself wag because"I've been all over this thhg like ablanket." Colson, Chapio Mitchell,and Haldeman were also vulnerable.Dean stated that he called break-inplanner Liddy the Monday afterthe break-in for an explanation.According to Dean, Fialdemandeputy Strachan pushed campaignaide Magruder to compel Liddy todo the break-in. Dean recommendedthat Magruder become the scapegoatand that an official statemento thateffect from the White House wouldbe helpful.a "Can't do that', Nixonreplied. Dean then switd€d bo usingSegretti as a scapegoat, whidr wonmore favor with the president.4s"It was pranksterism that tot outof hand," Dean said. Finallv Deanexplained the discovery ofihe bizarreconnection of the investigation totop Nixon aide John Ehrlichman,who had used Liddy in previousoperationt including the break-inat the offic€ of Daniel Ellsbere'spsychiatrist.45 Since Liddy wis alsocaught at the Watergate, he wouldeventually lead the investigation toEhrlichman Dean wamed.March 2O 1973, Unknown tiurebetwe€n L42 and 2:31 p.m.Oval Office 8&l-017; Richard Nixorlfohn W. Dean[II, Richard A. MooreDean and Moore pr€sented a draftof the recently completed falsifiedreport to the president. Dean notedthat Press Secretary Ronald L. Zieglerhad concerns that it would raisemore questions than it answered.Noting that it was iust a draft, Moorestad that "it needs one more goaround; we did the best we could." Inparticular, "of the eight paragraphgI think there are about thr€e that aretrcublesome."47 Dean and Mooregave a copy of the rcport to Nixon,who dir€cted various revisions onthe spo1, including how to rephraseDean's previous involvement withStrachan and Segrefti,March 21, 1973, 10:12-1L55 a.m.Oval Offce 885;008; RichardNixon, fohn W. Dean III, H.R.HaldemanDean warned Nixon that therewas a "cancer/' on the presidency,aSand he offered for the first time acomplete recollection of how theplanning for Watergate originated,which started as "an instruction tome from Bob Haldeman."49 Deanclaimed that Haldeman originallyasked Dean to set up a domesticintelligenc€ operation at CREEP.Dean initiated contact with rackCaulfield, who was Nixon's formerbodyguard.s However, Mitchell andpassport Apil 2009

Ehrlichman did not Iike Caul6eld slDean brought in Liddy instead, whocame recommended by White Houseaide Bud Krogh on the basis of thesuccessful break-in at Ellsberg'spsychiatrisrs offi ce.s2 Mitchellapproved of Liddy. Next, Magruderinvited Dean over to CREEPheadquarters to discuss Liddy'sintelligence plan. Dean describedthe plan, which included "black bagoperations, kidnapping providingprostitutes to weaken the opposition,bugging, mugging teams. . . It lrasiust an incr€dible thing."53 41,"r ,n"initial meetin& Dean also attendeda second meeting to discuss Liddy'splan, which included "bugging,kidnapping and the like."r Dean,Mitchell, Magrudeq, and Lidd),werc prcsent at the meeting. Deansaid he did not hear anything aboutLiddy's plan again after that meetin&so he assumed the mor€ extremeelements would not be carried out.55Howevet Dean conceded that he andLiddy "had so many other things"going on. Dean said he thought thatHaldeman assumed that the Liddyplan was "proper,"s which resultedin Haldeman aide Strachan pushingMagruder, who asked permissionfrom Mitchell, who consented tothe Liddy-led Watergate brcakin.Dean noted that informationgather€d from the break-in wasused by Strachan and Haldeman.STAs the 1972 democratic presidentialcampaign took shape, Haldemanauthorized Liddy to change his targetfrom Senator Muskie to SenatorMccovern.s Once again, thismessage passed through Strachan-Magruder-Liddy. Dean noted thatLiddy previously infiltrated Muskie'ssecretary and chauffeur. "Nothingillegal about that," Dean said.Although he had not heard anythingagain until the break-in, when Deanleamed about it on June 17 he "knewwhat it was."$ Nixon then askedDean for an update on any periuries.Dean was not sur€ if Mitchell hadperjured himself, but he u,as surethat Magruder had, as had HerbertPorteq, a Magruder deputy.e Deanclaimed they perjured themselvesby testifying that they had thoughtthat Liddy was legitimate, and thatthey did not know anything aboutPosspofl April 2009activities r€lated to the DemocraticNational Committee. After the breakin,Dean "was under instructionsnot to investigate" and insteadworked on containing it "rightwhere it was."61 AII the burglars gotcounsel immediately and planned toride out any charges until the 1972election was over.62 However, soonafter, the burglars began makingdemands for money. Dean waspresent when Mitchell authorizedraising cash for them, which was tobe funneled through Howard Hunt.Dean noted that not only was itbecoming more difficult to meet theburglars' growing needt but thatit was "obstruction ofiustice," andthat Dean, Mitchell, Erhlichman,and Haldeman were culpable.6Dean summarized that the biggestproblem was a "continual blackmailoperation."fl Dean also expandedon other vulnerabilities, including aprevious plan to do "a second-storyiob on the Brookings Instihrtq whercthey had the Pentagon Papers."6Summarizing Dean said that wouldhave been too risky. "lf the risk isminimal and the gain is fantastic,thafs something else, but with aIittle risk and no gain, ifs not worthit." Dean also noted that there wereother "soft spots."6 The problem ofthe "continued blackmail," he said,is that "this is the sort of thing mafiapeople can do." Dean estimated thata million dollars was needed overthe next two years. Nixon responded,"l know where it can be gotten."Dean suggested that Mitchell shouldhandle the money, "and get somepros to help him."67These materialshould help us seethe Watergate cover-up in a new light.lf this is "Watergate revisionism,"then so be it. Perhaps a littleWatergate r€visionism is needed, andtechnology, as is evident in this briefarticle, can be hamessed in ways thatpermit us to reconstruct these eventsand come to new interprctations.The president of the United Statesis barely moved when his counselinformed him in these conversationsthat mo6t of the presidenfls top aideswere involved in various illegalities.Dean told Nixon on March 13 thatHaldeman deputy Strachan knewther€ was White House involvementin the Watergate break-ir! even whileDean concluded in his falsified reportfor Senator Ervin and the publicthat the White House had no suchknowledge. fohn Dean was not onlyinvolved in managing the cover-up,but by his own admission was part ofthe inner cor€ of planners who set upCREEP's "intelligence operation." Hestated that he and Haldeman initiatedthe planning that led to the Watergatebreak-in. Dean not only hired GordonLiddy, but did so on the basis of hissuccessful break-in at the office ofDaniel Ellsbery's psychiatrist. Deanadmitted that he began the coverupshortly after the 192 electionby creating a falsified rcport thatconcluded that the White Househad nothing to do with the break-in.He conceded that he was presentwith Mitchell when authorizationwas given to bribe witnesses. Deanrecommended to the presidenthatMitchell handle the bribes, but thatsome "pros" should help him. Dean,in his own wordt admitted to thepresidenthat he was involved in"an obstruction of iustice." Mostof all, neither Dean nor Nixon didanything to stop this reckless andillegal behavior. Paraphrasing thepresidenfs rnea crlpa during theDavid Frost interviewg Nixon mayhave "let the country down," but itwas the country that had to endure,paraphrasing again, a "long nationalnightmare." The nightmare is notover yet, not as long as we have stillmore to leam.Lulce Nichter is AssistantProfusor of History at Tarleton StateUn i v e r si ty -C e n t r a I Texa s.8Notes:l. Patricia Cohen, "lohn Dean at Issue in NixonTapcs Feud," Ndro Yo* Tirn6, February l, 2009,D. Al.i. st€ http: / / chrcnicle.com / rcvierv /brainstorm /katz/whats-news-in-thenewyork-times.3. see http: / / www. thedailybeast.com / blogeand-stories/2009-02-04/the-timeehaeloshthe|{atergateplot/.4. Sc€ http:/ /hnn.us/articles/6l ln.html#hoff.5. Stanfey Kutfer, Ahsr of Poto.t: The Nao NitottTnpes (New York, 197).6. Klingman's manuscript submisgion to theAutcricnn Histo cnl Rtoieru rvas r€iecH forbeing "too narrow in focus" for that palticularpublicatioD as wellasof insufffcient length.Page 7

See http:/ / www.nyti m es.@n I M l02l0Z Ibook/07dean.html.7. OvalOffice 881-O3, March td l9a 10:34-ll:10 a.m.8. 5€e Kutfer, Arrsr o/ Poi4eL pp. 2jO-32,9. Whih House Telephone 037-134, March 16193,8:l,l-€:23 p.m.10. Th6e conversations have never treenEadily available to d|e public in one formatand location, apart from some disjoindtranscripts. A number of the transcripts we]€imaSed using optical character rec nitionsoftwaF (OCR) and placed online, but inhundr€ds of pla

SHAFR GRANTS AND FELLOWSHIPSREFORMED IN APRIL 2OO9A maior reform in the administration of SHAFR's grants and fellowships will be implemented in April2009. The purposes of the rcform, approved by Council in 2008, a.re to sh€amline thi application process forstudents aPPlying for multiple grants and fellowships; to promote uniformity across all grants and fellowshipsPrcgrams; to Promote coordination of awards by SHAFR as an institution; and to utilize electronic means ofcomrnunication. The reforms will take full effect in time for the 2009-10 award cycle.The reforms will most significantly affuct the Getfand-Rappaport Fellowship (GRF), Stuart L. BernathDissertation Grant (BDG), W. Stun Holt Fellowship, Michael f. Hogan Fellowship, and Samuel Flagg BemisGrant. APPlication procedures and deadlines as well as award administration will change for these programs.The Bemis program will also be divided into two separate programs, one for graduate students that keeps theBemis name and one for junior faculty to be known as the William Appleman Williams Grants program. Moremodest changes will also affect the administration of the Dissertation Completion Fellowship and the MymaBernath Fellowship.The reforms apply only to grants and fellowships invested in research-in-progress. The reforms do not apply toprize programs that reward completed work, including the Bemath Book Prize, Bemath kcture Prize, BemathScholarly Article Prize, Myrna F. Bernath Book Award Ferrell Book Prize, Graebner Award, Link-Kuehl Prize,Unterberger Dissertation Prize, and Oxford Dissertation Prize.SFIAFR members are encouraged to take note of the following reforms taking effect in the 2009-10 cycle:o An annual aPplication deadline of October I will be established for the following programs:Gelfand-Rappaport FellowshipBemath Dissertation GrantMyrna Bemath FellowshipHolt FellowshipHogan FellowshipBemis Dissertation GrantWilliams funior Faculty Grant. The above seven awards will be announced annually at the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of theAmerican Historical Association (in fanuary), for expmditure during the same calendar year.. APPlicants for the above seven awards should complete a common application form available on the SHAFRwebsite at http:/ /shafr.org/fellowships-application.rtf. Browsers may also follow prompts under thedescription of each fellowship/ grant posted at http: / / www.shafr.org/ members/ prizes-and-fellowships/.Directions for electronic submission of applications and letters of recommendaHon are provided on theapplication form.. Applications for the Dissertation Completion Fellowships should use the common application formreferenced above. However, the annual deadline for such applications will remain April 1. Fellowshipawards will be decided by around May 1 and will be announced formally during the SHAFR annual meetingin June, with expenditure to be administereduring the subsequent academic year.o The new Williams lunior Faculty Research Grant is desigaed for untenured faculty and others who arewithin six years of the Ph.D. and who are working as professional historians, and is limited to scholarsworking on thefrs t r*earch monograph.. Applicants for all SHAFR grants and fellowships must be members of SFIAFR.Pnssrytt Aptil2009 Page 9

The CIA and Declassification:The Role of the Historical Review PanelRobert leroiss current chair of the CIA'sHistorical Review Panel(HRP), I am glad to have thisopportunity to explain what the paneldoes and note the CIA programs withwhich it is involved. Members ofSHAFR will be familiar with the StateDepartmenf s Historical AdvisoryCornmittee (HAC) and with someof the special commissions thatdeal with declassifying records onthe IFK assassination and Nazi warcrimes. However, these groups arerooted in statutes that grant themsignificant powers and so, much aswe might wish it otherwise, are notgood models for the HRP. Formed in1991 the HRP is advisory only. Our"charte/' reads as follows:. Advise the Central IntelligenceAgency on systematic andautomatic declassifi cationreview under the provisionsof Executive Order 12958 asamended.. Assist in developing subiectsof historical and scholarlyinterest for the IntelligenceCommunity declassifi cationreview prctran.. Advise CIA and the lntelligenceC-ommunity on declassifi cationissues in which the protectionof intelligmce sources andmethods potentially confl icbwith mandated declassifi cationpriorities.o Provide guidance for thehistorical research and writingprograms of the CIA HistoryStaff, and when appropriate,review draft products.o Advise InformationManagement Services on itsPage 10mandatory and voluntarydeclassifi cation reviewinitiatives and the Center forthe Study of Intelligence on itsacademic outreach protrams.. At the request of the Directorof Central Intelligence Agency,advise on other matters ofrelevance to the intelligmceand academic communiHes.o Advise InformaHonManagemmt Serviceson arrhival and recordsmanagement issues.The current members of the HRPare Melvyn Leffler (Departmmtof His0ory University of Virginia),Thomas Newcomb (Departmentof Political Science and CriminalJustice Heidelberg College) RobertSchulzinger @epartment of HistoryUniversity of Colorado), JeffrcyTaliafurro (Deparrnent of PoliticalScience, Tufts), Betty Unterbe€er(Deparhnent of History, Texas A&M),and Ruth Wedgewood (Nitze Sdroolof Advanced Intemational Studies,Johns Hopkins). Previous historianswho have served include Emest Mavand Marc Trachtenberg. Membersof the HRP make suggestions forsuitable candidates when a vacancyopms up but the CIA's director andhis top assistants are deeply involvedin the selection process, which makessense because unless they havefaith in the professional skills andiudgment of the members of the HRP,its advice will carry little weight. Andwhat we do is give our advice andiudgment. We rneet with the dirccboror one of his top assistants after eachof our twice-yearly meetings, andwe arc frce bo express our individualand collective views withoutinhibitions. The discussion is alwavsopen and spirited, but as readersof our public statesments know,we can explain to our colleaguesand the public the subiects we havediscussed but not the substance ofthe rccomrnendations we have made.I know this clashes with the notionof openness, but heads of agenciesare entitled to confidential advice,and what is important to historiansand members of the general public iswhat material is released, not whatthe HRP has uryed.We advise on policies, priorities,and specific issues. Because of theimportance of FRU$ we spend alarge proportion of each meeting onthe pending volumes. As SFIAFRmembers know, the compiling andpublishing of the volumes rests inthe hands of the State DepartmenfsOffice of the Historian (HO), andin the first stage of the processdepartnent historians must selectthe documents they think should beincluded. The compilers have accessto CLA files thrcugh the relevantindexes and listings. In the past,security con(€ms caused signfficantproblems with accEss to rccordtas did the complexity of the Cl.A'ssystems, and the HRP spent timetrying to help. But I believe that theHO historians and the FIAC wouldagree that although the search fordocuments is someHmes difficult, thecompilers are now able to see whatthey need to. Searches are renderedeasier by the efforts of the "iointhistorian," who is shared by the CLAand the HO and understands bothorganizations.Most of the disputes concemPnssport April20o9

volumes involving covert actions.The first and most crucial stepis for the govemmento decidewhether the covert action can beacknowledged. This is not a CIAdecision. lt is made by the HighLrvel Panel (HLP), which consists ofreprE6entatives from State, the CIA,and the National Security Council(NSC). Because covert actions arepresidential decisions, the NSC"owrs" them, and it is appropriatethat the NSC play the central rolein decisions about whether or notto acknowledge them because suchdecisions involve balancing the costsand benefits to the national interest,broadly conceived. It is quite possiblethat the CIA might have no obiectionto revealing a particular operationbecause doing so would not harmits sources, methodg or abilityto operate oversea+ but the NSCwould obiect because it believed thatacknowledgment would signifi cantlyhinder foreign policy. The conversecan also be true. It is importantto realize that the CIA cannotunilaterally keep these transactionsout of the historical record.If the activity is to beacknowledged, the HLP draws upguidelines goveming what aboutit can and cannot be revealed, andthese are used to decide whichdocuments can be released, either intheir entircty or with parts removed(the infamous "redactions"). Theguidelines will resolve most but notall disputeg because they ar€ alwaysambiguoug and therc is room todisagree about whether documentsfit inside or outside them. Along withthe guidelines, the HLP passes onthe "issue statement" that appearsin the front of the FRUS volume andprovides the general context andbackground for the operation.The HRP is involved in all stagesof the process and goes over thematerial document by document andoften line by line, hearing argumentson why the CIA believes certainmaterial should be withheld. Wediscuss possible damage and, moreimportant, the historical value of thematerial in dispute. Thit of course,is where our greatest expertiselies. ln a number of cases we havefelt that materialscheduled to bePnsspo, t April 2009redacted were of very high value at some of the documents on CRESTto the historical rccord. Since the and at a sample of those of that areCLA and the HLP are engaged in a withheld or redacted and periodicallybalancing operation, those making examines the complicated guidelinesthe decisions are mor€ than willing to that are used. These make up a bookhear algumentsof about 500 pagesabout thethat contains bothhistorical value Because the annuitants Drocess formal policies andof the material. so rnany documents, they precedents thatWhen they are must make judgmcnts quickly. have developedconvinced that Their decisions are therefore over the years.its release would conserl,ative.lnd lead to more Of course, we allsignificantly redactiorrs and fevre releases want more, and theincrease scholarly than lvould be possiblc if evc'ry HRP will continueand public document could be cxamined at to look at theunderstandin&lerrgth.guidelines, but Ithey are willingthink even skepticsto be moreagr€e that theforthcoming than would otherwise be change brought about by Presidentthe case. Disagreements often rcmain, Clinton's Executive Order 12958 (onlybut the considerations involved are slighdy modiFed by President Bush)understood by all participants. has been noteworthy.This may be the appropriate The HRP also is involved in theplac€ to note that HRP members CIA s Historical Collections Divisionhave security clearances that allow (HCD). This part of the operationus to read all the material that the focuses on s€ts of documents that archistorians have gathered. We are both historically valuable and goodnot in a strong Position to judge candidates for declassification. Mostarguments about the risks and costs noteworthy have been the releaseof releasing material-although we of National Intelligence Estimatesdo vigorously probe CIA arguments (NlEs) on the Soviet Union the PRC,about those issues--but we can see and the former Yugoslavia. NlEsand discuss what the CIA wants to and other intelligence rcports onwithhold as well as what is planned Vietnam have also been released,for rplease.and in December 2008 CIA putWe also examine the CIA's other out a collection of documentshistorical declassifi cation programs. provided by the famous spy RyszardFor FRUS, we deal with a relatively Kuklinki conceming the plans forsmall number of documents of the the imposition of martial law inhighest value and so proc€ed with Poland in December 1981. The bestgreat ca.re (and the expenditure of of these documents are included in aa grcat deal of time and effort). On printed collection, but all of them arethe opposite end of the spectnrm available on a CD-ROM. The HRPare the millions of documents that advises on priorities for the HCDare scanned electronically each year, although our attempts to act on theexamined (largely by rctircd CIA principle of "top dowo oldest firsfofficers known as annuitants) and enunciated by John Gaddis at theput on the CIA Records Search Tool first HRP meeting I attended havesystem (CREST) at the National proved more difficult than expectedArchives (NARA). I know that many because our obvious target-theof you have used CREST, because files of the CIA directors-is difficultI see footnotes to these documents to declassify. These files arc filledquite often. Because the annuitants with names, each of which hasprocess so many documents, they to be checked to see whether it ismust make judgments quickly. Their releasable. Some of these documentsdecisions are therefore conservative are also less historically valuableand lead to more rcdactions and than we originally expected butfewer releases than would ber€newed efforts are underway andpossible if every document could be the prospects for significant releasesexamined at length. The HRP looks in the coming years have improved.rage l l

We know that the presidentiallibraries often have the mostimportant documents and are wheremost historians begin their research.We have worked with the CIA tosee that these collections remain ahigh priority. Frustrated researchersmay be surprised to hear thit butit is importanto note that many ofthe documents contain "eouities"from many departments (i.e., arebased on materials provided bvmultrple agenctes), and each agencymust review them before they canbe declassified. This is not onlytechnically challenging, but it alsomeans that the document is heldhostage to the slowest agency, whichoften is not the CIA. Nevertheless, theHRP has supported moving fundsfrom other areas to declassify thesematerials.The HRP has been involvedin a number of other issues withwhich SHAFR members will befamiliar, one involving the releaseof budget frgures for the intelligencecommunity in general and for specificcovert actiont and another being thereclassifi cation of documents. Heretoo I cannot reveal the positions wetook, but we thoroughly exploredboth issues. For what it is worth,we have spent hours talking to topCIA officials about what damagereleasing the overall budtet mightcause and about providing moredetails on the spending for particularcovert actions. Some of the issuesare quite pragmatic, dealing withwhat foreign intelligence servicescould learn fiom such releases; othersinvolve attempts to maintain generalprinciples to guide releases. Althoughone can argue that CIA is paranoidabout slippery slopes, its businessdoes involve and induce a degree ofparanoia, and historians do indeeduse particulareleases to argue that aPrecedent has been set.It is to be hoped that thereclassification issue will not return,but it is important to understandthat it laryely involved the re.reviewof documents that had not beenproperly released because theyhad not been reviewed by all of therelevant agencies. As noted abovein connection with the presidentialIibrarieq a number of documentsPage l2involve the equities of many agencies,and reviewers from one agency maynot recotnize this and so incorrectlyapprove release without referral toall the relevant partiet which is whathappened in thi recent cases. In anyevent, if officials did not previouslyr€alize that reclassifying documentsc.rrries a high cost and should bedone only for pressing reasong theydo now, in part because of the badpublicity generated by the earlierepisodes.The mention of other agenciesleads to the question of how theestablishment of the position ofdir€ctor of national intelligence(DNI) has change declassi6cationrules and procedures. Many setsof documents that r,.'ere under thecontrol of the CIA director in hiscapacity as director of the intelligencecommunity are now "owned" bvthe DNI. This is true most obviouslyfor NlEs and the Presidential DailyBriefs (PDBs). As members of SHAFRknow, the question of whether PDBsare subjecto declassification revier^,has been contested in the courts andwithin the federal declassifi cationbureaucracy. CIA directors haveaqgued that they are privilegeddeliberation documents and are thusshielded from review and release.We conveyed our views on thisissue to several directors at somelength, but what is relevant in thiscontext is that the issue is now outof the hands of the CIA. Because ofthe appeals within the government,the issue in now on the president'sdesk, although by the time thisappears in print we will have a newpresident and he may have made adecision. But President Bush did notact quickly on this question, and onething my service has taught me isthat much declassifi cation Droceedsat a pace that makes a snaii seem likea speed demon. We are dealing withlarge, complex bureaucracies thatrarely have declassification high ontheir agendag and orr issues like thePDBs there are incentives to stall. Onthe other hand, we should rememberthat people who are not in academiacannot understand why it takes usso long to publish, reach personneldecisiont or change our programs.The HRP works closely with theHAC. We have joint meetings everycouple of yearg the chair of eachcommittee meets with the other whenfull ioint meetings are impossible,and the HAC chair and I are infrequent contact. Close cooperationis not a magic bullet, but it do€s helpeach committee understand how theother sees the issues and sometimesenables us to help work out problemsthat arise between the CIA andthe HO. I also meet with membersof other olganizations concernedwith declassification, especially theNational Security Archives.I have found serving on the HRPboth personally and professionallyrevvarding. My colleagues areinteresting, the CIA personnel arededicated and hard-working andthe opportunity to understandintelligence issues a bit better hashelped me and, indirectly, mystudents. Panel members oftenhave sharp disagreements with CIApersonnel, but I want to stress anumber of points. Firt, as far as Ican tell, clA officials have been openand honest with us. Of course, wecan never tell what is being hiddensuccessfully, but I think our access isquite good. On only two occasionsover the decade have we been subiectto underhandedealings (whichnever happens in the academic world,of course), one of which wouldhave occasioned my resignation andprobably those of my colleagues hadit not been remedied. Both Droblemsgrew out of disputes within the CIA.Some units went not only behind theHRP's back, but behind the backsof their colleagues. In one of thecaset however, CIA decision-makersstepped in even before r,r,e had achance to raise the issue. I think thateven colleagues who ioined the HRPwith some skepticism believe thatthey are being well informed andtreated with candor.Second, the use of annuitants fordeclassification, which at first struckus as having the foxes guard thehenhouse, achrally works very well.Far from being extremely protective,these people are proud of what theysaid and did and want to release asmuch information as Dossible.Third, in the thousands of denialsand redactions I have seen, I canPossPor, April 2009

think ofonlylt is not surprising that in a better light, and ontwo insignificant where CIA officials and many occasions theycases in which acadcmics differ most have not hesitated tomaterial wasis in their assessment r€lease documents orwithheld because of the proper balance acknowledge actionsits release would betrveen protecting secrets that almost all of usbe embarrassing. arrd keepirrg the public (including many inIn one case,informcd. the CIA) regret. Thisa documentis not to say that theemployed arccord is complete orcommon national stereotype that that r€leas€s were as full as many ofwould hardly raise eyebrows in us would have liked. But gaps andconversation but that someone felt rcdactions cannot be ascribed to thewould look bad in print. When desire to bury mistakes and disguisequeried, the officials agreed that misiudgments.redacting it had been a mistake. (The It is not surprising that where CIAdocument had already been released, officials and academics differ mostso the redaction will remain until is in their assessment of the properthe document is rereviewed). We balance between protecting secrctscan and do argue with CIA officials and keeping the public informed.about the level of detail that should Although my colleagues and I arebe released and whether information glad (well, willing) to continue towould endanger sources andhear views and complaints aboutmethods. But while the declassifiers this from SHAFR members, the basicarc of course deeply concerned with decisions are legitimately political,protecting the CLA's missioo they which means they are driven byare not concemed with shielding its the values and judgments of ther€putation. Indeed, on morc than president and Congrcss. ButI shouldone occasiorL concem for sources note that the r€placement of Clintonand methods led them to withhold by Bush and thi increased prioritydocuments that would put the CIA for security after September 11, 2001,had relatively little impact on CIAdeclassification, much to my surprise.For years I hesitated to say this lestsomeone in the vicepresidenfs officewerE to notice and be alarmed, but Iam glad to be able to say it nowln all immodesty, I think the HRPhas done some good, and the factthat we have access to the directorand his top assistants means thatour voices are heard at the highestlevels and that people throughoutthe organization have to take us atleast somewhat seriously. But we arefully aware that we are participatingin a game whose rules we have notestablished. some may feel thatthe HRP only serves bo Iegitimize afatallv flawed institution. This viewmakes some sense, although theexistence of the panel in fact does notseem to have prcduced legitimacy inthe eyes of critics. Being a meliorist,however, I serve with an undisturbedconscience.Robert kruis is Profes*r of PoliticalScience in the School of International antlPublic Afiairs, at C.olumbia Unfuersity.I Oxford University Press-USA Dissertation Prize in International HistoryPnssport April 2009 Page 13

SHAFR Guide to New Platform ReleaseOn January 1,2009, all eBook subscriptions to the Guitte to American!orgign Relationsince 1.600: Third Ediiion became accessible throueh thehighly functional ABC-CLIO History Reference Online eBook plat"form.Subscriptions now include:. New advanced search options including synonym, natural language,and phonetic searching. Higlilighted keyword Eearch results and their surroundins contexto The ability to switch between page or entrv-based view "o New bookmark and emailing iap-abilities 'o An updated administrator sectidn with customization options andusage statistic resourceso Federated search compatibilityo Access to both American Foreijn Relations since 1600 subscription andcurrent ABC-CLIO eBook collections on the same cross-seaichableplatformWhen the transition to the new platform took place, all access URLswere automatically redirected to the URL listed below. No actions willbe needed to initiate the rollover and there will be no need to make anymodifications to OPAC systems or MARC records.New URL: www.ahro.abc-clio.com/?9781g51099504All questions re_galding subscriptions or the new platform should bedirected to acsales@abc-clio.com or 800-368-6868 rixt. 303.For further information, please contact ABC-CLIO at:130 Cremona DriveSanta Barbara, CA93Ll7(800) 368-6858www.abc-clio.comPage l4Pnssport April 2009

SHAFR Visits Falls ChurchFrank Cwtigliola and Paul Kramernp AXB SHAFR armual oonbrcneat the Fairvhw Part Marriott in FallsChundt, Vbdnl., isdupingup bb. m a(dting ev€nt A dyn mic mden€ltctic prcgnm aommitEe (chairedby PaulGamcr and induding CarclAndcrson, Ditt Bonker, Anne FcterAny Grea$erg, Naoko Shlbusawa,and Sallm Yaqub) isond an especiallybroad call br papcrs. Choosing c theonfcrenae fteme, 'The Unid StaEsh dref^rodd/ltNehbrld ln 0reUnicdStat!$" the ommitce cfutr|ladthe call br papcrs on nearly 60listserv3SFIAFR rdvertbed it in fieOAII bbgmirc arrd in Psrtpcliu.t.lhc Invibtim t€aognizrd SHAFR'ssignatuE md @ntlnuing st€!rg$3ln diplon dq3tsagcand focigprelatlone hisory, partiodady ln thcpci-f9[s pcrtod. lhe cell went qto wdone propoeals br panclsand papen dcalhg wtth non€treacbrs end/or prt.l95 higtorics orthe involvirg hborles of Fnderard nce, ailunl history cliglorshblory, EJrsn donll hbtory,and hislories ol nigratton ardbodlrhdi In k€eping with lhisouueadr efbrt SHAFR Council infune aIE haugunEd the Diversity/lncrnetional OuEeach Fellowshippogram, apprcprieting 125,ffi 6oruevel and lrccl expcnses br scholarswho can enhane fte diversity of&c mnual meeting.llrese awardswec inended primarily br scholarsof inEmadq|al / fulitn nlationshislory locaEd oreide thc UntadSae or repnsantin goups thathlrc bccn treditionally urdenrepnsaned at dre SHAFR confercne.Ohs€ rein be i25,0@ available brthe a)fO onfcrenae and the samearnount br alll.) The prognmcomnitlcc ccelved 28 aPPlicationsbr ttrse Diverity / lnternationalOubladr Fbllowship& The commltEealgo aeivcd 22 applicrtions brPosport Aprtl lIBRobert A. Div'rm lt$rel Grrnb toslst tradulE stud€nB hveling iothe confemce. i45(Xl wrs avrilable6rDivircganB.Ttcrc wrs rn oa*bclningrc4onsc o tbb ottach. Thcpogrrm omnircc rccivcd 100pcncl propocds phs 4l indivtdudpapcr appllcetiona Thia amountsto an inct€ase &om plrvious year3of more than 50 peturt In dcw ofS;}IAFR's comnttncnt b enh.ndngibsaope, weh re€xFndd lheannual mccting from dre usral4S or5{ p.neb b &l paneltr. Durlng no6ttirne slots dtcrr wilt be 10 oncrrrartpanels. Pnsaters will lndude*holan based in 17 countica outsided|e Unid StatB RoryNy 25 perurtof lh. pfftidFnBwill begnduacstudentt mrny ofthem drst-titrlnto sl{AFR lte local rrril€em€lrt3ommttEe will Frblicize theaonftErce for prosplcdve athdeegin thc DC areaThere will be spcddefforts b Each out b neurffiEr3at tha thursday wdodryreceptioO dr Frldry graduaEstudmt bnakhst and the Seturdaym€!|bftU.d netwo*ing bt!*hstThe Friday bnakhot will hclude arvo*shop on publbhing with cdtbrsfrom mdemic prrsocs. The S*urdaybrcakfast sponsored by thc $Jomat'sCommitEe ad lh. MembetsttipGommltEe, will be an infomrelga-togethcr whcn neutoomer3 cmminglc with vecnns orcr cofte andpa6tri6, r€twod(, and get advie ona veriety of isares that aosrcem otrrfield ald our pnftsoiot.OnThudaycvcntry,,AmyGoodman, radio irurnrllst Jd hctof the radio program Datmrcg tlo4t,will dcltvcr lhe phnary addrcsa Atthc fti&y lunctcoo, Fmf Cocddiohsil girr r p(l3i.lcotid rddc$ cotiddlfutuR\DarhhtgwhmsD*dcvcDdgtug, ad thcAM,ltlioe. Tbc Sln|day lutrcbcoospaecrbBdcE&lnro rbmcrfocit! rcilba ofts and Dc&ocDcparmcot o6cid who brs a Pb.D.in hioy ud who brs scrvcd rrrnbrsc.dor o Finlrnd ad b 1\tr&cy.His trfk bcotidcd Dtpbnt aauaWottbt (rddt Mt b nfut Murpht}For m rfter on&sroe Eocid evcngfte lool erangemene aonmltce(Kdstin Ahlba& Mer€dift Hitdley,.trd Ann Nelso& a3dsEd by Slr.Ulllscr) is booklng a dinls cnriscon dre Potonrr br Satuday nighton drcMb drrctin whidtwillbcre*rved br SIIAFR's ordrriveuse. The cnrise will unrcl homAhxandriab Mt l&mon and badsTh. ao6t will be.pproximaEly tglplus thc coot of bus b$portadon.(As we wrie this ln mid-F$ruary,thc locel rrrangemenB oommineeis sdI nego&tht wlft d|e bu3ompeny.) The pa*age wlll lncludeEeport|don ftom lhe ltariott tolhe bo{, dinne& and EansFrtrtionb.ck b lhe Mrrriott Becau* logisdcsm*e it too di6cult to durgescpanEly br drinke, then will dsobe an opar bar featuring beeq wlrE,and soft drinks. Spaoe on the bott blimicd to 125 persom By Mardt flhe o(!ct Fie wil bc ryailable qrtr€ SHAFR w€D6iE ttd rrgbuationbrm. SIIAFR wlll subsidize part ofdr! Gt io tradurE 3tud€ntiYtHre looklng brwerd to scdngyou at a conferare dcalgned tobe indtlctudly 3timulafmg andweloorning o bolh SHAF? vecnnsrrd mwoomerg.Fnnk@tigli&bFwrqHisftry at ilE Uniwlftfiy ol C.t tnccttrrt,tandPrrrtiden qSHAFePulrtKmrrllabAsrlr;iav@rqHistory at tlu Uniocrsity q Ism atdauir $ tfu 200p Progron c,,/rr///,it'ff,.Prge 15

A Roundtable Discussion ofWilliam C. Inboden'sReligion and American Foreign Policy,1945-1960: The Soul of ContainmentLloyd C. Gardner, Laura A. Belmonte, Daoid Zietsma, Seth lacobs, and William C. InbodenAThe Cold War CrusadeLloytl C. Gardners William Inboden sees itA ;.h;il';;;; *si"-.t"a';i."I lcrucial role religious beliefsplayed in America's successfulCold War policies - right from thebegiruring until the collapse of theSoviet Union. These, it tums out,exploited a fatal flaw in the structureof Communism, and a principalreason for its ultimate failure: theabsence of God in its foundation.That is the central argumentpresented by Inbodery whosesubtitle "The Soul of Containmenf'foreshadows the case he makes fora new ass€ssment of several keyplayers suffused with Christianbelief and values. Indeed, he arguegone must understand the Cold Warfirst as a relitious war, uniting suchdiverse figures as Harry TrumanReinhold Niebuhr, Billy Graham, andDwight D. Eisenhower under thesame banner. As is well-known, the1950s witnessed an increase in churchatbendance and membership, in part,he suggests, as a response to theatomic age and the threat of nuclearholocaust.The Soviet explosion of an atomicdevice in 1949 naturally heightenedsuch fears, sending people back tochurch but also into movie theatersto see Godzilla ravage New York oraliens warn earth to stop playingwith a-bombs in films such as'TheDay the Earth Stood Still." In thistellin& the aliens's messenger, Klaatu,with his mithty robot, Gort, landtheir spacecraft on Cold War-eraEarth iust after the end of World WarII in an effort to communicate andreconcile humans to a higher entity.It is worth notint that the 1950s wasalso the decade of the UFO withsimilar obsessions coming into playin asserted sightings of spacecraftportmding world destruction.What political leaders did tocounteract such feals and takeadvantage of the moment, asidefrom identifying bomb shelters, wasto use public anxiety as expressedin church going figures to stimulatethe idea of moral rearmament as anoffensive weapon againsthe SovietUnion in the war of ideas. But itis a long way from that point to aconvincing argumenthat the ColdWar was in its essence, a religiouswar. Inboden's book will inevitablybe used as a guide for understandingthe foreign policies of Geolge W.Bush as well those of the now distantCold War, for he finds (as have manyothers) a consisbent religious strainin American policy going back toMcKinley who got down on hisknees to ask for God's guidancein the matter of the Philippines,and continuing through WoodrowWilson who announced that Godhad apparently spoken to him aboutan even larger proiech "I believethat God planted in us the visionof liberty.... I cannot be deprivedof the hope that we are chosen, andprominently chosen, to show the wayto the nations of the world how theyshall walk in the paths of liberty."(9)Not everyone agrced, of course, thatGod had chosen the United Statesfor this mission. At the Paris PeaceConference, French Premier GeoqgesClemenceau made a dour commentin a moment of frustration with theAmerican pr€sidenthat while Godhad only ten points Wilson hadfourteen.While American religiosity isoften commented upon by foreignobservers, Clemenceau's irritationat Wilson's pretensions as alatecpmer in the war suggests oneof the difficulties an author facesin grappling with the questionof motivations of statesmen byemphasizing an over-ridingpsychological or spiritual force at theroot of it all. It is something of a giventhat nations with large aspirationswill invoke destiny or guidance frornabove to explain the righteousness oftheir cause. Therefore, the questionalways arises: Suppose we leave outthe religious factor? Would Americanpolicies have been any different atYalta? At Potsdam? Did the TrumanDoctrine depend upon the prcsidenysconviction that he had to staveoff an invasion of non-believers,as compared, say, to his bluntassessment in his memoirs that Stalinwished to fulfill an ancient aspirationof the Tsars?It is surprising that Inboden makesa partial exception to his collectiveportrait for Dean Achesory the singlemost influential knight at the ColdWar roundtable, as many wouldargue, the essential Cold Warrior."One searches in vain," he writes,"through the record of Acheson'spublic lifu, howeveD for an extensiveconceptualism of the Cold War inPage 16Pnsspofl April 2009

eligious terms," at least in the samemanner as the others he discussesTaylor's efforts and Truman'sconstant encouragement of the ideaconstructed their views of the that centuries-old confl icts betweenessential meaning of the conflict (24). Catholic and Protestant beliefsAcheson, he believeg exemplifiesthe tradition of "proud realism" inAmerican policy. Inboden concludes,nevertheless, that Acheson used anumber of occasions to contrastheimage of the Christian moral universewith the hate-filled Soviet outlook.and practices could be overcomein the face of the Communistchallenge is enlightening. Truman'sdetermination to press the idea of aWashington conference of religiousleaders in the hope that some sortof unity crcdo would emerg even"Here again was the basic outline of surpassed his original scheme, forAmerica's diplomatic theology." (25) he envisioned sending Taylor toThat phrase, "diplomatic theology,"does seem to caoture an essentialasDect of the mindset of Americanrecruit "the top Buddhist and theGrand Lama of Tibet" for such anecumenical assembly. If he couldpolicymakers. Achesonmobilize all thosewas as capable, for .rL-r -L--^^people "who believeexampre, as John Foster ,,:?:Ifl::,:' in a'morar worrdDulles in popularizing theagainsthe BolsheviktdiS;;;;,agentheory of revolution -------.::'-1-.:.'.--:- materialists.,.we canas an explanation for -"t""^T,::-t"1f:t:rT^win this fight." (140). essennal asDe( oI Inewhyothernations;til;;;l;i.;;.ln,thePlanninssuccumbed to Communist """-:;: ': ' ;' - '*" for the conference,blandishments or were PollcvmaKers' Inboden writes,subverted by deceivers.there may have beenThe agent theory ofsome diplomaticr€volution $ras an old one, perhaps theology involved, as the Unitedas old as the Devil in Massachusetts States desired that the invitation goin Puritan days, for it posited that a to a particular candidate Washingtonsmall group of individuals operating favored in the succession to head thefrom some central source, Satan or Orthodox Church. To what extentthe Kremlin, were behind all the American officials directly influencedtroubles in the world. It was a little the selection of the ultimate victor,like the situation in the Garden of Archbishop Spyridion, "is unclear,"Eden when the serpent appeared. writes Inboden, "or at least notDuring the Korean War; for examplq revealed by currently availableAcheson wrote a lengthy answer to documents." (141) This tantalizintthe troubled father of an American sentence puts in pretty clear reliefsoldier who wanted to know why the problem of talking about genuinethe United States had allowed itself religious belief as opposed to theto become involved in a seemingly teopolitics of diplomatic theology.endlesstruggle with no clear vision Nevertheless, Inboden moves on toof victory? Korea happened, Acheson the conclusion, "Truman's campaignsaid, because there existed a source reveals a side of him comParativelyof evil in the Kremlin that distorted unknown and under aPPreciated: thelives everywhere. Interrupted by the spiritual idealist." (155)war, his son's hopes for the future, The conference plan failed for adifficult as that obviously was to number of reasont much to Truman'saccept, hinged upon the favorable distress, as did his efforts to oPenoutcome of such struggles in such far up an embassy in the Vatican. Theoff and foreboding landscapes. Archbishop of Canterbury wrote theIt was above all the policymaker's president, for example, "we cannotduty to mobilize the nation, as whole-heartedly claim the RomanAcheson attempted here to do, and, Church as a champion of freedomas Harry Truman did in using Myron against Communistyranny." (154)Taylor as his ambassador-at-large ln a way, the archbishop's letterto try to mobilize all Christendom suggestsomething important aboutto resisthe innuence of the Soviet an interpretation of the Cold War asUnion. Inboden's discussion of a religious crusade: while AmericanPnsspo,'l Apdl 2009leader sought to unify all religionsunder their guidance, historictheological differences preventedsuch unity. Does that mean therecould be no real mandate from God,in the sense of an all-encompassingmission that went beyond alliancepolitics?There seems no reason to doubtTruman' sincere wish to foster asintle religious outlook on ColdWar issueg an AmericanledChristian revival, or the depth of hispersonal beliefs about heaven andhell, whatever they might be. Butwhat were the duties of a believingChristian in terms of making thesacred political? No one struggledwith that question more thanReinhold Niebuhr, who practicingrealist intellectuals and policymakerssometimes called "the father of usall." Like his discussion of Truman'suse of Myron Taylor, Inboden givesus a fresh picture of the theologian'sencounter with political realities ofthe Cold War. Niebuhr disavowedliberal Protestant campaigns fornuclear disarmament, fearing theconsequences of Passivity wouldlead, as it had befor€, to the horrorsof World War Il and the concentrationcamps. He was a strong supporterof NATO from the beginning anddefended the division of Europe ithad helped to create on the groundsthat "the spiritual facts correspondto the strategic necessities." Morecontroversially, in an article hewrote for the National BusinessCommittee for NATq he argued thatthe East European countries "havebeen separated from this spiritualcommunity" not only by "the powerof Russian armt" but also by theirown lack of "the political and culturalprerequisites for the open society."(67)The 1955 Suez Crisis brought outyet another aspect of Niebuhr's"realism," a strong denunciationof Eisenhor,r,er and Dulles forseparating themselves from theAnglo-French-lsraeli alliance againstNasser's Egypt. Now, obviously,the Egyptian'successful appealto the Russians for arms gave adecided Cold War slant to the crisis,but Niebuhr's alarm at Americanpoliry had a somewhat differentPage 17

slant. He called for a more asserHveMiddle Eastem policy, where themost important security issue forNiebuhr was the protection of Israeland opposition to Arab nationalism."We ought both to guarantee Israeland to prevent the unity of theArab world under Nasser." Andhe accused Eisenhower of beine amoralist who espoused a "univirsalbenevolence without regard forstrategic necessities." As for Dullethe was guilty of a moral "formalism,which makes simple distinctionsbetween nations which obev the'moral law' and those whicir do not."These things added up to a "moralsentimentality" that was dangerousto the well being of "the grcatestcenter of power in the modemworld;' (298)In sum, it could be argued,Niebuhr's approach in these earlydays of the Cold War would behard to distinguish from the neoconservativeagenda of George WBush when it came to the MiddleEast and suppooed threats toAmerican national securitv. Dulles,in opposing the hvasion of Egypt,he argued, had acted from "simpledistinctions" about those who obevedthe moral law and thos€ that did -not. It was a bit more complicatedthan that, however, for the UnitedStates held its allies at fault forhaving abandoned an importantdeclaration of 1950 that committedthem to prctecting the territorialintegrity of all the nations in theMiddle East. The Niebuhr positionseems somewhat akiru as well, tothe national defense strategies of theBush II Administration, and Seqetarvof Defense Donald Rumsfuld'sfamous edict that the strategymust dictate the coalition, not thecoalition the strategy. But more thanthese arguable points, we are leftto wonder if there can be so manv"Christian" points of view, then whatis the one true faith?A final comment on the Eisenhoweryears: During the 1954 Indochinacrisig Eisenhower wondered whvit was not possible to mobilize aBuddhist military opposition to theCommunists, and had to be toldthat Buddhisc were pacificists,something that seemed to amazePage | 8him in light of rhe idea that allreligions had a stake in opposing theVietminh. Inboden understands thedilemma. Niebuhr had married asentimental attachment to Zionismwit\ a realpolitk assessment thatdefending Israel was the best wayto block "Arab naHonalism andSoviet expansion." Eisenhowerput his money (in this instance)on the other horse. "That both ofthem drew on the resources of theProtestantradition for their differingpositions was an irony that neitherseemed to acknowledge." (298) It isdifficult to throw a religious cloakover such differences. The SovietUnion, on the other hand, had itsown prcblems in underestimatingthe power of religion, especially inEastem Europe, where it was oftenlinked to nationalism. One canargue the priorities, but the truthwas the Communists failed at manvthings, even after calculating thedevastation and set-backs of WorldWars I and II, and the success ofArnerican containment policies.Whatever conclusions one drawsabout the collapse of the Soviets,the implosion brought about thekind of fragmentation that Russia'sallies back in World War I fearedwould be the case from the collapseof the Tsar's empir€ even if theatheist Bolsheviks did not succeed informing a government to rule afterthe Romanovs. The issue becomesmore complicated than the failureof the Communists to include Godin this view; it goes as well to theproblem of attempting to includemany nationalities in an exogenousempire. On the American side, itseems clear - as this book argues -that with all the other advantagesit had in the Cold War, religion wasa glue that helped to hold togetherpublic support for the arms race,and hot wars in Korca and Vietnam.It stuck well for a time, but evenbefore the end of the Cold War, it hadloosened all around the comers.That said, the story of how theChristian right rapidly became thebase of the Republican Party willbring many readers to this book insearch of answers. Inboden has someof thenr, especially in his effort toexplain a very "odd couple," BillyGraham and Reinhold Niebuhr, aswings of a particularly Americanreligious creed. Looking at the actionsof policymakers through such a lensreveals the way that creed couldbe useful in the Cold War, in muchthe way Blaise Pascal sutgested theritual of the church was good bothfor intellectuals and the commonman, humbling the arrogant andIifting up the poor in spirit. Readersmay also lie awake at night, however,pondering where belief in a divineManifest Destiny could take thenation - beyond where it alreadyfinds difficulty in defining a strategyfor meeting new challenges beyondattempting to do over past mistakesof other empires.Uoyd C, Gardner is Charl* awl MaryBeard Prcfessor of History at RutgersUniversity,Review of Willianr C. Inboden,Religion and American FonignPolicy, 7945-796A The Soul olContainmentLaura A. Belmonteeligion has played a criticalrole in U.S. foreign policyin the post 9-11 era. AMethodist prcsident championed byevangelicals began a "war on terrofdir€cted at radical Islamists, andreligious factionalism complicatesAmerican obiectives in lraq. WilliamC. Inbodery senior vice presidentof the Legatum lnstitutre andformer senior director for strategicplanning at the National SecurityCouncil under George W Buslr,witnessed this fusion of faith andpower firsthand. In Religion anilAmeican Foreign Poh:qy, he placesthis phenomenon in historic contextand illuminates a surprisinglyunderstudied element of U.S.diplomacy in the early Cold Waryearli.Inboden algues that officialsin the Truman and Eisenhoweradministrations perceived the ColdWar as a religious struggle andattempted to folge policies that usedChristianity as both a motive forand means of combating communistatheism. Yet he treats spirituality as aPnssporl April 2009

genuine expr€ssion of policymakers'deepest convictiont not a toolcynically manipulated for politicalgain. Although he acknowledgesthe importance of "balance of powerrcalities, s€curity concerns, andpolitical and economic ideology" inexplaining the origins of the ColdWar, he believes that these factorsalone are "insufficient" because"they ignore God" (4). He asserts thatwhile most Cold War scholars neglectspirituality as a key component of thebattle between democraticapitalismand Communism, "Americans in the1940s and 1950s did not" (4).Confining his analysis to mainlineProtestant elitet Inboden explorestheir responses to the postwarworld in Part I. Determined tomaximize their ability to shapepublic culture at home and abroad,Protestants organize dozens ofinterdenominational com missions,councilg and conferences aimedat articulating a unified vision forinternational relations. Groups likethe National Council of Churches(NCC), the Commission of theChurches on International Affairs,and the World Council of Churches(WCC) offered varied assessmentsof the Soviethreat, atomic weapons,China, the United Nations, theMiddle East, and other issues.lnboden deftly analyzes how figuressuch as Reinhold Niebuhr, johnFoster Dulles, Swiss theologian KarlBarth, and Czech theologian fosefHromadka clashed in their views onreligion and foreign policy. Dulles'faith in Western Christian civilization,Niebuhr's Christian realism, Barth'sreiection of political involvement, andHromadka's union of Christianityand Communism proved impossibleto reconcile, even without includingRussian Orthodox or Catholicperspectives in the dialogue. At thesame time, neo-evangelical leaders,including Carl F.H. Henry, E.J.Carnell, Charles, Fuller, and BillyGraham, challenged the theologicaland political liberalism of mainstreamProtestant leaders. Pairing a stronganticommunism with a desire toprioritize spirituality over materialneedt evantelicals voiced suspicionsabout initiatives suclr as the UnitedNations and the Marshall Plan. YetPrssporl April 2009they proved no more successful Pope Pius XIl. Although his attemptsthan their mainstrcam Protestant to establish formal diplomaticbrethren in articulating a clearly relations with the Vatican faileddefi ned political theology. American in the face of blistering domesticProtestants were soon voicing three political opposition, he continueddistinct interprctations of U.S. foreign to support the use of spiritual andpolicy. All three factions "contested moral weapons against atheisticthe right to speak authoritatively to Communism.Protestants on questions of public While lnboden presents amplepolicy, and to speakFr Protestants evidence of Truman's religiosity,in the public square."one gains little senseAll called for aof how spirituality"Christian"Irrboderr discotrntsforeigntheranked among otlrerpolicy,possibilitvbut nonethat Tlum.rndeterminants ofcould agree on whatuscd rcligious rlretolicU.S. forcign policy.that constituted (93). for politic.rl gain, but hisHow, for example,Such stark internalcxclusion of an extcndeddid Truman balancediscnssiondivisions, lnbodenof Truman'seconomic, seorrity,decisionconcludetto rccognizeensuredmilitary, and politicalthat ProtestantIsracl complicates thisimperatives withleaders "failed toclaim.spiritual factors?exercise a significantAlthough Inbodenor determinativeacknowledges theinfluence on the actual formation of role of non-religious factors, he doesAmerican foreign policy" (101). not analyze them in conjunctionAlthough Protestant leaders may with religion. Nor does he establishhave faltered in their efforts to infuse any connection between Truman'sU.S. foreign relations with spiritual religious views and those of hisperspectivet American political advisors, members of Congresg orleadersuccessfully constructed a the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all of whom"diplomatic theology" of containment certainly shaped U.S. policy in the(191). ln Part Il, Inboden illustrates early Cold War. Were Truman'show Harry S. Truman, Senator H. spiritual beliefs echoed or challengedAlexander Smith, John Foster Dulles, by others in the foreign policymakingand Dwitht D. Eisenhower linked establishment? The answer is unclear.their religious convictions to their Furthermore, the fact that the foreignforeign pol icy obiectives.policy initiative Inboden examinesBeginning with Truman, Inboden most closely-Truman's efforts toasserts that faith played a critical formalize U.S. relations with therole in initiatives like the Marshall Vatican-ultimately failed raisesPlan, aid to Greece and Turkey, significant questions. Why doesintervention in Korea, and large this unsuccessful overture r€ceivedefense budgets. Truman's Baptist far more attention than hallmarksbeliefs, Inboden argues, compelled of Truman's foreign policy likehim to oppose CommunismNATO, the Berlin Airlift, or NSCaggressively.Truman not only viewed 68? Did spiritual factor shape thesethe Cold War as a battle between decisions? If so, how?"nations who believed in God and Inboden discounts the possibilitymorality, and those who did not" that Truman used religious rhetoricbut also saw religion as a potent tool for political gain, but his exclusionfor undermining the Soviet system of an extende discussion of(107). Not a regular churchgoer or an Truman's decision to recognize Israeladvocate of any particulareligious complicates this claim. lt is welldoctrine, Truman espoused Christian known that the president factored inethics in ways that resonated with the possible loss of Jewish-Americanadherents of other spiritual traditions. votes in determining his course ofReiecting the anti-Catholicism action with the lsraelis. One alsoendemic among Protestant leaders wonders how Truman responded toof the era, Truman sought to forge a the brutal clashes between Muslimsstrong anti-communist alliance with and Hindus following the partitionPaBc l9

of India in 1947. Throughout muchof the volume, Inboden's narrativefocuses quite narrowly on howProtestant Americans within politicaland religious hierarchies inteipretedthe international role of the UnitedStates early in the Cold War. Hisargument could have benefited froma broader analysis of the myriadways that religions, religious people,and religious conflicts informedU.S. foreign relations, or it mighthave been r€cast as a considerationof how spiritual factors were oneelement among many in a largerU.S. ideological offensive againslCommunism.btura Belmonte is Associate Profcssorat Oklahonn State Uni.,ersity.Shining Religion's Psychic Lighton William lnboden's Religion andAmerican Foreign Policy, 7945-7960:The Soul of ContainmentDauid ZietsmaTn August 1947, Reverend KatieI Whittemore of the Church ofIPsychic Litht in Los Angeleswas arr€sted for fortune+elling.As an ordained minister in thelnternational General Assembly ofSpiritualistt Whittemore believedthat "pr€cepts contained in the Bibleare scientifically proven by andthrough mediumship." Outragedat the arrest of Whittemore andother Spiritualist ministertReverend Henrietta Young wroteto President Truman, demandingto know "under the Bill of RighOand the ritht to practice religiousfreedom, whether we actually door do not have the privilege ofworshiping God as our Constitutionprescribes."l Young's perception ofreligious persecution belied ColdWar foreign policy declarations thatthe United Statestood for religiousfreedom. Unfortunately, WilliamInboden leave such contradictionsunexamined. lnstead, Reldon nrrdAmerican Foreign Policy reifies atriumphalist narrative in whichAmerican political elites prescientlydefended religious faith and freedom,often using religion itself, against anPage 20atheistic Soviet empire.To be sure, Inboden shouldbe congratulated for a usefulcontribution to the growingdiscussion of religion's significanceto United States foreign relations. Thebook's mountain of documentarvevidence ought to finally resolvethe skepticism Robert Buzzancoexpressed concerning religion'sinfluence on foreign policy creationinhis Diplonntic History article,"Where's the Beef?" For thoseconventional meat-eaters who mayhave been dissatisfied with dishespreviously offered by Andrew Rotter,Seth Jacobs, David Foglesong, lraChernus, and Walter Hixson, Inbodenappears to lay out a New York stealgcooked on the hot coals of traditionalempiricism and served without thecultural spices of discourse, race,gendeq, or identity.2Religion and American Foreign Policyessentially argues that religion wasboth "a cause" and "an instrument"of U.S. foreign policy during theearly Cold War (2). The worldviewof U.S. religious and political leaderscentered on the importance of God,religious faith, and America's divinemandate. Inboden maintains that, inaddition to the usual menu of ColdWar causet "Americans found iteven more ominous that not onlywere the communists attempting toexterminate religious faith in theirown orbit, but they were also seekingto spread their godless materialismaround the world" (4). AnimatingProtestant leaders as well as ooliticalelites, this religious interpretitionof world affairs, rooted in "faith rnGod," induced opposition to theu.s.s.R. (22).In terms of foreign policy, Inbodenargues that political figures provedmor€ efficienthan religiousleaders at forging religion into "aninstrument in America's Cold Wareffort" (5). The first two chapterscontend that because Protestants weredivided over theological and nationalissues, they "failed to exercise asignifi cant or determinative infl uenceon the actual formation of Americanforeign policy" even as they "helpedto develop a public vocabulary thatspoke of America's world role inspiritual terms" (101-2). The thirdchapter shifts to the political front,asserting that President HarryTruman defined "the Cold War as aspiritual conflict," attempted to cr€atean international religious oppositionto the U.5.S.R., and "establishedthe religious blueprint that hisWhite House successor largelywould follow" (156). Truman's storyis followed by chapters tracingreligion's influence on politicalfigures such as Senator H. AlexanderSmith (R-NJ), Congressman WalterJudd (R-MN), and Secretary of StateJohn Foster Dulles, all of whom werealso influenced by a general religiousworldview as they contemplatedworld affairs. The book's finalchapter argues that President DwightEisenhower "refined, expanded, andinstitutionalized the civil religion"on which the policy of containmentrested (261).While Inboden provides a richlyresearched narrative that establishesreligion as germane to Cold WarU.S. foreign policy, the book isnarrowly focused on the "greatmen" of history. Portentously, thebook's iacket displays only thecut-out photographs of four whitemales: Billy Graham, ReinholdNiebuhr, Truman, and Eisenhower.To Inboden, religion's influenceseems to involve little more than thereligious worldviews of elites andthe efforts they make to organizereligious leaders and organizationsinto national and international anticommunistfronts. This narrowfocus might account for the curiousabsence of Seth Jacobs' incisiveinsithts connectint national religiousculture to Eisenhower's Cold Warforeign policy. Strangely, neitherJacbos' prize-winning book nor hisprize-r^,inning article appears in thebibliography.3The emphasis on elites emergesfrom the book's methodologicalbedrock, namely, the theory ofempirical inquiry. Inboden infersthat the documentary record left byelite figures can simply be arrangedto reveal as much as possible aboutreligion's influence. For example, inrccounting Truman's efforts to createa united international religious frontthrough Myron Taylor's efforts atthe Vaticao Inboden complains thatPossport April2m9

the story is not knowable at pointsbecause "the documentary record .. . is frustratingly thin" (149). In thechapter on H. Alexander Smith, thesenator who receive direct messagesfrom God, Inboden concludes tharbecause historians cannot know"with certainty one way or theother whether someone Iike Smithdid or did not receive tuidancefrom God" they can only "seek asaccurately as possible" to let Smithbe heard and interpreted (224-25').Byutilizing supplementary theoreticalapproaches such as discourseanalysit however, Inboden mighthave mitigated empiricism's limitsand answered questions concerningreligion's role in shaping culturalidentity, meanin& and power.lnboden's methodological straitiacketrelegates religious doctrine tothe sidelines. [n the case of Dulles,Inboden informs us that only on "rareoccasions" did the s€cretary of state"notice doctrinal questions" (228).Neverthelesg "for all his dogmaticuncertainty, Dulles maintained afirm resolve in the spiritual stakesof the Cold War" (229). EscapingInboden's analytical purview is thatdoctrine shaped the possibility of"spiritual stakes" in the first place,even though political actors may nothave been conscious of the doctrinaldynamic. For instancg systematicdoctrinal beliefs about the natureof sin shaped "spiritual stakes"in the 1930s-including Dulles'sown views-and were reflected inthe good-neighbor narrative of thedivinely ordained destiny of theUnited States.4The failure to interrogate linkagesbetween explicit religious languageand the discursive construction ofAmerican mission leads Inboden toneglect religious doctrine's culturalinfluence. This is certainly thecase with Dulles's transition fromadvocate of peace internationalismto prcponent of the nuclear-basedcontainment of evil. During theWorld War II intervention debate.neo-orthodox theologian ReinholdNiebuhr's systematic theology oforiginal sin provided the Iantuage fora reincarnation of American destinybased on the righteoustruggleagainst evil.5 In the postwar period,Pdsst'ort April 2009Americans migrated to visions ofthe Soviet Union as original sin'slatest earthly embodiment. Despitethe efforts of a few theologicallyliberal Protestants to encourageinternationalism, the hegemonicdiscourse of original sin formed thebasis of America's postwar nationalmission, namely, to contain evil thatwas "original." Thug when Dulles"took the strategic architecture ofcontainment and sacralized it" (231),one might suggest that he r€flectedthe shifting discourse of Americandestiny. In failing to interrogateDulles's sense of national identity,Inboden interprets Dulles's transitionas a pr€scient response to an obiectivethreat to religious faith and freedomrather than, say, as part of Dulles'sabsorption of a righteous mission.To be sure, engaging nationalidentity is difficult because it liesin the "undocumented" psyche.But that is no reason to ignorethe issue. After all, anxiety overAmerican identity is rampant amongInboden's cast of elites. Trumanbelieved that Americans neededto "peer into their own soul, andresolve how they would live" (111);Smith had a "tortured sDiritualconscience" which "coniinued toplague him over matters from theepic (the American destiny) to thecomic" (201); Dulles was "troubledand provoked" and "issued a direwarning against declining Americanvirtue" (235); Eisenhower believedthat "Americans needed to searchtheir own soul" and, in lke's ownwordt must "carefully determinewhat it is that we are trying to protectagainsthe Communisthreat" (258).One wonders whether Americansassuaged this uncertainty aboutAmerica by locating evil, atheisticenemies abroad so that they couldconstruct a righteous nationalcommunity in opposition to them.But lnboden does not grapple r^,ithany such cultural analysis of religiouslanguage in his recounting of thedocumentary record.Inboden also seemsimply toaccept as true pervasive claimsthat the Soviet Union threatenedreligious faith across the globe. Thisunderlying assumption is curious,since Inboden informs the reader onseveral occasions that the communistgovemment had not succeededin exorcising religion from theSoviet Union. For example, Trumanbelieved that there was even enoughindependencethe Soviet churchto send Myron Taylor on "a covertmission . . . to the Russian PatriarchAlexis" (142). In another instance,Inobden relates that evangelist BillyGraham "received an invitation topreach in the Soviet Union" (244).U.S. Ambassador George Kennan, ofcourse, informed Washington1952that a deep-seated religious fervorpersisted among the Russian people.6If the Soviets were unable to destroyreligion within their own bordersthree decades after the revolution,wherein lay the threato the entireworld?But any hints of ambiguity inthe Cold War's moral boundariessuffer Inboden's interpretive wrath.For example, he characterizesliberal Protestant suggestions forcooperative internationalism (aphrase he denigrates by placint itin quotation marks (30)) as "moralobtuseness," "simple-mindedmoralism," and "moral equivalency"(41., 42, 69). To lnboden, thesereligious individuals were "incapableof rendering any decisive moraljudgments beyond anguishedhand-wringing and saccharinepaeans to "peace" and "iustice" and"reconciliation" (68).The book's scathing indictmentsof cooperative internationalismignore the complex historicalcontexthat made such "ambituity"possible. Some of these "incapable"individuals probably could noteasily overlook the recent U.S.terror bombings of Dresden, Tokyo,Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the violentcrushing of organized labor groupsin wartime America, the ongoings€gregation and lynching of blackAmericans, the forced sterilizationof natives on the Lakota reserve,wartime Japanese-Americanconcentration camps, U.S. supportfor tyrants such as Vietnam's Diem,or, for that matteL the arrest ofSpiritualist minister seeking topractice their religion.Inboden's analysis consequentlydoes not go much beyondPage 2l

cheerleading for the "We NowKnow" capital "H" History of theCold War. For examplq withoutqualification or explanatiory heremarks that Dulles's 1958 speechto the National Council of Churches"placed the United States firmly onthe side of selfdetermination" iE2).Either Inboden is unfamiliar withU.S. history or he chose to ignore theportion of the documentary r€cordrecounting the U.S. overthrow ofdemocratically elected governmentsin Guatemaland lran, interventionsthat occurred on Dulles's andEisenhower's watch and favoredtyrannical despotic r€gimes. Orperhaps bringing the antidemocraticinstallation of dictators to light is tllestuff of moral obtuseness.Although Relrgion and AmericanF o re i gn P o I i c y effectiv elydemonstrates rcligion's pervasivepresence in U.S. forcign policy, thebook falls short in identifying whyreligion function so powerfully inpolicy creation. Inboden ultimatelyreifies a triumphalist narrative thatleaves unexamined the con tradictorvnatur€ of Cold War claims regardingthe defense of religious faith andfreedom. The experiences of electedIranian leaders, Spiritualist pastors,and others maqginalized by U.S. ColdWar power do not square with theseclaims. Although the "History" of theCold War obscure such historicalparticipants, shining religion,s lightat a more obtuse angle might makethem increasingly visible.Daoid Zietsma is Assistant Professorof History at Redeemer UniaersityCollege.Notes:l. Rever€nd Henrieha Young to HaryTruman. March 13, t948, Offfciat Fite 76:Chur$ Matterc Harry S, Truman Papers,Independenc€, Missouri.2 Robert Buzzanco, 'Wherc's the Beef? CultuEwi0put Power in the Study of U.S. FoeignRef ation$" Diplo,n rlic History 24 (Fall Zfftr)l62tn.3. Seth facob6, Arflcrior's Mimcle Mon hlVichnu: Ngo Dhfu Aem, R.ligio , Rnce, at lNew SHAFR Website LaunchedThe Society for Historians of American Foreign Relatiors (SHAFR) is dedicated to the scholarly study of thehistory of American foreign relations. As such, it promotes the "the study, advancement and disseminationot a xnowledge of American Forcign Relations " through- the sponsorship of research, annual meetingg andpublications' The new website, www.shafr.org extendi this mission by iroviding an online forum foi peoplebether to understand contemporary foreign relations within a historical iramewoik. Among the new feitutes arethe following:Blogs composed by prominent members of our guild. Our inaugural team of bloggergrcprysenti.nq a. livgrserange of topical and geographical areas of intercst, pEvidethoughtful, informe4 and often provocative historical perspectives on foreign relationsissues in the news today;Op-eds authored by important and knowledgeablexperts in our field. In additionto the blogs maintained by our blogging team, shafr.org will both actively solicit.and iudiciously acc€pt opinion piec€s emphasizing historical perspectives andbackground on specifi contemporary issues;.Historicalthinkint about cun€nt_foreign relations around the web. Shafr.orghighlight.willopinion pieces from other online sources that use history to explJecontemporary issues in foreign affairs;Comments on original shafr.org generated contmt. Visitors can comment on shafr.org blogs and op-eds byretisterint on the site; andSubscription to RSS feede for shafr.oqg. Visitors can subscribe to RSS feeds that will keep them updabed onnewly generated content on the site.In addiHon to these featurcs, the new website provides all the information about SHA-FR that members cameto_exPect from the old site. These new-feah.lresimply allow shafr.org to serve as a valuable platform thrcughwhich members can interact with the larger virtuaicommunity and irom which they can unierscore the value ofhistorical thinking and analysis to contemporary intemationai affairs.\Az\nz\nz. sbrafr.orgPnssryr, Apt'tl2009

U.S. htetw tio,t i Southcnsl Asid,195F1957 repeatedly cited his Catholicism as(DuAam, NC, 2004); Seth Jacobs, "'Our proof of anticommunism, equatedSystem Demands the Supr"me BeinS': The U.S.Religious Revival and the'Diem Experiment' his devotion to the Catholic Churchlg*fi," Diplonntic HEtory 5 (Fall 2001):589- with allegiance to the free world, and624.insisted that Buddhist, Cao Daiist,4. David Ziebma, 'Buildint the Kintdom of and Hoa Haoist South Vietnamesefu: Reli8ious Discourse, Nationaldentity,and thc Good Neighbor Policy, 193&1938," politicians were, by virtue of theirRl/E,oric & Pu ic Afnirs ll (Summer 2008): faithg undependable as Cold War179-214.allies, regardless of how much5. David Zietsma, "'Sin Has No Hisbory': administrativexperience or publicReliSioD Nationaldentity, and U.S.Intervention, l93T-1941,' Diplonn,ic History 3l support they had, As I movedoune 2m7): 531 -55.out of the archives and explored6. David S. Fogfesong Thc A,,1,cricd[ Missiotl Eisenhower-era popular culturcmoviesand television, bestsellingoud the "Evil E,ntin'(New York 2007),115-116.fiction and non-fiction books,influential prcss organs like the NauYo* Thnes and Life magazine-lReview of William Inboden,rcalized that I was rcsearching aperiodReligion and American Foreignof tremendous religiousPolicy,79t15-7960: Therevival in the United States, an almostSoul ofContainmentunprecedented upsuqge of pietythat frequently expressed itself inSethhatr€d and fear of America's godlesslacobsgeopolitical opponent. It becamelittle over a decade ato,apparento me that statesmen likewhen I began work on my lohn Foster Dulles were attractedissertationto Diemin eamest, Ibecause he sharcd theirexperienced one of those crises that,conceotion of the Cold War as aimproperly managed,crusade in whichcan torpedo anJudeo{hrisHansneededacademic career before it begins. Myto band totether.subiect was the "Diem experiment "This discovery intrigued me, butIWashin$on's commiknent tocould hear Cassandra howlingpreserve an independentin the background. I am not, bySouthVietnam under the premiershiptemperament, a maverick. Iwasof Ngo Dinh Diem. Dissatisfiedaware, as Andrew Preston haswithr€c€ntly pointedstandard explanations for thisout, that "standardpolicy-i.e, that it was the result ofhistoriographical guides to the fieldof diplomatic history" do not includemilitant U.S. anticommunism andreligionthe absence of other candidates foramong the recognizedSouth Vietnam's highest"methodological and theoreticaloffi ce--andhaving fallen under the spell ofschools to explain what drivesseveral works typifying theAmerican foreign policy."r Well overculturalthirty, with kids totum in diplomatic history I soughtosupport, I wantedemploy then-fashionableto finish my dissertation and get outcategoriesof analysis like race and genderinto the iob market. I did not relishto determine why the Eisenhowerthe prospect of being one of thoseperpetual graduate students whoadministration chose Diem as itsSoutheast Asian strongman. Racespend years pursuing iconoclasticproved a useful lens; gender,theses no one takes seriously. Hadapartmyfrom some provocative cables fromadviser, Michael Sherry, toldme to drop religion as a category ofEdward Lansdale describing Diemanalysis, I would have obeyed.as "two-fisted" and praising hiswillingness to "fight like a man,"It will come as no surpris€ to thosewho know Mike to learn that hisworked less well. What really struckme as I reviewed governmentcounsel ran in the opposite dircction.Not only did he encourage me todocuments, though, was howinvestigate the relationshi p betweenoften policymaker iustified theirdecision to "sink or swim" withmidcenturv American statesmen'sreligiousDiem on religious grounds. Theybeliefs and their diplomaticbehavior, but he directed me toPdssport April 2009the work of other historians, inparticular Anders Stephansory whohad interpreted U.S. foreign policyas a prcduct of rcligious attitudes.2The sternness of Mike's commentarvon my early chapter drafts pertainedto my lack of theoretical clarity,not, as would have been the casewith a more orthodox critic, to thepresumption that religion has nobearing on policymaking. Urgedto systematize what I meant by"religiorl" and emboldened whenMike seemed pleased with theresultt I pres€nted my first paper ata SHAFR confurence in 1999, where,as fate would have it, I stumbledupon another mentor. Andrew Rotterfound my argument persuasive,offercd some suggestionq an4 bestof all, let me read his soon-to-bepublishedessay on how religiouspreconceptions affected u.s. rclationswith India and Pakistan in the earlvCold War period.That a scholar as distinguishedas Rotter would make the case forreligion was reassuring althoughthe response his article elicited in aDiplomatic History roundtable gaveme cold feet again. Had I not alreadywritten half of my dissertatiooRobert Buzzanco's "Wherc's theBeef?" review might have causedme to start over from scratch. Yetone could rationalize the tone of thatpiec€ by attributing it to Buzzanco'sdislike of cultural approaches to thehistory of international relations.More troubling was PatriciaHill's reaction. A self-proclaimed"culturalist'' who had lauded Rofter'searlier work on gender as "brilliant"Hill insisted that religion "cannot bedeployed as a category of analysisin the same way that scholars havewielded gender, class, and race";it was not a "variable that mattersas we now assume race, class, andgender must always be understoodas constituents of any society orstate." Hill propooed a test Couldhistorians accustomed to speakingof things as raced, classed, andgendered "imagine the loc,ution'religioned'?" No, not in 2000, andthat answer indicated an "intuitive,linguistic awareness of the distinctionbetween rcligion and these otherskuctural categories." Rotter's essayPagc 23

was provocative, Hill concluded, but continuing to teach Sunday schoolit was more noteworthy for its risktakingthan its explanatory power. we can identify the specific set ofafter becoming president, but unlessIt did not herald the arrival of an theological convictions that Dulles,important new mode of analysis for Nixon, and Carter possessed withhistorians of U.S. diplomacy.3 respect to God, iustice, peace, andHill would, I suspect, be surprised the American mission in the world,by the number of religion+hemed we cannot make anything but vaguearticles that have appeared inassertions about rcligion's imoact onDiplornatic History since she issued their policymaking. ilappily, brestonher verdict. In addition to my piece observet several recent workgonDiem, Ira Chemus's reassessment Rotter's Corzradas al Odds foremostof Operation Candor, and David among them-have "beg[uln toZietsma'study of American unravel the exceedingly complicatedinterventionismthe pre-Pearl .. . relationship between the sacredHarbor years, theand the secular,"iournal publishedan extraordinary rnbocren un

Graham in the pages of. Christianity against communism and for a new to warrant a orivate channel ofand Cnsrs; the latter r€ciprocated democratic order" in South Vietnam. communication: Taylor bypassed thein Christianity Today, The National FMSCO's operatives would slip into State Department and reported toAssociation of Evangelicals (NAE) the country and, Lowry declared, the president directly; his dispatchesthoutht the National Council organize "native Buddhists, Cao relating consultations with, amongof Churches (NCC) was soft on Daiists, Catholics, and other men and others, Pope Pius XII, the PapalCommunism; the NCC charged the women of conviction" in support of Nuncio in Paris, the Lutheran BishopNAE with isolationism and war- the Diem government. Apparently, of Berlin, and the Archbishop ofmongering. Some Protestants felt Vice President Richard Nixon was Canterbury were sent in s€cretthat true Christianshould eschew quite taken with this scheme; he code. Truman believed, as he putpoliticalinvolvementandplace lobbiedupper-echelonadministration it, that "[t]he cause of Communismtheir trust in God alone; others figures to endorse it, assuring them of versus Christianity and Democracyconsidered this "a quietistic betrayal his "high regard for and considerable transcends minor differences inof the gospel' social imperatives" confidence in Dr. Lowry." Since other Christian creeds," and he sought to(47). While Inboden concurs with documents relating to Lowry's plan build an anticommunist coalition onstandard interpretations of the late have yet to be declassified, we do values shared among all Christians,1940s and 1950s as a time of religious not know if it was implemented, but regardless of denomination,enthusiasm in the United Statet he Inboden is surely right to asserthat Europe and America (121). Indeed,demonstrates that this enthusiasm it "provides a revealing window Truman once entertained thefound expressioninto FRASCOs possibility of "sendIing Taylorlin different ways,cooperation to see the top Buddhist and theespecially amons Methodologically, traditional witir the"churchmen" -Grand Lama of Tbet" if it woulddiPlomatic historians are fond of administration, help "mobilize the people wholike Niebuhr and reminding culture vultures like Nixon's very believe in a moral world againstheGraham. me that while n'e may portray the early interest in Bolshevik materialists" (139-140).Religion ant! existence of widesPrcad attitudes Vietnam, and the For five years, Taylor engaged inAneri-can Foreign about race, gender, or religion, ideological uses what Inboden calls "spiritual shuttlePolicy alsowe cannot connecthose attihrdes of religion against diplomacy," navigating a Europeanbene-fits from definitively to deeds. tn the end, communism" "religious landscape rife withInboden's mininq our approach requires a leap of (28&281). I wish almost 2,000 years of ecclesiastical-of dynamite faith to account for the origin of these papers had controversy" while fending off theprimary sources, the behavior we are endeavoring been ivjilable brickbats of American Protestantslome recently to explain. when I was who considered Catholicism anddeclassided, theresearching my Communism "equally repressive,rest overlooked forfirst book, and equally threatening and thereforedecades until Inboden blew the dust I intend to cite them the next time equaf y reprehensible" (124, 729, 128).off them. For selfish reasont I was a colleague minimizes religion's His initiatives failed, and Trumandelighted to learn that the Operations importance in shaping American terminated the campaign in late 1951.Coordinating Board (OCB), an diplomacy.Still, the president had articulated anagency set up by Eisenhower to I will moreoverefer thatobiective that his successor wouldcoordinate departmental execution of colleague to lnboden's account of achieve, not so much by appealingnational security policies, considered the adventures of Myron Taylor, to European and American clerics assponsoring a covert mission to the "quixotic, controversial, and by going over their heads and usingVietnam in 1954 to, in the board's elusive figure" who gave up his the "white House pulpif' to promotewords, "use the religious factor to job as chief executive of the United a doctrinally inclusive faith aroundintensify local anti-communism." States Steel Corporation to serve first which all opponents of CommunismThe mission was conceived bv as coordinator of American relief could rally.an Episcopalian minister named efforts in war-torn ltaly and then as The most significant primaryCharles Wesley Lowry whoPresident Harry Truman's "chosen source lnboden draws uDon isenioyed a friendship with President agent" in a "grandiose, secretive Senator H. Alexander Smith'sEisenhower's pastor, the Reverend plan. . . to unite the leaders of the daily iournal, in which the senatorEdward Elson, and who, together various factions of Christendom recorded, in copious detail, his searchwith Elson, established thein a pan-religious alliance" (119, for divine counsel on matters routineFoundation for Religious Action in 122). Taylor has heretofore been and world-shaking. This is the kindthe Social and Civil Order (FRASCO) almost invisible to historians of of archival bonanza scholars dreamafter Eisenhower assumed office. the Truman administration. David of, and it comes closer to solvingLowry volunteered the services McCullough does not mention the ubiquitous causeand-effectof several FRASCO members, one him in his cinderblock-sized problem than any document I havea Catholic priest, for a "spiritual biography.T Yet Truman thought encountered. Methodologically,offensive movement directed Taylor's mission important enough traditional diplomatic historians arePassrytt Aprilzo@Page 25

fond of reminding culture vulturcslike me that while we may portraythe existenc€ of widespr€ad attitudesabout race, gender, or religion,we cannot connect those attitudesdefinitively to deeds. In the end, ourapproach requires a leap of faith toaccount for the origin of the behaviorwe arc endeavoring to explain. Thisis an unavoidable feature of culturaland social history, but, as Inbodennotes, Smith's diary provides"incomparable material" for s€holars"wrcstling" with the issue (191). Howcan we say with confidence that,for example, Smith's speech on theSenate floor in support of the TrumanDoctrine was informed by his prayerlife and religious convictions?Because his diary entries for 5 and 7April 1947 read, in parh "God grantthat in these days I may find my truthand speak it into my speech in theSenate on this Greek and Turkish aidbill. . . . I have gotten up early for theinspiration of the moming and God. Iam making my notes for this foreignrelations sFech. It must be GeCl or itwill fail. It comes to me that I will beguided. Start now. . . . God will helpme in my dictation" (198).Smith penned similar entrieswhile brooding over how to respondto proposed U.S. membership inNATO, Mao Zedong's victory overthe Nationalists in the ChineseCivil War, and the face-off betweenEisenhower and Robert Taft forthe 1952 Republicanomination.His diary's somber, supplicatorytone remained the same when thetopic under review was his ownover-fondness for tobacco or Mrs.Smith's temper tantrums. The senator"believ[ed] God to be involvedin every one of life's last details,"Inboden observes. "His foreignpolicy was merely an extension of hispersonal commitments" (201). AndSmith's strongest commitment was tothe Moral Re-Armament movement(MRA), a "shadowy" organizationfounded in the 1920s whidr taughtthat God gave "unmediatedinstructions" to those who engaged ina moming ritual called "quiet time."Disciples wer€ told to "pray and thenwait attentively for God's 'guidance'for the day's events" (192). Smi*rperformed this ritual every morningPage 26from young adulthood until hisdeath in 1967. For half a century, hisconduct was govemed by the advicehe believed he receive during quiettime, and when he wrote his dailv"to do" lists, he prefaced each goilwith "lt comes to me to. . . ." Thisphrase, Inboden notes, "indicatledlhis unambiguous conviction thatGod spoke intimately and dir€ctlyto his daily activities," whether theyinvolved lobbyhg for Chiang Kaishekor abstaining from cigars (195).Reprcss that smirk. Smith'smeditations mav strike academicsin the twenty-first century asamusin& but he was no "bucolicFundamentalist yahoo" of thetype satirized by H. L. Mencken,sBefor€ entering politics, Smithhad been a lawyer in New YorkCity and a professor at Princeton,and he became one of the Senate'sauthorities on intemational affairsduring the early years of the ColdWar. As a longtime member of theSenate For€ign Relations Committeeand occasional chairman of theSubcommittee on East Asian Affairs,he was in a position to exerciseconsiderable influence on forcignpolicy, especially toward Asia. Heenioyed the confidence of Dulles,who hoped he would becomechairman of the Foreign RelaHonsCommittee, and he worked withsuch prestigious legislators asReprcsentative Walter Judd andSenator William Knowland to craftsome of the most consequentialforcign-policy initiatives of theTruman-Eisenhower era. I actuallvthink Inboden underrates Smithjjstatur€ as a policymaker. He mighthave pointed out that the senatoraccompanied Dulles to the ManilaConference that established theSoutheast Asia Treaty Organization(SEATO), which, of course, wouldsupply an excuse for a variety ofU.S. interventions in Vietnam. Dulleswas concemed about obtaining theconstitutionally r€quired tr,r,o-thirdsvote for ratificaHon of the SEATOpact in the Senate, and he thereforeselected Smith and Mike Mansfieldto travel to Manila with him andgive the treaty their imprimatur,Mansfield, a former professor ofAsian historv nicknamed "ChinaMike" by his colleagues, was a logicalchoicg but it was Smith whom Dulleslauded as an "expert on the Far Easf'when announcing the membershipof the U.S. delegation.e We mayassume that the "experf advice thatSmith gave Dulles at Manila, likeevery act in his long career of publicservice, was religiously infused; it"came to him" as orders from Godwhile he meditated before breakfast.Historians who probe beyond this insearch of Smith's "real" motivationare commifting the cardinal sin ofthe discipline: anachronism. Inbodenrecognizes the need to engagehistorical figurcs on their own terms,and the result, especially in hischapter on Smith, is dazzling.The grcatest advantate Inbodenpossesses over other scholarcexploring the interplay betweenreligion and foreign policy i9 Isubmit, his own devoutness. Somemay argue that this compromiseshis obiectivity-as though there hasever been a completely objectivehistorian-but I disagree. BecauseInboden is himself a Christian, hedoes not condescend to his subjects.He tr€ats them with a measure ofempathy rare among academics.More than rare: it is almost unheardof.Twenty years have passed sinceRobert Wuthnow demonstrated thecoflelation between higher levelsof education and lower levels ofr€ligiosity in America, a phenomenonWuthnow labeled the "educationgap."lo Th's trend is even morepronounc€d today. A professoropenly affirming his or her beliefin God and the power of prayerwould be anomalous in anv historvdepartment, including mine-and'I teach at a Jesuit university. YetInboden makes no bones aboutthe centrality of faith in his lifu.He told a rcporter for Christianitylbday a while back (l hope hewill forgive me for Googling andciting this source) that the r€asonhe enrolled in Yale's history Ph.D.program after working as a staffmember in the U.S. Senate wasthat "I realized I was not equippedwith a theoretical framework thatwould help me approach politics asa Christian." Although barely outof college the precocious lnbodenPnrsport April 2009

was one of the authors of the 1998International Religious FreedomAct, and the experience of draftingand negotiating passage of thatpiece of legislation, he recalled,"challenged me to ask what rolereligion has in foreign policy. Whenis it right to leverage the kingdomof man for the ends of the kingdomof God?" CT editorialized, "Thesewere big questions for a youngpolicy wonk."ll They were also thesame questions that Harry Truman,Dwight Eisenhower, lohn FosterDulles, and other elite Americangeopoliticians asked themselvesand each other as they led theirnation through the first decade anda half of the Cold War. These menwerc profoundly concerned withthe religious component of foreignpolicy, even if diplomatic historianshavg until recently, neglected it.Inboden understands midcenhrrypolicymakers' priorities; they are, to aconsiderablextent, his own.Thus, when he examinesEisenhower's notorious assertion that"our form of government makes nosens€ unless it is founded in a deeplyfelt religious faith, and I don't carewhat it it" he does noL in the mannerof Bancroft Prize'winning historianJames Patterson, rcll his eyes at thepresidenfs fatuity and write off therevival for which Eisenhower wasstandard-bearer as superfi cial.l2Instead, he takes Eisenhowerseriously. Viewed in context, heobservet "Eisenhower'sentimentreveals much." The president had justvisited with his old comrade fromWorld War II, Soviet General GrigoriZhukov and he was describing theirencounter to a troup of iournalists,seeking to explain why, despite thewarm embraces, there could be notrue ddtente. Eisenhower remindedhis audience of the Declaration ofIndependence's claim that all men"are endowed by their Creator withinalienable rights" and then offeredhis own interpretation: to wit, that a"deeply felt religious faith" affirminghuman equality was necessary fordemocratic govemment. "With utof course, it is the Judeo-Christianconcept " Eisenhower declared, "butit must be a religion that all men arecreated equal. So what was the usePnaspprt April 2009of me talking to Zhukov about that?Religion, he had been taught, was theopiate of the people" (89-260).Eisenhower's remarks, howeverinelegant, were consistent with hisoverall effort to use religion as aweapon in combating the SovietUnion. Like Truman, he believed thattheological distinctions were trivial inthe face of atheistic Communism, andthat Americanshould unite aroundthe cor€ set of principles common toProtestants, Iewt and Catholics. TheUnited States needed a nonsectarianfaith as "deeply felt" as the Soviets'godless creed or the free world wasdoomed. We can criticize Eisenhowe4,as some of his contemporaries did,for valuing religion's social utilityabove its spiritual content, butlnboden has made it much harderfor scholars to dismiss religion asa significant force in Eisenhower'spolicymaking. If anything, itoutweighed the holy trinity of race,clasg and gender, and may evenhave trumped familiar explanatorydevices like "national security." ToEisenhower, and most governmentofficials of his generation, the ColdWar was a holy war. The Trumanand Eisenhower administrationsworked as hard to fortify America'sreligious defenses as they did to buildup the nation's nuclear arsenal. Byrestoring this long-ignored featureof U.S. foreign policy to its properplace at the forefront of policymakers'consciousness, William Inboden hasmade an invaluable contribution toour understanding of the early ColdWar era. His book is essential reading.Seth laabs is Associate Prcfessor ofHistory at Boston College.Notes:l. Andrew Pr"ston, "Bridgint theGap betweenthe Sacred and theSecular in the Historyof American For€ign Relationt" Dillorr.rticHirrory 30 (November 2006): 791 .2. Ande6 Stephanson, Mnttif.sl Dtsti,'y:Atttuican Exytnsionn.l the Ernpirc of Ri9ht(Nelv Yorlq 1995).3. Andrcrv l. Rottcr "Christians, Muslimt.rnd Hindus: Rcligion and U.S.-South AsianRefationr 1947-1954," Diploudlic Histotg24 (Fall 2m0): 593{13; Robert Buzzan(o,"Commentary: Where's the 8€ef? Cultur"rvithout Porver in the Study of U.S. ForcignRclrtiont" Dr'plor,.rlic History 24 (Fall 2000):62'632; Patricia R. Hill, "Commentary:Religion as a Catcgory of DiplomaticAnalysis," Diplot,totic H,1s,or!, 24 (Fall 2000):633-640.4. Seth lacobs, "'OurSystem Demands theSupreme Being': The U.S. Religious Revivaland the'Diem Expcriment' 1954-1955,"Diplona, ic History E lFall 2001 ): 589-624;lra Chernut "Operation Candon Fea[Faith, and Flcxibility," Diplo,,ntic Hisloty 29(2O5): 799803; David Zietsma, "'sin Has NoHistory': Religion, Nationaldcntity, and U.5,f nten ention, 1937-1941," Diplot'mtic History3l (June 2007):531-565; Prcston, "Bridgingthe Gap," 783-812; Andrcw Rotter, Corrmddsat Otl.ls: Tlte U ilcd Statcs ntul htiin,1947-196,t(lthaca,2000).5. fra Chemus, Apocnlyp* Mnmgcutclr't:Eise oiLut d .l lhc Discours of Nntiotnlfirsc4rrity (Stanford, 2008); David S. FogelsonpThc A|ruicn Mission dul thc "Ei,il E pirc".Th. Crujl,'fu hr n 'Frcc Russid" sittcc 1881(Cambridge, MA,2007).6. Wif f Hcrber& P|l'l.Eta t,Cdtholic,lmt AnL.Jiy i,t At crica Rctigrbrls Sociologv (GandenCity, Nr, 1955), Z€2. Forexamples of rhistcndency, s€e Douglas Miller and MarionNowak, Trrc Ffli,-,j Tlr Way W: Rmlly Werc(Garden City, Nl, l9Z) 83-1fi; t. RonaldOakley, Gorl's Country: Autcrico iI tl&' Fifi6(New York 1986), 3ll.32Z Slephcn r. Whitfield,TlECullutc of the Cold Wdf,2nd ed. (Baltimore,19961,V.lm'7. David M€ullougb Tnr,rarr (New York1993).8. H. L. Mencken, "ln Memoriam: W. J. B.," T,r.'Vh agc Mclckc , cd. Alistair Cooke (New York'1983),155.9.'TK,o Go with Dul16: Senato6Smith andMansfield to be Far East Advisers," Ndru yo*Tifles, 20 August 1954.10. Robert Wuthnoh', trtc Rcstructuri'/g ofAitc cnn RcliSiott: Socicty dttd Fdilh sitve Worl.lW,rr ll (Princeton, 1988), 168.ll. kur€n F. Winner, "Policy Wonk forChrist," Chrisrinnity Tottoy, 13 November20fl).f2. ,ames T. Patterson, Gn d Exryctdtiotts:ThcLhtitcd Stdtes, 1945.1974 (New York 1995), 329,332-33.Author's ResponseWilliam InbodenfS eligion and Anerican Foreignl( Policy,1945-1960, appears toI \have elicited quite an arrayof respons€s. I hope their diversitytestifies to the potential for continuedlines of inquiry into the role ofreligion in diplomatic history. I willattempt to address what appear tobe the rEviewers' main points andalong the way offer a few furtherruminations on approaches to thesubiect.Laura Belmonte and Lloyd Gardnereach raise in slightly differentformulations a common question:How nrclr did religion matter in thePaga 27

early Cold War? Belmonte says thatin my book "one gains little sense ofhow spirituality ranked among otherdeterminants of U.S. foreign policy,"and she asks specifically whether andhow religion influenced particularpolicy initiatives such as NSC-5&NATO the Berlin Airlift, etc. Gardnerputs it this way: "Suppose we leaveout the religious factor? WouldAmerican policies have been anydiffet€nt at Yalta? At Potsdam?"On one level, such questionscan help discipline and refine anargument by keeping it tethered toactual events. But on another level,they shift the analytical ground toomuch to a narrower, tactical focus onspecific policies without first askingr.r,hy American leaders believed thosepolicies were necessary. The primaryobjcctive of my book is to addressbroader, strategic issues: Why didthe United States even fight the ColdWar? How were the boundaries ofthe conflict (i.e., the boundaries ofcontainment) determined? How werefriend and foe defined? Religionforms a significant part of the answerto all these questions.Thus to Gardner's questionabout Yalta and Potsdam I wouldreply that relition helps solve thehistorical puzzle of why Yalt andPotsdam are primarily (and correctly)remembered today more for markingthe slart of the Cold War ratherthan marking the crd of World Warll. To revisit a point made in mybook, religion helps explain whythe United States and Soviet Unionpivoted so quickly from their postureas uneasy allies sitting together tonetotiate the end of World War Ilto a posture as uneasy adversariessitting across from each other andestablishing the boundaries of theirown inchoate conflict. Religionalso helps illuminate other specificCold War initiatives-hence mycomparison of NSC-68 to a "sermon,"for example, and Bruce Kuklick'sanalysis of it as a seminal Americancivil-religious document.l Hencealso Reinhold Niebuhr's descriptionof the "spiritual significance ofNATO." Niebuhr contrasts religiousliberty and religious belief in NATOcountries with the state-mandatedathcism of Warsaw Pact nations andP.rge 28observes that in NATO "the spiritual understanding of the Cold War.facts corresp-ond to the strategic Curiously, Belmonte avers thatnecessities." z"lnboden discounts the possibilityBelmonte's questions about that Truman used religious rhetoric"how spirituality ranked among for political gain." Yet my argumentother determinan!s of U.S. foreign is precisely the opposite: Trumanpolicy" and how Truman balanced (and Eisenhower, Dulles, and most"economic, security, mili tary, other American leaders) did in factand political imperatives with use religious rhetoric for politicalspiritual factors" are intriguing but gain. The book describes religion,somewhat miscast. Disentangling for example, as a "potent tool forthese factors in the historical record strengthening anticommunist resolvewith any precision would be almost at home" and contends that "onlv bvimpossible. These factors werc not summoning the American people toeven disentangled in Truman's a religious crusade could U.S. leadersmind (or Eisenhower'9 for that maintain domestic support for thematter). Nor werc they necessarily extraordinary measures needed toin comDetition with each other. fight the Cold War."3 However-andRather, they coalesced and reinforced here is the other, crucial half of theeach other in the basic worldview argument-they also used religiousthat governed the way Truman and rheaoric because they rcdlly bclie.,cdEisenhower perceived the Cold il. This is hardly incongruous orWar and defined America's role. inconceivable. Given the complexitiesThey believed that the rights and of human identity and the challengesresponsibilities of both people and of political leadership, it should notnations werc authored by God and surprise us that political leadersincluded limited and accountable could sincerely believe somethinggovemment (democracy), private and also employ those beliefs toproperty and open marketspersuade, manipulate, and/or inspire(capitalism), and the use of force to others.protect borders and deter threats I want to be careful, however, to(security). Godavoid reflexivelyin tum ordained The primary objective of my book overstating thethat the United is to address broader, strategic case' While IStateshouldissues: Why did the Uniti think that thebear a particular States even fight the Cold War? documentaryresponsibility How were thJboundaries of the evidence andto protect and conflict (i.e., the boundaries of the argumentsadvance these containment) determined? How Presented invalues in thewere friend and foe defined? my book offer aworld, and HePersuasrve accountendowed theof the religiousnation with distinctive military roots of the Cold Wa4, I do not servepower, economicapacity, and either my own credibility or the craftspiritual capital to carry out the of history by overdetermining thetask. For Truman and Eisenhower, argument. Thug as the reviewersincluding a religious dimension noted, I also try to present in thein their definition of the Cold War book what I regard as constraints onsometimes led to explicitly religious ils thesit such as certain gaps in thepolicy initiatives, such as their efforts archival record or the comparativelyto unite world religious leaders under limited role of religious convictiona common banner of anticommunism in the life of a Cold War lion suchor to launch a world day of prayer. as Dean Acheson-though even heBut it also meanthat Truman and embraced a religiously informedEisenhower believed that otherwise definition of the conflict.secular policy initiatives (such as The appreciative review by SethNATO, the Marshall Plan, Atoms for Jacobs is the type that authorsPeace, Open Skieg etc.) also had a dream of, and I am tempted iust tospiritual element by virtue of the fact typ€ "Amen"(or an appropriatethat they proceeded from a spiritual equivalent) and leave it at that. MorePnssrytl Aprilz0og

seriously, I thank him for his graciouswords, particularly given his ownpath-breaking work in the field.facobs' review does touch on a coupleof issues that I think merit somefurther reflection. They are retatedyet distinct. FirsL should scholarsof diplomaHc history k€at religionprimarily as an issue of identity(alongside race and gender), orideology, or neither, or both? Second,what role (ifany) shoulda historian'spersonalidentity,includingpolitical andreligiouscommiEnents,play in historicalsdrolarship?Jacobsand AndrewPreston, among others, havedone some sophisticated thinkingabout the first of these questions.In considering how religion caninfluence poliry facobs describesthe need to "straddle both genles"of diplomatic history and culturalhistory and engage in "ideologicalhistory---or history of the power ofideas" in a way that encompasses asomewhat unorthodox factor such asreligion as well as a more theorizedfactor such as race.a Preston in turnsketches out the beginnings of aframework for how diplomatichistorians might engage withreligion. While he locates religionprimarily in the realm of identity andsuggests a similar methodology forstudying it ("historians using religionmust emulate their counterDartswho have already used gender,racE, and culturc"), he then qualifiesthat suggestion by declaring that"'religiory' of coursq is innatelydifferent from 'gender' or 'race,' bothas subiects of historical inquiry andas causal explanations of historicaldevelopments." He also notes that"religion differs fu ndamentally"from gender, race, and culturc inthat it is "both essentiallvoluntarvand escapable."s He is for the mosipart correcto highlight religion'svoluntary and escapable nature,although there are traditions forPasspor, Apdl2mFirst, should scholars of diplomatichistory tr€at religion primarily asan issue of identity (alongside raceand gender), or ideology, or neither,or both? Second, what role (if any)should a historian's personal identity,including political and religiouscommitments, play in historicalscholarship?which that characterization wouldhave to be modified, sudr as Judaism,with its ethno-national dimension,or Islam, with its strict constraints onapostasy.6Religion has at least fouradditional characteristics that makeit distinctive as an interpretivecategory particularly for diplomatichistory. First religion by its verynature includes a meta-narrative thatexists outsidethe individualand purports todefine the past,present, andfuture as well asthe individual'srelationshipto a largercommunity, Itaddrcsses notonly "who amI?" but also"what is the reality of the worl4and how does it bear on me?"Second, religion makes normativemoral demands. It is as much aboutwhat outht to be done as who aperson is. Related to this is the thirdcharacteristic, which is especiallyrelevant for the study of diplomatichistory: religion's normative moralobligations and meta-narrativescan apply to nations as well asindividuals. Religion can help shapean entirc nation's belief in its roleand purpose in the world, The finalcharacteristic, unique to religiorL isits eschatological dimension. Religionattempts to define an etemal rcalitybeyond time and beyond this world.Yet actions that take place in thisworld are very much influenced byetemal perspectives, whether theybe Hindu doctrines of rcincamaHon,utopian ChrisHan post-millennialism,apocalyptic pre millennialism,Islamic Shi'ism's hopes for theHiddm Twelfth Imam, or anynumber of other traditions. Giventhese factors and others, rcligion doesnot seem to fit neatly into a definitionof either identity or ideology, and assuch poses both unique challengesand opportuniHes for furtherscholarlv work.On thi question of how a scholar'spersonal convictions and identitybear on his/her work on historyfacobs offers a respectful andnuanced perspective. One of the mosthelpful aspects of the postmodemistcritique of obiectivity (or perhapsI should say "objectivity") is thatit forces us to interrogate our ownidentity and beliefs and acknowledgehow they invariably shade ourreconstructions and interprctations ofthe past. Identity and personal beliefsare inescapable for any sdrolar, and inthis era of Google they are also muchmore readily apparent. Sometimesthey may help illuminate otherwiseopaque historiographical questionsand perspectives, while at other times(or even at the same time) they maybias and distort our reading of thepast. In my case, on an existentiallevel I understand firsthand whatit means to have serious religiouscommitments. But this does not meanI can or would claim any privilegedepistemological insights into thestudy of history. In other words, Iread and try to decipher the samearchives and secondary texts that areavailable to every other historian.And I attempt to rcspect the properboundaries between scholarship andpartisanship.To take one example, consider thequestion of civil religion, describedin my book as an instrument formaintaining domesti consensus andsupport for U. S. Cold War policies.David Zietsma seems to think thatI applaud civil religion, and hewishes that I had critiqued it mor€fierc€ly. But to do so risks confusingthe distinction between scholarshipand advocacy. As a historian I findAmerican civil religion intercsHngand important and tried to describe itas such in my book. Yet as a ChristianI find civil religion idolatrous andhave said as much in an explicitlypartisan / confessional setting morcappropriate for such debates.TOf the four reviewers in thisroundtable, Zietsma offers the mostsustained critique of my book acrossseveral fronts, and I will attempt togive him a morc extended response.Some contextualization is in order toframe the thrust of his critique andmy reply. Over four hundred yearsof American history many Christiansacross a range of theologicaltraditions have wrestled with thePage29

spiritual identity of America. Muchof this hand-wringing can be distilledinto a question ofbiblical typology: IsAmerica the "New ferusalem" or the"new Babylon"? This vexing questionsymbolized and summarized thestruggle to define America's Plac€in the world and the identitv of itspeople.s Jerusalem represenG thePromised Land, the city upon a hill,the light of the world in which theglorious eschaton has arrived. TheNew Jerusalem is chosen and blessedby God, embodies peac€, iustice, andliberty, and in its final days will bevisited by God Himself. Babylon isthe paragon of wickedness and sin,the city of exile and alienatiory anoppressor of its own people and ascourge to its neighbours. In the lastdays it will be visited by God as well,though He will come not in peace butin wrath and righteous iudgment.When political leaders have heldAmerica up as the hope of the world,a nation that resists tyramy, advancesfreedom, and promotes peace, theyhave spoken of it as extendingthe promise of the New ferusalemaround the globe. Countless familiarexamples could be cited, from JohnWinthrop to Ronald Reagan. Bothevocative and representative isWilliam Henry Seward's assertionthat "to the oppr€ssed masses, theUnid States is the Palestine fromwhich comes. . . political salvation."gBut whm the United States hasopprcssed its own people, traffickedin colonialism, supported dictators,or engaSed in the killing of innocents,it has been condemned as a latterdavBabylon. Again history offers myriadexamples, from William LloydGarrison and William lennings Bryanto Daniel Berrigan, who, channellingthe Book of Revelation, bellowedhis fierce denunciation of the UnitedStates during the Vietnam War asanother Babylon "whose very stonesooze with the sweat and blood ofvictims."l0Though Zietsma does not explicitlyinvoke terusalem" or "Babylon,"his critique embodies these tropes.For him it seems that in WorldWar II and the Cold War era theUnited Statesaw itself as the NewJerusalem but was in fact the newBabylon. The nation that definedPage 30itself as righteousness incarnate,chosen by God to punish evil, inreality oppressed its people at home,supported tyrants abroad, murderedinnocents, and pursued a foreignpolicy of imperial adventurism.In Zietsma's narraHve, Americanslocated "evil, atheistic enemiesabroad so that they could conskucta righteous national community inopposition to them." But he seems tothink that iust the opposite was true.The real evil lay in the nation thatwas guilty of the "terror bombingsof Dresdeo Tokyo, Hiroshima, andNagasaki, the violent crushing ofoqganized labor groups in wartimeAmerica, the ongoing segregationand Iynching of black Americans,the forced sterilization of nativeson the Lakota reserve, wartimeJapanese'American conc€ntrationcampg support for tyrants such asVietnam's Diem, ot for that matter,the arr€st of Spiritualist ministersseeking to practice their religion."And for good measure, in the nextparagraph Zietsma reminds us of theU.S.-supported coups in Guatemalaand lran. How can such a nation beanything but a latterday Babylon?Of course, as potent and religiouslyevocative as these Jerusalem-or-Babylon typologies can be, theydistort more than thev reveal.Because of course the United Statesis neither Jerusalem nor Babylon, butrather a unique amalgam of greatnessand squalor, of brilliance and folly,of magnanimity and avarice, ofnobility and turpitude, of periodicmediocrity -and yet of the sacr€dand the profane. To do iustic€ tothe study of the American past is toacknowledge these paradoxes in alltheir complexity.Yet Zietsma seems to havelittle patience for those who donot employ history-as-propheticieremiad.ln his words, my book"reifies a triumphalist narrative,"isnarrowly focused on the'great men'of history" uses a "methodologicalstrait-iacket " and "do€s not gomuch beyond cheerleading." If thosecomments werc not damning enough.he also suggests that the author iseither ignorant or guilty of historicalmalpractice ("either Inboden isunfamiliar with U.S. historv or hechose to ignore the portion of thedocumentary record").Well, where to begin? I am bydisposition an optimist and so willstart with the positive highlithtingat least three meaningful areas inwhich I believe Zietsma and I arein agreement. First, we both believereligion is an important factor indiplomaHc history. Second, weagree that American political andreligious leaders constructed a civilreligion narrative in part to maintaindomestic support for America's ColdWar forcign policy posture. Third,we both think history has a moraldimension and believe it is oftenappropriate (though often precariouqas I suggest in my discussion aboveon partisanship) for historiansto incorporate moral iudgmentsinto their work. I have no wish togloss over our disagreementt butthese arcas of agreement arc notinsignificant.We diffel however, on questionsof methodology. Zietsma lamentsthat I rely exclusively on "empiricalinquiry" and the "documentaryrecord" while failing to explore the"'undocumented' psyche" or employ"discourse analysis." It would betempting at this point to respondthat I plead guilty to doing whathistorians do, whidr is researchin andrives. But there are moresubstantive reasons for my skepticismabout the methodology he advocates,at least on the terms in which hedescribes it. First, for historians todepart from the use of texts andinstead engage in specu lations(however linked to theory) about the"undocumented psyche" of peopleand naHon seems to subiect thepast to a standard that we wouldnot want to be subiecto ourselves.llSecond, I think it is safe to presumethat Zietsma would like his fellowhistorians to engage his aqgr.rmentsbased on the documentary record hehas provided, to read the text of thereview he has written, assume thatthe text is clos€ly related to his ideasand intended meanin& and attemptto respond to the specific points hemakes. ln other words, he would likeus to employ empirical inquiry.In contrast, discourse analysis asZietsma employs it risks distortingPosslro,'t April 2009

morc than illuminating the past.Specifically, it attempts to flattenout and squeeze the complexities,nuances, and subtleties of historicalactors into a rigid ideologicaltemplate largely contrived by thehistorian. In other words, if Zietsmadismisses a reliance on archives andtexts as being a "methodologicalstraitiacket," then the discourseanalysis that he advocates risks beinga methodological cookie-cutter, whichtries to make diverse figures, events,and ideas look more or less the same.Zietsma cites his own DiplonaticHrstory article "Sin Has No History"as an example of the approachhe thinks I should have taken inexploring how "religious discourse"ostensibly functions in shapingforeign policy, in this case duringthe years immediately leading upto the American entrv into WorldWar II.l2 Some interesting insightsnotwithstanding this article revealsin several ways the deficiencies ofthis approach.For example, Zietsma bases thethrust of his argument (and evenhis article title) on a re-casting ofReinhold Niebuhr's articulationof the doctrine of "original sin" asthe catalyst for the creation of a"rcligiously structured narrativeof the United States as a iust,moral, and good nation standingup against evil enemies."l3 Hemakes a virtually identical assertionabout the Cold War in his rcviewof my book when he says that "thehegemonic discourse of originalsin formed the basis of America'spostwar national mission, namely,to contain evil that was'original'."This is a misreading of Niebuhr and amisunderstanding of the doctrine oforiginal sin. In fact, one of Niebuhr'smost consistenthemes, constantlyintoned throuthout his decades inpublic life, is the pretension, selfrighteousness,folly, and yeg sin. ofall nations--especially the UnitedStates. So too with the doctrine oforiginal sin, which indicts all humanbeings, all nations, and virtually allactions as tainted in some way by sin.In Niebuhr's own words, throughoriginal sin "one may understandthat no matter . . . how universal thecommunity which human statecraftPtsspor, April 2009may organize, or how pure theaspirations of the saintliest idealistsmay be, there is no level of humanmoral or social achievement in whichthere is not some corruption ofinordinate self-love.-14 Additionally,it is implausible to claim thatAmerican political leader simplyappropriated Niebuhr's doctrine toiustify their own agendas. First, itis extr€mely rar€ to find examplesof American politicians at the timeeven using the term "original sin."Second, Niebulu's fiequmt criticismsof America' shortcomings and selfrighteousnessimposed limits on thedegree to which he was embraced byAmerican political leaders, especiallyat the pr€sidential and cabinet level.However, the pervasiveness of sindoes not obviate the possibility ofdrawing moral distinctions and, whatis equally important, acting on thosedistinctions. For Niebuhr, the factthat the United States was sinfulivflawed did not mean that GermanNazism (or later, Soviet Communism)could not be regarded as embodyingevil of a greater magnitude or thatother nations would not be iustifiedin using (or even compelled to use)force againsthem.Related to this inaccurate renderingof Niebuhr and original sin isZietsma's odd indictment of "neoorthodoxChristian realist discourse"more generally.l5 Herc again,Zietsma appears to be flaftening outsome remarkable complexities anddiversities within this theologicaltradition in order to fit it into hisargument and critique. Contraryto Zietsma's rcndering of neoorthodoxyas a crude instrument ofAmerican r€ligio-nationalism, it is infact a tradition of primarily Europeanorigin whose main prcponents(e.g., Karl Barth and Emil Brunnerof Switzerland, Dietrich Bonhoefferof Germany) included amongtheir concems the need to insulatethe church theologically from thecaptivating allure of nationalismln Barth's and Bonhoeffer's caseespecially this concem was mor€than academig as the former leda group of German pastor inestablishing the "Confessing Church"in dissent from Nazi control andthe latter was executed bv the Nazisfor his involvement in an effort toassassinate Adolf Hitler. In the UnitedStates, while the Niebuhr brotherswere the most visible proponentsof neo-orthodox Christian realismin the American context, they hadtheir own significantheological andpolitical differences with each otheland evm more so with Barth. Forexample, Reinhold and H. Richardengaged in a legendary debate inthe pages of the Christian Centuryin 1932 over whether the UnitedStateshould take action againstheJapanese invasion of Manchuria, andthey later disagreed significantly overAmerican nuclear weapons policy inthe Cold War. In the case of Barth, hisdecadesJong theological and politicaldifferences with Reinhold Niebuhrerupted most visibly at the foundingof the World Council of Churches inAmsterdam in 1948.16 This clash evenmade the pages ol the Nao YorkTimes.This short digression intothe complexities of neoorthodoxyis important becauseit demonstrates how a centraltenet of Zietsma's argument andmethodology-specifi cally how amonolithic discourse of religiousnationalism allegedly shapedU.S. foreign policy-depends onan oversimplified and inaccuraterendering of both a theologicaltradition and important historicalfi gures.u Simila;ly, zietsma'salgument is oddly un-tethercdfrom world events. He repeatedlyinvokes various iterations of theclaim that Japanese and Germanatrccities and atgrcssion "werc notthe reasons for U.S. intervention"but rather functioned as ex post factorationalizations for self-righteousAmerican bellicosity.l8 This argumentdepends on an almost conspiratorialrendering of American religious andpolitical leaders employing selfaggrandizingrhetoric to drive theirnation to war; it virtually ignores thefact that these American leades wereliving amidst geopolitical realitiesthat changed profoundly by themonth. Of course, as Zietsma and Iand virtually every other historianwould agree, the United States hasalways conceived of itself in spiritualterms as having a providentialrole to play in the world, and itsPage 3l

MERSHON CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITYSTUDIES ATTHE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITYSEEKS APPLICATIONS IN PEACE STUDIESThe MeBhon Center for Intemational Secudty Studles at The Ohio Stat6Uniwrsity is se€king appllcants for one of several possible positions open in thearea of peace studies.1. Endowed Chair in Peace Studi$. The Mershon Centor is se€klng applicationsfor its Endoryed Chalr In Peace Studies. This is a sonior tenured position as afull professor. The purpos€ of the chair is b promote research and educationon the foundatons of peaoe and strategiE3 for conflic-t resolution. The chair willb€ oxp€c-bd io design a broad pogram in p€ace studies that complem€ntsothor aclivities at the Mershon Center. We aro open as to the bsckground anddiscipline of the candidate. Scholars at ths Mershon Cent€r come fiom a varigtyof departments induding political scienc€, history, sociology, psychology, law, andphilosophy. A distinguish€d r€cod of publication and teaching is expected. Weare also Interosted in candidates who have experien@ dealing wlth vlol€nt conflictand lts aflemath In either a govemmental or non-govammental context. The chairwlll b€ exp€c'ted to carry a half-tlmo teaching load, devoting th6 other half of his orher tme to aclivities at the Mershon Center, which will include both rosoarch andpractical pursultB related to peace studies.2. Visiting Inslrudors in Peace and Conf,ict Resolulion. The Mershon Centar alsowelcomes applicstions for visiting instructors in p€ace and @nflicl rsolution.Ph.D. is r€quired by August 2009, and proference will b€ given to those with aPh.D. and teaching experience. ytsltlng instructoB wlll teach one course €achquarter, or thr€€ courses a yaar. One @urse may bo taught twice. We are opena8 to ths discipllne of the candldates, but they must d€monstrais the abillty toteach coursas In peacs and conf,ic{ rssolution In a recognized dlsclpline or in OhioState's interdisciplinary Int€matlonal Studies Pr€ram. Msiting instructors will b€€xp€cted b pariicipate in the activiti€s of the Mershon Center.3. Msiting Scholar in Peace Studies. The Mershon Center also wolcom€sapplications for visiting scholars to do r€search in p6ace studios and participatein the actlvitios of lhe Mershon C€nter. They may b€ in residenc. at the centsr foran!,wher€ from one !o nine months. Visrung scholars may be senior practitionerswlth expedence n€gotiating for a govemment agency or non{ovemmentalorganization, or they may b€ establlshed academics with a solirt r€cord ofrcsearch.The Mershon Cenbr is not likely to fill all thre€ positions in peace studles; thesxac-t positions we decide to fill are contingont on funding and on the applicationswe rec€ive. Th€ search wlll remain open until the Endowed Chalr in Peac€ Studiesis f,lled.Th6 Mershon C€nter for Intemational S€curity Studies advanc€s theunderstanding of national security In a global contaxt by fostering intE disciplinaryfaculty and student res€arch in thr€€ areas of focus: the use of force anddiplomacy the ideas, identities, and decisional process€s that afiBct securityi andlhe Instltutons that manage violent connid. For more infomation, please se€ the@nter's wob site at http://mershoncenlsr.osu.edu.Applicants for any of the thr€e positions should submit a letter of Intersst, currntcuniculum vitae or r6sume, and the names of three refer6nc€6 to:Page 32Poace Studies SearchMershon C€nter for Intomational Security Studiss1501 Nell Ave.Columbus, OH 4320'l -2602Ath: Melanle Mannleaders justified or rationalizedmany policies in this light. Yet it isnot implausible that a nation thatwitnessed, in the span of less thana decade, the Japanese invasionof Chin4 the Rape of Nanking,tlra Anschluss, the arurexation ofthe Sudetenland, Kristallnacht, theMolotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Germany'sinvasion of Poland, Germany'sinvasions of Denmark, Norway,France, and the Low Countries, theTripartite Pact, the Japanese invasionof Indochina the Grcater East AsiaCo Prosperi ty Sphere, etc., wouldinterpret these events througha moral, religious, and poliHcalframework and shape its words andactions accordingly.lg It is a questionof causality and complexity. Zietsmaseems to cast America's belief inits own righteousness as a cynicalcontrivance, almost divorced fromthe context of profoundly troublingworld developments, but it is perhapsbetter understood as the outgrowthof an effort by American leaderc todraw on their own convictions andtheir nation's religious and moraltraditions to interpret these eventsand determine how to act.This interpr€tation by no meansimplies agreement with-let aloneunapologetic cheerleading for

Armamen| the obsequiousness andself-promotion of Edward Elson; andso on.But there is a larger point her€.The main purpose of my book is notto pronounce judgment on winnersand losers, but to explore from theAmerican side why the conflict wasfought and why it was fought theway it was. This does not mean that Ido not have opinions-as a historian,as an American, as a human beingaboutthe moral and geopoliticaloutcomes of the Cold War. But I donot regard those opinions as theprinlary domain of this book. Yet atthe same time, some moral iudgmentsare inescapable particularly insofaras they touch on questions of thehistorical record. On this count,one passage in Zietsma's review isespecially puzzling and problematic.He begins with an indignantrecounting of the 1947 arrest by localpolice of a fortune-telling ministerin los Angeles as an example ofreligious persecution in the UnitedStates. A few pages later, he lamentsthat "lnboden seemsimply to acceptas true pervasive claims that theSoviet Union threatened rcligiousfaith." and he follows that with arather clumsy attempt at "gotcha"by citing alleged examples frommy book about pockets of rcligiousresilience within the USSR. DoesZietsma really mean to make therisible claim that the Soviet Union didnot in fact execute or imDrison tensof thousands (at least) oi religiousbelievers? Unfortunately, he seemsto have fallen into the posture ofassuming that, iust because onefervently disagrees with Ame canforeign policy, it is somehowinappropriate to acknowledge Sovietbarbarism. But this is of course afalse choice. One does not have toapplaud or even agree with U.S.Cold War forcign policy to rccognizeSoviet Communism's record of brutaloppression and of particular hostilityto religious belief.Finally, a brief comment onZietsma's complainthat thecover of my book "portentously"displays "four white males." Indeed,Eisenhoweq, Trumaru Niebufu, andGraham are all white males. Butduring the immediate postwar years,Passryrt Aprilz0@they were also four of the mostinfluential political and religiousfigures in American life. Identifyingthem only by their race and genderwith no regard for their politicalor theological importance andthe differences among them maybe, ironically enough, an effectivedemonstration of the analyticallimitations of the us€ of race andgender categories alone.l9William Inboden is Scnior Vice-Prcsident of the Legatnn lnstitute forGlobal Deuelopment.Notes:l. Wifliam Inboden, Rrlitiott dli At],cricirrForcign Policy 1 5.1960: Thc Sorl ofCoxr.rir,[.,rt (New York 2m8), 3,2. Inboden, Rrl{giox, 67.3. Inboderr Raligio,r, 5.4. Seth Jacobt Ar,'ric.r's Mimch Md itlVid nu: Ngo Ditlt Dict , Rclighn, Rdce, atdU.S. ht,cr,'c tioni Sot hcost Asid,1950-1957(Durham, NC, 2004), 5.5. Andrcw Preston, "Bridging the Gap betweenthe Sacred and the Secular in the Historyof American Foreign Relationt" Dr'plornticHisfory 30 (Novembcr 20n61,7 ,W.6. Also worth noting is how the developmentof individualistic Christianity in the UnitedStates likely innuences the acadcmicp€Fpective on religion that almost allAmerican scholars have r€gadless of faithafffliation. Walter Mead's observation isrelevant in this regard: "Christianity in theAmerican contert is less and less a matterof family orethnic identity, more and morea matter of personal choi

Promoting International Education:An Academic Vice-President'sApproachKennethW. Rearavel is fatal to prcjudice,bigotry, and narrowmindedness,"Mark Twainwrote. "Broad, wholesome, charitableviews of men and things cannot beacquired by vegetating in one littlecomer of the earth all one's lifetime."For diplomatic historiant travel andinternational education have longbeen part of the profession. Today,Twain's words carry even gr€atermeanint for our students.I have always been a strongsupporter of international education.My advocacy originated in a personaljoumey. I grew up in northemlouisiana, in a very "little corner ofthe ean:h." I did not studv abroadwhile I was an undergraduate; myintercst in intemational educationcame instead fiom my historyand political sciencE profussors atLouisiana Tech University (at thetime, louisiana Polytechnic Institute).I especially enioyed a course on EastAsia, and out of that course grewmy interest in Chinese and Japanesehistory. I received my M.A. andPh.D. in history from the Universityof Colorado, where I studiedwith Professors Earl Swisher andJoyce Lebra, Their cbmmitmentointernational education had a lastingimpact on my life and work.When I became the vice presidentfor academic affairs at Louisiana Techin 1982 the university had alr€adybeen a proponent of intemationaleducation for a long time. However,it did not have a specific plan topromote intemational educationcampus-wide. Situated in a ruralsetting in Ruston, which has apopulation of 20000 and is located70 miles east of Shreveport and about250 miles north of New Orleans,Page 34Louisiana Tech enrolls approximately11,000 students, many of whom arethe first members of their family to goto college. My overarching obiectivewas to ensurc that internationaleducation became part of theirundeqgraduatexperience. Therefore,with President Dan Reneau'ssupport and that of the academicdeant unit headt and a campuswidefaculty committee, I laundledthe Tech Intemational Initiative topromote undertraduate intemationaleducation.This initiative had five key parts.The first was the IntemationalEducaHon Committee (IEC). Bycreating the IEC, the universityimmediately raised the visibilityof intemational education. My roleas the IEC'S chair is to ensure thatit r€c€ives the necEssary fundingto meet its purpos€, which is topromote international educationthroughouthe campus. The IECapproves the courses that may beused to satisfy an intemationaleducation requirement. It also awardssummer study-abroad sdrolarshipsto undergraduates. The academicunits recommend applicants, and theIEC selects recipients based on meritand financial need, Scholarship fundscome from the academic deans, tnepresident, and my office.The second part of the initiativeinvolved expanding study-abroadopportunities. For almost twenty-fiveyears, the university had a successfulprogram in Rome. In 2004 I formeda committee to evaluate the programand the intemational education needsof our student body. The committeerecommended that we end the Romeprogram and diversify study-abroadchoices. ln response, the universityjoined the Council on InternationalEducation Exdrange (CIEE) to ensuregreater accEss to study-abroadprograms. More important, we beganprcmoting our own discipline-basedstudy-abroad programs. This stepled to a Spanish-language programin Costa Rica, a French quarter inParis for art students, a Tech-Londonprogram for theater and Englishstudeng a history and architectur€program in Florence, and a foreshyprogram in Honduras. College ofEducation students have traveledto Kor€a to gain experimce as well.Faculty intercsted in leading astudy-abroad group may apply forfunding to visit a proposed site beforegaining final approval and recruitingshrdents. Other facultv initiativeshave resulted in exchinge agreementswith foreign universitie.The third component of theinitiative was the implementationof an international facultvdevelopment program. Becausefaculty development is the key tointemationalizing the curriculum, myoffice sponsors a program that sendsfaculty abroad during the summer.The faculty may conduct research,but the program is meant to helpthern develop their intemationalexpertise. Thooe who receive grantsarc rcquircd to take part in theCIEE's summer faculty developmmtseminars. My office covers the costof the seminar, while the recipient'scollege or department underwritesthe remaining expenses, Since theprogram has been in place, we havesent an average of thrce facultymembers abroad each sumrner. Onrctuming to campus, they give abrown bag lecture for the Centerfor Academic and ProfessionalPnssport April 2009

Development and another lechrre totheir academic unit. By the end of theacademic year, they must show howthey have integrated internationalcontent into their courses.The fourth part of the initiative wasthe launching of the "Shaping the21st Century" series. We rccognizethat most of our students willgraduate without studying abroad.Although we continue to try toincrease the number of studentswho do go abroad, we also want tobring an international experienceto tho6e who do not. Therefor€,we created a lecture and culturalprogram that we call "Shapingthe 21st Century." Each year, theRussia,TIlA|{[$SHAFR and Passport wishto thankEd Goedekenof theIowa State UnioersityLibrury Systemfor his many years ofhard work on behalf ofSHAFR members. Ed hascompiled theannual listofdissertations relevant todiplomatic history, whichran in the newsletter formany years. The list nowappears on the SHAFRwebsite, rather than inprint, and can be accessedat:http: / / www.shaf r.org /publications / annua l-dissertation-list /The 2008 liet is nowavailable!IEC selects a nation or region thatwill have a major influence on ourstudents' lives. It then sponsorsa series of events, all open to thepublic that begins with a campusassembly featuring a distinguishedscholar and goes on to include food,art, photographic exhibitions, fi lms,and lectures by visiting and residentscholars. The Office of AcademicAffairs collaborates with the collegegdepartments, and the honorsprogram to bring the distinguishedspeaker to campus. For example,the Department of History and itsAmerican Foreign Policy Centerunderwrote lecturcs by lonathanSpence and David Shambaugh inthe "Focus on China" series in 2007.Mark Von Hagen and Maria Carlsonwere among the scholars who tookpart in the recent "Focus on Russia"series. In addition to China andthe program has focused onthe Middle East and lndia and in thespring of 2009 will focus on LatinAmerica.Originally a month long, the"Shaping the 2lst Century" seriesnow extends through the springguarter. We have been especiallypleased by the popularity of the lndiaart exhibition which has traveledto several other universities, and bythe number of elementary schoolstudents who have visited the artand photographic exhibitions. Theincrcased intercst in internationaleducation on campus has alsospread to the community: the localparish library has partnered with theuniversity by hosting faculty lecturesand exhibitions.The final component of theinitiative was the convening of acampus-wide conference to promotegr€ater discussion on campus aboutintemational education. AcademicAffairs and the IEC hosted thisconference in the fall of 2007. Theoneday event brought togetherinterested students, facul9, andadministrators. In the fall quarterof 2009, my of6ce will sponsorthe second of these campus-wideconferences.Louisiana Tech is committed toproviding students with studyabroadopportunities and tointernationalizing the curriculum,and we have made substantialprogress toward those goals.Universities that want to achievesimilar objectives must developa plan that will be funded, willbecome institutionalized, andwill garner faculty support.Administrators must remainactivists and identify faculty leaderswho will mentor their colleagues ininternationalizing the curriculum.They must also set and evaluateinternational education goalg whilerecognizing that the respons€ fromeach college within the universitywill be different. Some colleges movequickly; others need prompting.Increasingly, accreditation agenciesare helping in the development ofintemational education programs.However, presidents, chancellorsand chief academic offic€rs musttake every opportunity to stressintemational education and to fundcampus-widefforts. In doing so,they send a clear message to theirfaculty and administrators thatintemational education is important.To end on a historical note, I havefound that being a proponent ofintemational education is a littlelike being a Protestant missionaryin mid-nineteenth century China.The task is daunting but if one iscommitted to the cause, one cannotafford to become discouraged.Kenneth W, Rea is Vice Presidenlfor Academic Afiairs and ProfessorHistory at Inuisiana Tech Unbersity,He serues on the Louisidna Boardof Regents' Intemational EducntionCotnmittee,Pdss,,orl April 2009 I'age 35

SHAFR Council MeetingSunday, January 4, 20098:00-11:00 amHilton Harlem SuiteNew York, New YorkPrcsent: Kristin Ahlhug, Fronk Costiglioln Oresidittg), lcfftev Enqel, Brian Etherid1c, Cathcrine Forsluntl, Peter Hahn, DaaidHctscltllr; Mark Lnzorciicc, Erin Mahin, Robert McMlalidit, Rennith Osgood,laidefp Prabhu, Andrrtu Rotter, Chapin Ryditrgsznrd,Thonns Schzoarlz, Katherinc Siblcy, Iercmi Suri, Randall Wootls, Thontis Zeiler.Costigliola called the meeting to order at 8:00 A.M. and thanked everyone for attending.1. Discussion of SHAFR representation on State Department Historical Advisory Committee (HAC)Costigliola welcomed David Herschler and Kristin Ahlberg of the State Departmenfs Office of the Historian (HO).Hersc-hler highlighted the HO's statutory obligation to cooiperate with the Flistorical Advisory Committee (HAC)jexpress€d gr-atitride for the advice and ci'iticish provided liv the HAC; and emphasized that ihe HO will continu; to workn ith the HAC and by extension the SHAFR comhuniw ancl Council members. He concluded bv reouestins that in lishtof the internal review panel recently appointed by the Secretary of State, Council refrain from ta'kine' action-bevond tlietext of the draft resolution that had bebn circulatdd prior to the meeting. Costigliola thanked Herscliler for his ieport.Costigliola moved Council into Executive Session. Mahan recused herselfrom the discussion. Council heard a lensthvreporl from Robert McMahon, SHAFR representative to the HAC, and Katie Siblev former Council member and atYlaisemember of HAC, on r€cent controversy involving the HO and its relationship with HAC. After lengthy discussion, a -consensus emeqged around the following motioniThe SHAFR Conncil belicz,es thnt thc Forci*n Relntions of the United States (FRUS) xries is crucial to transDarcncv itr detnocraticgoz,ernnncc nnd to ittorned citizenship. lnlipltt of reccnt'problems h the Stnte DeDarhtrcnr's Office of the Hiitofini (HO) that nnutiflect the future of tlie FRUS scries, SH AFR-cxpiesscs its'stronR support br tlrc Siaetarv of Stiite's decision to name an outsitlc 'Rcuiau Tenn to issess thc situation in tlrc HO. SHAFR looks finoiid to o public report inrt b the HO's maintnininc its ftission ofProdu-cing accunte, rclinblc FRUS znlurnes in a timely mannir. Giucn llrc concerni expressed by thc Historical Adoisory Comtnitiee(HAO, SHAFR Couttcil zt ill continuc to monitor thii situalion.Mahan and Schwartz recused themselves from the vote. The motion passed unanimously.Discussion ensued regardinq a second resolution convevins SHAFR' suDDort for the work of the HAC and its concernwith developments tlier€in.-A cons€nsus emerged arourid dhe following rhbtion:We nffirnr our srywrt for the zwrk of thc Historical Adaisorv Comniltee (HAC), its independence, ontl its intcerihl We exprcssconcinr ouer tlrc'r'eceui raiRnotionsbf trn nanberc of H AC n the nbrupt non-rcnaua!'of a third tnember. Exierial opcrsiphtis fxndatnental to thc succdsful opcrition of thc Hist6rian's Ofice ond pa;t of its Congresiionnl mandnte. We look lonuortl io ,hcDcportmant's continuing attbntitin to this ;nntteLSchwartz recused himself from the vote. The motion Dassed unanimouslv.2. Resolutions of thanks to retiring Council membersCostigliola introduced a resolution thanking retiring Council members Stephen Rabe, Mark Lawrence, David Anderson,and Gaig Daigle for their valuable service.The resdlution passed unanimriusly.3, Recap of motions passed by e-mail voteCostigliola reported on the five motions approved by Council via e-mail since the Iune Council meetine. Councilapproled of i resolution on FOIA proposed bv the National SecuriW Archive; incrbased the annual stiD-end to executivedirector; agreed to sponsor the grailua'te studrint breakfast at the 20d9 OAH me€ting; aDproved the establishment of theOxford Unf versity Press Disseriation Prize; and signed on as co-plaintiff in a lawsuit fileh bv Citizens for ResDonsibilitvand Ethics in Washington (CREW) againsthe VicE President of fhe United States over reconds retention.4. Motion to accept 2(x)8 financial reportHahn presented written and oral reports on SHAFR's finances. He pointed out that while the SHAFR endowmenthad folt 28% of its value between November 30,2007 and Novembir 20,2008, the endowment sained modest value inDecember 2008. lt was noted that SHAFR was able to cover its operating expenses without with'drawing any funds fromthe endowment.Hahn hiehlishted certain revenues and expenditures in 2008. He noted that new revenues enabled SHAFR to doublespendini on-fellowships and establish thebummer Institute, the diss€rtation completion fellowships, the web editor, andthe diredtor of seconda'ry education in 2008. Hahn invited Council members to eximine the detailed written report andPage 36Passryrl Aprilzc0g

indicated that he would answer questions at any time.Osgood asked- ifCouncil needed to be more conservative in the future since increased spendine in 2008 was intended19,uJtlLzF tR 9iYldend.tunds generated by the endowment. Hahn replied that after receht conv-ersations involving withSHAFR's.CPA,.David Kirkey, and SHAFR's endowment managers iir New York, SHAFR ls on retitivllv iotia fina"niiiig.round Flv€n that its recent expenditures were not.directly dependent on Endowment revenues. Hahn also noted thatwlley-blac_Kwell r€Presentativestlad assured him that the revenuestr€am remained healthy desDite the economicrecession. Hahn reCommended that Council maintain the current level of spending but thatit shciuta proceed tiutiourtuand avoid a_ny major new initiatives. Although there is a risk of running--'a aeficit i;2009, Uahn emphisized inltalternatrvetunds were available to cover it. Fle noted that the Society finished 2008 with a net gainbf$36,500. CostigliolasupDorted Hahn's recommendation and also pointed out that the gJaranteed minimum revenfie i-rn *u;or reuenresoirice would increase2009 over 2008.Council unanimously passed a motion to accepthe 2008 financial report.5. Motion to raise annual subsidy to Diplomatic HistoryA motion to raise the annual Diplonntic Historv subsidy by 5Zo (from 940,000 to 942,000) in 2009 passed unanimously.6, Motion to set disbursement amount for Bemis Research Grants in 2009Hahn briefly summarized the Bemis Research Grant program, which was cr€ated in part to Drotect SHAFR'S Dubliccharity status. Council allocated $35,000 in 2007 and 932,000 in 2008 for Bemis Grantj. The Wavs & Means Coinmitteerecommended that Council allocate $32,000 in 2009. The motion passed unanimously.7. Discussion of action plan to reform graduat€ student grants and fellowshipsHahn and Osgood discussed the plan approved in June to reorganize the structure of the qraduate student srants andteuowshjlp. As.directed, Ostood, Etheridge and Hahn deviseil a strategy to create a single committee to aifminister theawards. I hey alsorecommencled that the proposed committee be composed of 3-5 members. After discussion, Councilindicated approval ot a commiftee with 3-5 members.Hahn asked Council to define "iunior faculty" as it pertains to the guidelines of Bemis Faculw Grants. Woods and Oseoodtgested that Bemis awards should be limited to those working o-n first books. Forslund nofed that scholars teachin;at"tea_ching" colleges and universities generally needed access to fusearch funds for second books. Schwartz sueeested"thatthe ways & Means Committee could contemblatestablishing a separate award for scholars at such institutioiE CouncilqPProved an amendment to include "scholarb working on thdir first monograph" to the definition of the Bemis luniorFaculty Grant. OsSood suggested a later discussion of-renaming the facult/ a*ards to avoid confusion with the'graduatestudent awards.Costigliola moved to approve the proposed package as amended. The motion passed unanimously.8. Discussion of travel funds for Council membercCostigliola instructed Council to devise a clear policy regarding travel funds for Council members attendine Councilmeetings in lanuary an{ June. A consensus emdrged thal SHAFR should provide travel funds to include airTare (or itsequivalent in mileage), hotel accommodations foi 2-3 nights (3 in cases where the member is also oresentins a DaDerscheduled to necessitate the third night stay), and a per iliem based on federal rates for all Council memberi at'teidinesuch Council meetings who are una6le to

11. Diecueeion of venue for 2012 annual nreetingCostigliola rccogpized Rotter as acting chair. Rotter proposed holdins the 2012 SHAFR confermce in C-onnecHcut,sponsored by th! University of Conndcticut. Costigliola noted that Uconn Presidmt MidEel Hosan had offered ti5,000to subsidize sudr a meetind. Costigliola explained-ihathe conference would be based in Hartforil and a olenarv sessionand other SHAFR events viould tale place on the university campus in Storrs. He hiehliehted Ttromas Pitersori's paoershoused at the University of Connecticut and the archival afnearby Yale and HarvanflUniversities; he also noted th:at theFDR Library is within dtiving distance. Woods moved to accept the proposal to hold the 2012 meiting in Connecticut. Themotion carfied unanimously,-Costigliola resumed the drair. -12. 2009 mnual mectingPaul Kramer_reported that the 2009 meeting is sdreduled for fune 2.!28 at the Fairview Park Marriott in Falls Churd:r,Virginia. At thelune meeting Costigliola citled for a concertid effort to broaden the audimce and DarticiDant pool for the2009 conference. ln responsel the cofitrerence committee (Paul Kramel Chair, Carole Andersory Dir* Bonkbr, Arine Foster,Amy Greenberg, Naokio Shibusaw+ and Salim Yaqub) drafted a call for papers that appealed to scholars interested in th;interplay between fo..rcign relatioSgcultural, and genderhistory. TtieCFP had been widely publicized inPnnt pumaF as we as on sxty ft-Net -ald.immigration, tistservs.ln rcsponse to its outreadr, the committee received an unprecedented number of proposals induding 99 for panels and tt5for inclividual papen. High quality prcposals were also rireived from overseas.'Given the high quality of the applicant pool combined with SHAFR's desire to readr out to a broader and morr diverseaudience, thd 2009 coirference crimmitteb recommmded increasins the number of panels from 48 Danels to 80. Discussionmsued. It noted that expanding the conference in this manner woirld minimize anl potential bacfrlash that mieht resultfrom increased competiiion be6,veen the new rccruits and SFIAFR's haditional con-sdtuencv. Kramer also intnfiuced theidea of a cocktail hoirr to welcome first-time attendees.After some discussion a consensus emened in favor of expandins the 2009 con-fercnce. Woods exDressed suDDort forthe cocktail hour, Costigliola noted that ihe potmtial beneBts in 6rms of outreach would be well ivorth the idsts ofexpansion. Kramer poiited out that the conipleted results of the enlarced prcsram would be publicized on the listservs.Sdrwartz supported the idea of expansion but recommmded satlprin-s inloniation durinc tlie conference to evaluatepotmtial issirEs. It was sugqested ftiat panel chairs could be diected tri'record and submit'turnout numbers to caueethe potential d.rop.in averife panel attindance. Schwartz added that the Ways & Means Commitce supports olferi:ngreduced memberihip rates-to -trrsuccrssfuI applicants.12. Report of the 2009 Local Anangeurmte ComnitteeAhlberg rcpord that the 2009 Local A$ansements Committee is planninc a SHAFR cruise on the Potomac after theformal iryrdpup of the conference. The LAgwill recommend that SFIAFR Eubsidize a portion of trip to lower the co6t tograduate stirde-nts, The L,AC will also issue a local acivities and dining guide.13. Odord Diesertation PrizeHahn.rcported dnq the Oxford University Prcss-USA Dissertation Prize is now operational and that the first prize will beawarded in 2010. The prize originad in a $5,000 gift fron OLJP to SHAFR.14. SIIAFR website rc-launchEtheridse rcpord that shafr.ors has been successfullv reformatted and is now live. The information on the orevious sitehas beei reoiganized and severii new features addedl includins bloes, oeeds, and RSS feeds. Etheridee wai happv tor€port that Bob Buzzanco, William Stueck and Georse White Ir; hav; ioiipd the inaucural team of bloEsers, buiEiorteddifficulties in recruiting scholars to write op-eds. OsEood raisid the p

of Torcnto and that an Honorable Mention would be gnnted to Tao Wang of Georgetown and Yveline Alexis at theUniversity of Massadlusetts at Amherst.17. Bernath Di$ertation GrantForslund reported that the Bemath Dissertation Grant would be awarded to Chfistopher Dietrich from the Universitvot lexas-Austin and that an Honorable Mention would be granted to Kevin Arlydr ai New York University and to K6[yShannon of Temple University.18. Link-Kuehl PrizeHahn on behalf of Ted Keefer announced that the Link-KueN Prize would be awarded to David C. Gever and DouelasE. SeJvage for their edited volume Soviet-American Relations: the Detente Years,lgSg-7972;-andttritin-tYonoiaiite-lii'n'donwould be awalded to Richard Br€ihnan, Barbara MacDonald Steward, and Severin Hochbery" eds., Advocate fur theDmmed: the Diary of lames G. MacDonakl.Council adjoumed at 10:55 am.Respectfu lly submitted,Peter L. HahnExecutive DircctorPLH/crCALLFOI

Po?%1. Personal and Professional Notes"{g,oorPloma,'tJessica Gienow-Hecht has accepted a tenured position in the History Department at the Univerity of Cologne.Eric Manell (lJqryard) has been awarded an American Academy of Arts and Sciences' Visiting Scholars Programfellowship for 2009.2. Research NotesReagan, Gorbachev and Bush at Govemor's IslandPreviously secret Soviet documentation shows that Mikhail Gorbachev was prepared for rapid arms control orocressleadinS towards nuclear abolition at the time of his last official meeting with President Reaian, at Governor'3 Island, NewYork in December 1988; but President-elect George H. W. Bush, who also attended the meeiine, said "he would need aliftle time to review the issues" and lost at least iyear of dramatic arms reductions that were fossible had there Ueen imore forthcoming U.S. position.The new documentation posted by the National SecuriW Archive at George Washington Universitv includes hiehesFlevelmemos from Gorbachev advisorsleading up to Gorbachev's famous speeih at the United Nations'durine the Mw Yorkvisit, notes of Politburo discussions befo-re dnd after the speech and thb Reagan-Bush meetine, CIA estim"ates before andafter the speech showing how surprised American officials had been and how reluctanthe n"6w Bush idministrjtion *asto meet Gorbachev even half-way, and the declassified U.S. transcript of the private meeting between Reagan, Bush andGorbechev.For more information contact:nsarchiv@gwu.edu(202199+/OOOhttp: / / www.nsarchive.org-€rlanPalach Week, 1989: The Beginning of the End for Czechoslovak CommunismThe brutal suppression by Czechoslovak Communist authorities of commemorative cercmonies for "Palach Week"20 years ago mhrked the beginning of the end of the regime in 1989, accordins to secret Dolice, Communist Partv, anddissident documents posted on_the Web by the CzechoSlovak Documentation-Centre (Piague) and the National'securityArchive at Georte Wa.shington University.Various independent civic initiatives (also known in the official Communist Dr€ss as "anti-state" and "anti-socialistforces") had planned to lay wr€aths at the site in Prague's main Wenceslas Square where the student lan Palach in lanuarv1959 had bumed himself tb death in protest againsthe repression that followed the Soviet occupation of Czechoslbvakia'in August 1968. Also planned was a pilgrimaie to the ruril cemeterv where Palach's ashes were'interred. But theCommunist secr€t police cracked doi,r,n-with beatingt tear gat and-mass arrests, includine the dissident plavwrichtand future Czechodlovak president Vdclav Havel. The repre-ssion occurred at the exact mo;lent in lanuari, tlgg tKat thesignatory countries to theHelsinki Final Act (the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Euroie, or 6CE) weremeeting in Vienna, and drew widespread protests from abroad, includiirs from U.5. Secrctarv of Siate Georse Shultz,leading Soviet dissident Andr€i Sakharov'and perhaps most eloquently, American playwrigfit Arthur Millei.This web posting includes never-beforepublished documents from Czechoslovak archives, including the secret policereports ori the demonstrations in January 1989 and the internal Communist Party briefines and instrictions (thePartvline) to cadres about the events of tanuaiy. AIso included are key Charter 77 andother dissident and samizdit statenients,and several international protests of the time.The posting republishes the detailed duonology of events in lanuary and Februarv 1989, orisinallv written bv theCzeclrosloVak Documentation Centrc for its qriarterly publicttion A;tr (vol.3, No.'9-12), com-Diledand edited bv lanVladislav in collaboration with Vil6m Preian,'titled "Czechoslovakia: Heat in lanuarv 1989" ahd ultimatelv oririt6d inDecember 1989 iust as the "velvet rcvolution" toppled the Communist regime and pirt former prisoner Hdvil in thePage,l0Pnssporl April20f9

presidential office in Prague Castle.For more information contact:nsarchiv@gwu.edu(m2\994-mO0http: / / www.nsarchive.orgCzechoslovak Documentation Centrehttp:/ / www.csds.czCWIHP Working Paper $57t A Chance for Peace? The Sooiet Campaign to End the Cold War, I9S3-t955CWIHP announces the publication of the latest addition to the CWIHP Workinq Paper Series, Workine Paper No. 57, AClnnce ftr Peace? Tltc Soiiet Catnpaign to End the Cold War, 1953-1955 bv GeoffreriRoberts. In his paper,Robarts sueeeitsthat the "'chance for peace' after Si'alin's death was actually a prolonied Droce'ss rather than a riroinentarv ooporirinitv,,Drawing heavily updn documents from the Ark,iu Vneshnai Pblitiki dossifskoi Ftdcratsi (AVPRF), the Rossiiskii 'Gosudaritaennyi Arkhiz, Notcishei Istorii (RGANI), and the Rossirskii Guwlarstoennvi Arkhia Sotsial'no-Politicheskoi lstorii(RGASPI), Roberts argues that between 1953 and 1955, Soviet Foreign Minister Wacheslav Molotov Dut forth severalgood-faith proposals to unify the divided Germany, and to "replace-the Cold Wai blocs with Dan-Euiopean collectivesecurity structur€s." Greeted with skepticism in th'e West, thesi proposals were initiallv reiectbd as probaeanda. and itwas not until late 1955 that "the Westtirn powers themselves prdpoied pan-European ioll6ctive seci.rrit'v a"rraneements inex.change for all-German elections leading to German unity."'Prcispectdfor an eaily end to the Cold Wir fadedhowever,when "Khrushchev, suppo.rted by the res[ of the Soviet leailership, blocked any deial involving a trade-off of Germanunity for pan-European-collectivL secu ri ty."Download the paper at http: / / www.wilsoncenter.orgltopics/ pubs/ W P57_WebFinal.pd f ._€r_The Nuclear Emergency^Search Te am,797*1996: Declassified Documents Depict Creation, Capabilities, and Activitiesof Once-Secret Nuclear Counterlerrorism UnitThe U.S. governmenfs s€cret nuclear bomb squad evaluated more than 100 nuclear extortion threats and incidentsbetwepn.1974 and 1996 but only a dozen required actual deployments (the others were hoaxes), according to the newbook Defitsing Arnageddon, and key primary sources posted inihe National Security Archive's';'Nuclear Vault" by Archivesenior f6llowleffrey-T Richelson.The Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) had the capacity in 1995 of deployine up to 500 people and over 150 tonsof equipmento an incident sitq but all deployments to that point had been'mJch-sm'aller (a riraximum of 45 people),accordlng to the documents. A subsequent W6b postins will iover the NEST from 1997 throush the present. Manirsedby the Nevada Operations Office of the Departnient of-Energy (and its predecessors), NEST drew pdrsonnel from [evnationalaboratoiies-Los Alamos, Sandia, Livermore--and tlieir contrattors. On an evervdav basi6 NEST oersonnel 'worked in a multitude of areas-including weapons design, diagnostics, health physics, ind'information tichnology-andwere called into action for exercises or acfual ddploymen-is.This posting of twenty-four documents includet but is not Iimited to: national intelliqencestimates on the threat ofclandestine attaclg the directive resulting in the creation of NEST, examples of extorti6n letters and the psvcholinsuisticanalysis of such letters, accounts of NEST participation in the effort to l6cate the remains of a Soviet nuilear-oowEredsate[ite that crashed into the Canadian wildernels in 1978, documents concernins the controversial 1994 MIRAGEGOLD exercise and its aftermath, and briefing material concerning NEST's missiSn as well as its human and technicalcapabilities.For more information contact:Michael Evans202-994-7029mevans@gwu.eduhttp:/ / w*w.nsarchive.org/ nukevault-€-"We can Bomb the Beiesus out of them all over North Vietnam": Comprehensive Collection of Kissinger "Telcons"Provides Inside View'of Government Decision-MakingAmidst a massive bombing campaign over North Vietnam, Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon candidlv shared theirevident satisfactionthe "shock trdatment" of American B-52s, iccordinE to a declassified transcript ofiheir telephoneconversation published for the first time by the National Security Archivel "Thev dropped a milliori pounds of bombs,"Kissinger bridfed Nixon. "A million pounds of bombg" Nixon elclaimed. "Godilamn, ihat must hav'e been a goodPas,sprt April 2009Page 41

strike." The conversation, secretly recorded by both Kissinger and Nixon without the other,s knowledee rcveals that thel'r€sident and his national security advisor shared a belief h 192 that the war could still be won. "Tha-t shock treatment[is] cracking them," Nixon declared. "I tell you the thing to do is pour it in there everv piace *e ian.- irisi Uorirt iE-h;ii9l!oj tlgm." Kis.singer oPtimistically pr€dict+ that, if tre SouthVetnamese goveminbnt didnlt colla'pse. the U.S. wouldevenrualy prevall: -t mean as a country we keep our nerves, we ar€ going to make it.',The transcript of the-April 11 1972, phone conversation is one of over 11500 documents in a uniqug comprehensivelvindexedset ot the telephone conversations (telcons) of Henry A. Kissinger-perhaps the most fambus andtontroversillU.S. official of the second half of the 20th century. Unbeknownst to the fost of the LI.S. covemment, Kissinser secretlvtaped his incoming and outgoing.phone conver{ations and had his secretary transcrib8them. Ai['i d;;6!iilitr" ilb"r,Krsslnger took the transcripts with him when he left office in lanuary 192 tlaimine they were ,,private pdpeE." In 2001,the National Security Archive initiated-legal proc€edings to force th6 govemment6 rec6ver the ielcons,intl used theFr€edom of Information Act to obtain the-deilassificati6n of most of them. After a three-vear proiecto cataloeue andindex.the.transcripts, which toral over 3O000 pates, this online collection has now been'pnUiiJtrLa Uy tG-Difitat NitionatSecurity Archive (ProQuest).Jh9 dqcurye-1q9h9a light on every aspect of Nixon-Ford on-ioKr diplomacy, olplomacy, including lnducrng U.S.-soviet u.5.-Sovtet d6tente, detente, rhe the wars in Southeast South(Asi4 the 1969 Biafra crisis, the 1971 &iuth Asian crisir crisis, the October 1973 Middle East War. War, and.the i974 igZe Cvorus Cypru.s Crisis-Crisigamonq among manv many other developments. Kissinger's dozens of interlocutors include political and policv ficurcsl 3uch asPr€sidents-NixonPrcsidents.Nixon and Ford, Secretaryof Siate State William william Rogers,,Governor Nelsoir Nelsoh RockefelleriRotirt5. RoErtS. tvtdNamara,MdNamara, tandSoviet Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin; joumalists and pu6lishers, such as Ted Koppel, JameS Reston and KatheiirieGra.ham; and such show businesd frienils as Frank Sinitra. Besides the telcons, thLkijsfuger faepioie Conaersa Cnnwrsoiiota,s: t iotts: AVerbatim Reartl of U.S. Diplomactt, 7969-7977 includes audio tape of Kissinser'i telephone"conveisationJwiih *ihiraNixon that were rccorded autoriratically by the secret White House tapindsystem, 'some of which Kissinger's aides wereunable to transcribe.For more information contact:William Burr or Thomas Blanton202-99'+7000http: / / www.nsarchive.o4g-.€I-New FRUS Volume on the Middle EastThe Department of State has released Foreign Rzlations of the llnited Stat*, 1969-1976, Votume XXIV, Mitfulle East Reeionand Arahhn Peninsula,7969-7972; lordan, September 7970.1n this volume, the editors present documentation that eiplainsand illuminates the maior foreign policy decisions of Prcsident Ridrard M. Nixon oh the Middle East resion, thet'eriiinGulf, the Arabian Peninsul4 an? J'ordair during the crisis of September 1970, and represents the counsefof his kevforeign policy advisers. The volume focuses oiU.S. rcgional pblicv in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. It also hasdnpters on U.S. bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia, Yemen,' and-the smaller Persian Gulf states. The documents usedin the Middle East r€gional part of the volume include memoranda, records of discussions, cables, and papers that s€tforth policy issues and options and show decisions or actions taken. The lordan crisis section of tlie voltrnie uses similardocumentation and also relies heavily on transcripts of cnrcial telephone'conversations.Middle East Region. This section focuses largely on events in Washinstory however, it also covers events anddevelopmentsdev.elopmentsin the Middle Middlg East reeion region andthie Indian Ocean.asas thei affected-the I oolicv policy orocess- proc€ss. The thpme, themes of thissection-ares€ctionframed_by tramed the Nixon adriinistration'sadministration'seffortsto replace rcplace th'e the political and d miliiaiv structureleft bv the forn formerBritish Empire with a newer structure that met America's colcl war needs. The United Stateis worked with tfre British torcstructuF the rcgion militarily and politically, and this required diplomatic contact with Saudi Arabia; tan, ana *re -various sheikdomssheikdomlthat evenhiallyniade up the United Arib Aril Emiraies, as well as with Qatar and Bahriin. Other themesmerged after Britain's political and militarv departure fromartidrlate a srand stratbsv toward the Middle East resion thallies, enlariine the U.Sina^valU.Sliaval presurqe oresence in tlre the \$ia4 Indian"Oceanp;ev.enting C:compgtition betr,r,een!\rssrngef ,and for )r dominanceinSolirymaking policymakingand- the -r€luctancereluctance of Nixon and Kissinqer to be involved in reeionalissues,-unless the of lran or King Faisalbf Saudi Arabia demanded their personal attention. -Tbe lordan.9risis,,This chapter.documents the Septgmber 190 crisis in fordan. The crisis confronted the NixonadministrationaqmlnlsEanon with wtm the me poisibility posstDlllry that tnat the tne monaichy monarcnv of ot King Krnq Husseirl'a maior U.S. ally in the Middle East, wouldnot survive. Although

"Body Count Mentalities": Colombia's "FaIs€ Poeitivee" Scandal, DeclassifiedThe CIA and senior U.S. diplomats were aware as earlv as 1994 that U.S.-backed Colombian securitv forces encaced in"death squad tactics," coor;erated with drug-running iraramilitarv croupt and encouraqed a "bodri count syn-d6me,"accordini to declassified documents published on thleWeb bv thd Natioiral Securiw Arctrive. The# records -shed lisht ona policy-recendy examined in a still-irndisclosed Colombian Armv report-that iMuenced the behavior of Colomb'ianmilitary officers-for years, leadins to exkaiudicial executions and iollaboration with paramilitarv drue traffickers. Thesecret report has ledto the dismidsal of 30'Army officers and the resignation of Gen. Mario Moniova l]ribe, the ColombianArmy Commander who had long promoted the idea of using body c6unts to measur€ progrcss against guerrillas.Hithlights from the posting include:* A 1994 report from U.S. Ambassador Myles Frechette decrying "body count mentalities" among Colombian Armyofficers seeking to advance through the rinks.* A CLA intelligence report from 194 finding that the Colombian security forces "employ death squad tactics in theircounterinsurgEncy carirpaim" and had "a history of assassinating leftwine civilians fn e-uerrilla aieas, cooperaHncwith narcotic-s-related parahilitary groups in attacks against susp;ected gu;rrilla sympaihizers, and killing captu.rEdcombatants."' A Colombian Army colonel's comments in 1997 that there was a "body count svndrome" in the Colombian Armvthat "tends to fuel hirman richts abuses by well-meanine soldiers trvini to set their ouota to impress suoeriors" ahd a"cavalier, or at least passive,-approach wlien it comes to-allowing thil piramilitaries t6 serve as froxies ..L for the COLARin contributing to thi guerrilla'6ody count.". A declassified U.S. Embassy cable describins a February 2000 false positives operation in which both the ACCUparamilitaries and the Colorirbian Armv almdbt simultarieouslv claimed credit for havine killed two lons-demobilizedluerrillas near Medellin. Ambassador Curtis Kamman called ii "a clear case of Armv-paiamilitarv comD'liciw," addineihat it was "difficult to conclude anythinS other than that the paramilitary and Armi inemb€rsiinply lailed to get thEirstories straight in advance."For more information, visit:http:/ / www.nsarchive.orgMithael Evans - 202 l9+7O29mevans@gwu.eduU.S,-Iran Nuclear Negotiations in 1970s Featured Shah's Nationalien and U.S, Weapone WorriesDuring the 1970s the Shah of lran argued, like current Iranian leaders todav for a nuclear energv capability on the basisof national "rishtr" while the Ford aind Carter administrations worried abirut nuclear weaponi'posiibiliti6s, accordincto newly declisified documents published bv the National Securiw Archive. The documeirts, obtained bv tlrc Arddv;throuqh a mandatorv review reqdest, show that tr,vo U.S. oresident6 dealine with the Shah of lran, Ford ahd Carter, Dutconcehrs over prolif6ration and the Shah's possible desire'to build a nucleai bomb front and center when thev appio:vednegotiating politions for a deal to sell nucl6areactors to lran. While lranian officials am.red then, as thev do todivthit Iran hid "riqhts" under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaw to develop nuclear tec'hnolosy, the U.Sl sovemnientsuccessfully soufht an agr€ement that put nonproliferation contiols over U.S.+upplied nucleii material. -The 1979 Iranian Revolution derailed the asreement, but the approach that the Ford and Carter administrationstook shows sisnificant continuiw with confemporarv U.S. and*orld policv, which holds that Iran must not use itstechnological iapabilities to proauc€ nuclear #eapoirs. The doclment! coritradict the 2005 claim by former Secretary ofState Heiry Kissinger that nbn-proliferation was hot an issue in the 1970s negotiations.Among the disclosures in the new documents:' In 1974 Department of State officials wrote that if the Shah's dictatorship collapsed and lran became unstable, "domesticdissidents oi foreim terrorists might easily be able to seize any special nuclear material stored in lran for use in bombs."Moreover, "an agglressive successdr to theShah might consideir nuclear weapons the final item needed to establish lran'scomplete militaf-dominance of the rcgion."* According to national security adviser Brent Scpwcr,oft, the Ford administration hoped that the Shah would commithimself to i "major act of nucl6ar statesmanship: namely, to set a world example by foregoing national reprocessing."* When officials from Oak Ridee National Laboratorv received briefines on the planned Esfehan Nuclear TedrnoloevCenter (ENTEC), they concluded that the "bears wafthinC'because "[nusuallilarse" size ofthe facilitv "makes it-'theo-rctically possibld to produce weapons-grade material(plutonium)" and thb ENTEC plans include d "laqge hot lab,"the first step toward reprcc€ssing.' Questioning U.S. efforts to rcstrict Tehran's fieedom of action, Iranian officials argued that "lran should have full rightto decide whEther to reprocess" and the "right to effective control of the managem-ent and operation of reprocessing-facilities."* By the summer of 1978, Tehran and Washington had overcome differences and asreed to a nuclear pact that metU.S. concems and the Shah's interest in buviie rcactors, but the asr€ement closelirestricted lran's abilitv to produceplutonium or any other nuclear weapons luel-using U.S. suppliedmaterial witholt Washington's "agreehenl."P,rsspor, April 2009 Page 43

For morc information contact:William Burr202-994-7032htg: / / www.nsarchive.org/nukevault-€r_New Kuklinski Documents On Martial Law In Poland ReleasedThe Central Intelligence Agency has releasedocuments rclatinA to one of the most simificant espionaee cases of thecold wat the casebf Polish Arhy Col. Ryszard Kuklinski. A sen-ior officer on the Polilh General Staff a-nd aide to Polishprime minister and communist p rty chiirf (and later president) Woiciech Jaruzelski, Kuklinski had volunteered hisservices to the United States Army during a sailing trip to northemGerminv in 7972. For over nine vears. Kuklinskiprovided the CIA with more than 40,000 Fages of Eocriments regarding the irurermost secrets oi ihe tV;;;* F";i;"the secrcts of the kitchen" (Jaruzelski), incl-uding war plans-inlelligei'ce that was deemed of "trulv ercat stratesicsignificance" by Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national seiurity adviser. Much of the doiuf,rentation "pttotographed py Kuklinski at,great personal risk (with the door to his office u_nlocked) was passed to the CIA throughclandestinexchanges during boat trips, some 63 moving car exchanges and also through de:a drops.During the 1980-81 Polish Crisis he continued to provide information on Warsaw Pact Dlannine, intemal Polishdevelopments and Soviet pressures. From the iniiial outbreak of labor unrest and the rise of thE independent tradeunion "SolidarnosC(Solidarity)to the declaration of martial law on December 12-13, 1981, Kuklinsk'i provided periodreporting and commentary on'the chaotic progression of events. His reportinq focused on the refinem6nt of the blansfor introducing martial law (with which, much to his frustration he wa3 taskfi), internal debates within the oariv andmilitary leadership, and the constant pressure from Moscow on the Polish communist regime to contain and'desiroy thelabor union.The documents released include a 1977 document outlining governmental tasks in the event of a thr€at to nationalsecurity; l8 reports by Kuklinski on information and impr*iions gained from his close contacts on the Polish GeneralStaff and from contaat with Soviet officers; 42 reports relaying maitial law planninq documents, 15 reDorts based onKuklinski information diss€minated after the declarationbfrartial law on'Decem6er 13, 1981, as well as one 1983 r€portprepared by Kuklinski after his (and his family's) extraction to the United States.Current and earlier releases related to this cas€ can be found at the web page of the Cold War International History Projectat http:/ / www.wilsoncenter.org.Soviet Strategic Forces Went on Alert Three Times during September-October 1962 because of Apprehension overCuban Situadonln 1962, a month before the Cuban Missile Crisit Soviet leaders put their stratesic forces on their "hishest r€adinesstasesince the beginning of the Cold War," according to a newly declaisified internafhistorv of the Nation"al Securitv Aeencv"published for the first time by the National Sec-urity Archive. Possibly respondine to ltresident Kennedv's call for Eseri,es.perhaps worried that the Wliite House had discovered Moscow's plins tci deploy-missiles on Cuba, thd Kremlin keptforces on alert for 10 day+ beginning on September ll, 1962.The NSA's signals intelligence (SIGINT) history also discloses that, a month later, on October l5th, the Soviets initiated a"precautionaiy, preliminary" alert, perhaps beiause Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev feared thaa U.S. intellieence haddiscovered the ririssiles. After Presiclent Kennedy'speech on October 22,1962, arnouncing the "quarantine" Iblockade)of Cuba, the Kremlin put military force+ especiilly a'ir defense forceg on an "extraordinarilv hielistate of aleriSignificantly, "offensiire forces av,oided assdming lhe highest rcadinesstage, as if to insureihaiKennedy understood thatthE USSR would not launch first.ln r€sponse to a declassification request by the National S€curity Archive, the secretive National Security Aqencv hasdeclassified large portions of a foui-part "top-secret Umbra" stidy, Atnericnn Crwtolocu durhp the Cold t'tnrlDejoitemaior redactiong this history disclosles much new information about the aeencf i his[drv andthe role of SIGINt' andcommunications intelliSence (COMINT).during the Cold War. Researchedind written by NSA historian Thomas Johnson,the three parts released so far provide a frank a-ssessment of the history of the Agency arid its forerururerg warts-6nd-all.For more information, contact:Matthew Aid202-994-70[ohttp: / / u,ww.nsarchive.org.-.@-Page 44Posslntt Aptil2009

New Evidence On North Korea's Crrollina Movement and First Five-Year PlanCMHP is pleased to announcE a new publication from the Wilson Center's North Korea Intemational DocumentationPtgea, Nczt Eo.ideacg gry Ngrll Korea's Chollima Monement anil First Fiue-Year Plan (7957-7967I The collection was speciallyprepared for a ioint NKIDP-United States Institute of Peace conference, "'New DPRK RevolutionaryUp5urge'-A Blast from the Past or a New Path?" and contains newly obtained documentarv eviddnce on North Koreanptilitical and economic developments in the late 195G from Polistv (East) Germaru Chinese, 'and Czedr ardrives. The5 documents contained in thd reader shed new liqht on the events surrounding the laundi of the Chollinra movemenLa campaign designed to inq€ase prcduction and t6 subordinate individud thoiehts and actions to the needs of thecollecEve. The Clollima movemeit took its name from a mythical winged horse drat could travel 1,000 li, ol100 km,in one day and- exhorted the North Korca people to work is hard as. tfre legmdary horse. The docummt! place recdntgovernmant efforts to r€vive the Chollima rirov-ement into a broader historiial conlext.Nao Evidence on Nortlr Koraq3 Chollim a Mooemen, is available for download flee of charge at http: / /www.wilsoncenter.org/nkidp.National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Eook No. 272Twenty years ago, the commander of the Soviet Limited Contineent in Afshanistan Boris Grcmov crossed the TermezBridgd dut of Alghanistan, thus marking the end of the Soviet vv-ar whidr lasted almost tm vears and cost tens ofthou-sands of Soiiet and Afghan lives. As a tribute and memorial to the late Russian historiin General AlexanderAntonovidt Lyakhovsky, thi National Security trffhvg has posted on the Web (www.nsarchive.ore) a series of oreviouslvsecrct Soviet documents including Politburo dnd diary nobes published here in Enclish for the first-time. The dci:uments'suggesthat the Soviet decision td withdraw occurred as earli as 1985, but the pndess of implementine that decision wasexcnrciatingly slow in part because the Soviet-backed Afchan rcsime was nevdr able to achieve the neiiessarv domesticsupport anil legitimacy, a key problem even today for the-currenf U.S. and NATGsupported govemment in trGbul.The Soviet documents show that ending the war in Afghanistan, whidr Soviet seneral secretarv Mikhail Gorbachev called"the bleeding wound," was amonq his hiqhest prioritiA from the moment he aisumed power in 1985, a point he madeclear to then:Afghan Comrnunist leader Fabrali Karmal in their first conversation on Mirdr 14 1985. Alrbadv in 1985,according to the-documents, the Soviet Politburo was discussing ways of disengaging from Aflhanistan, ancl actuallyreadred dre decision in principle on October 1Z 1985.For more informatiorL cDntact:National Securiw Archive2m-9iL70Nhttp: / / www.nsardrive.org.3. Announcementg:CFP: "70 Years Laten The Global Impact of the HolocauetoHoly Family Unioersity, Philadelphia, PA, Nwember 7-8,2009At the next annive rsary of Kristallnacftt, the Graduate Proqrams of the Sclool of Arts and Sciences at Holv FamilvUniversity will presenl a tr,voday interdisciplinary confeftnce entitled "70 Years Later: The Global Impa6t of thdHolocaust " to 6e held on Noverirber 74, 2O9. Pairels, prcsentations, and poster sessions will be accefd from alldisciplines.Eadr proposal must include the following information: title of presentation and topic area; name hiehest educationaldegree, e-mail address of person deliveriig presentation (prindpal author); compfete maiiinq addre;s, telephone number,fax number, and institutioh/business inloiriation (departinenL-school,aqency, oi companv)bf principal authou namesof coauthors, their highest educational deqrees, and iheir institution/budiness informitioir preleren& for Dresantationin a poster, panel, or p-aper se6sion; and a 250,300 word abstract of the paper, poster, or pres€iltation topic. Submissiondeadline is April 30, 2009.Please submit abstracts to:Dr. Leanne OwmHolv Familv UniversiW9801 Frankford Avenu6Philadelphia PA 19114Pdsst'o April 2009 Page 45

CFP: 8rh Annual Transatlantic Studies Association ConfercnceCanterbury Christ Church Uniwrsity, Canterbury, UK, Iuly 1j-162009The Transatlantic Shrdies Association welcomes pmposals by individualg full panels of three speakers or a series ofrelated panels focusing on a particular theme or topic. Please direct any initial iuestions to Alair Dobson at alan.dobson@transatlanHcstudies.coin or the relevant panel coordinator listed belor,ri We weliome early submission of proposals andpanels.For History, Security Studies and IR, please contact David Ryan at david.ryan@ucc.ie and Alan Dobson at a.p.dobson@dundee.acluk.For Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Transatlantic Relations, please contact Priscilla Roberts at proberts@hkucc.hku.hkand Taylor Stirrmei at stoermer@virginia.edu.Please submit proposals with a 300-word abstract to the appropriate panel leaders by the Deadline of May l, 2009.For further information s€e: www.transatlanticstudies.com-€r-Eisenhower Foundation Travel GrantsThe Eisenhower Presidential Library Abilene Travel Grants Program assistscholars' research of primarv sources insuch fields as history, government, 6conomics, communications] and international affairs so thev mav piovide informedleadership in our na'tidnal life. The grants program is funded and administered by the Eisenhori'er F6dndation in Abilene,Kansas. -Grants arc awarded to individual researchers on a competitive basis to cover a portion of expenses while in Abilene,Kansas using the presidential library. The size of the erint (not to exceed $1,00O is dependeirt upon the distance traveledand duratioi of st'ay in Abilene. Grants are not rctroictive and travel must occur witliin one yeir of award.Applications must be received no later than February 28th for Spring reviews, and Septemb€r 30th for Fall reviews andintlude the following:. A letter from the Eisenhower Library providing information on the availability of relevant materials in the Librarv'sarchives. Please addrcss inquiries to: Dwieht D. Eisenhower Librarv, 200 S.E. 4th, Abilene, KS 57410 and reouestpermission to use the holdiirgs of the Libriry. An archivist at the Li6rary witl resirond with a letter detailing' collectionsihat are pertinento your resEarch topic.o A curriculum vitae including academic experience and a list of any publications.o A detailed summary (not to exceed five pages) of the subiect and scope of your research. Funding priority will be givento well-developed proposals that will rely'siinificantly on (he resourceb in t6e Eisenhower Library. Tentative timetable for visiting Abilene (including duration of stay in Abilene) and for completint project.. A ten- to fifteen-page writing sample.. A proposed budget. For information on lodging, food and travel costs please visit the Abilene Tourism and ConventionBureiau website atlrttp:/ / www.abilenekansaslor!.o lnformahon as to any other grant rcceived or being pursued for the project.o Two or three supporting letters from academic advisors or professional colleagues.o lntended publication or other use of the product of your research.A selection panel reviews application packaces. All aDDlicants will be informed in writins of the selection oanel's decisionapproximatbly six weeks aftdr the applicatio-n deadliid. Once a qrantee has firm travel plins, the srantee will be issuedtrlvb check. One check in the amounf of half the award will be fiailed to the grantee irimediately-prior to the research tripto the Library, while the second will be held by the Library for presentation u-pon arrival.Applicants should provide these materials to:Abilene Travel Grants ProgramEisenhowerFoundation -P.O. Box 295200 S.E. 4th StreetAbilene. KS 57410Gerald Ford Library Research Grants ProgramsTwo grant programs are available to support research in the holdings of the Gerald R. Ford Library. These holdings focuson feileral folicies, U.S. foreign relation's, and national politics in thE 1960s and 1970s.The Gerald R. Ford Foundation awards several Research Travel Grants of up to $2,000 each in support of research in theholdings of the Gerald R. Ford Library. A grant defrays travel, Iiving, and photocopy expenses ofi research trip to thePage 46Passport April20f9

Ford Library. Grants are awarded twice a year with application deadlines of Manch 15 and September 15.The "Gerald R. Ford Scholar Award (Dissertation Award) in Honor of Robert Teete/ in the amount of $5,000 is eivenannually to one individual to support dissertation r€s€ardl on an aspect of the U.S. politicat process auiiirg thi fatteipartof the twentieth centurv.Inlormation about both of these grants can be found on the Library web page at hftp:/ /www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library / hpgrants.asp.Cold War Prize CompeHtionFor the fifth year, tlre John A. Adams Center at the Virginia Military Institute will award prizes for the best unoublishedpapers dealing with the United States military in the Cold War eri(1945-1991). Any aspe'ct of the Cold War is blieible, withPaPers on war planning, intelligmce, logistic3, and mobilization esxcially welconie. Please note that essavs which rdhteasPects of the Korean and Southeast Asian conflicts to the larger Co'ld Wai are also open for considerationlPrizes: First place will earn a plaque and a cash award of $2,000; second place, $1,000 and a plaque; and third place, $500and a plaqud.Procedures: Entries should be tendered to the Adams Center at VMI by Iune 15, 2009. Please make vour submissionin Microsoft Word and limit your entry to a maximum of twenty-five iaees of double+paced text, elclusive ofdocumentation and bibliogriphy. A p6nel of iudges will, over the sunimEr, examine all iapers and the Adams Center willamounce its toD three rankin-es'earlj' in the fall of 2009. The /ournal of Military History r,riilfbe happy to consider thoseaward winners lor publicatioi.Phase dircct submissions and questions to:Professor Malcolm Muir, Jr., DirectorJohn A. Adams_'7l Centei for Military History and Straregic AnalysisDeparhnent of HistoryViriinia Militarv Instiiutelcx-ingbon, VA144fimuirri@vmi.eduw&744717338 a,Fax:540&-72462ffi9 Edwin H. Shernan Family Prize for Undergraduate Scholarship in Force and DiplomaryTemple Univ,epity's Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy seeks submissionsfor its annual Edr,r,in H. Sherman Prize for Undergraduati: ftholirship'in Force and Diplomacy. The reciDient of the EdwinSherman Prize will receive a $1,000 award along iith a certificate. Ariy paper written liv an Gaenraa"Ste CiriaJtii i. tt J2008 calendar year, submitted by either the student or a faculw memb'ef af the studenY6 colleee or-universitv is elieible.The paper muit address an issub, contemporary or hisborical, that demonstrates the intersecti5n of force and dioloiracv inintemational affairs. Although electronic_iubmissions are prcferr€d, hard-copy submissions will be accepted. Pipers ninstbe emailed or postmarked no later than Friday, April 1, 2ffi8.Send eleckonic submissions to Beniamin Brandenbuqg bbb@bempte.edu.Send hard copy submissions to:The Center for the Study of Force and DiplomacyHistory Departmentcladfelter 913Temple University1115W. Berks StreetPhiladelphia, PA 19722-60894. Upcoming SHAFR Deadlinee:The Stuart L Bemath Dies€rtation Research GrantThe Bemath Dissertation Grant of up to 94000 is intended to help graduate students defrav exDenses encountered in thewriting of their dissertations. The grant is awarded annually at theTHAFR lundreon held ilurihg the annual meeting ofthe Arierican Historical Associahon.fJrmfiil,fbffie$L"t*fi;,#pt'.oissertations dealing with some aspect of u.s. rorcign r€lations history.Passpor, April2009Page 47

Procedures: Self-nominations a.re expected. Please download and complele the application.found on the SFIAFR web pageat h-ttP:/ /www.shafr.org/ . To be.coirsiaerea roi the zoio.i*atd, no^tt auons ano supporhng marerials mustbybe r€ceii,eilOctober 1, 2009. Subftit materiats to fellowships@shihorg.-'Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SFIAFR Business office a briefrcport onhow the tunds were sftnt. such reports wriiue *;.Hfi;eio;ilbftiiii'rii'nllfriT'"_6The Michael f, Hogan Foreign Language FellowshipThe.Michael l. Hogan Foreign language Fellowship was established to honor Michael J. Hogan, long-timeDiplomaticeditor ofHbtorylThe Ho-gan Fellowship of up to fi,000 is intended to promote research in foreign language sources by graduate students.ff-fH:mH:;l'#ffxi1ffs1ff"'""'*""ix*fttFhi';*9"'nr*g::#:34?;ffi;.'i.iApplicants must be graduate students researching some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Membership inrcqurreO.SHAFR isProcedures: Self-nominaHons are expegled. 4gasq download and complete the application found on the SFIAFRat http:/web oaee/www.shafr.org/ . ro be co:nsidered for the 20to awarO nomfna-uirii-ai'dji,ipiiiiriiiiiiit'ri''-ilr1i d" ii,iiiS!8'by October 1, 2009. Subirit materials to hogan-fellowshipdhafrorg.Within eiqht morrths of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a briefrcport on now tne runds were spmt. Such rcports will be considered for publication in passport.-AThe W. Stull Holt Dissertation FellowshipThe W..Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship of up to $4,000 is intended to defray the coots of travel necEssarv to conductS.l5LTi_tiq1fi,cantdissertationproie*. the fell6wship is awarala ann"ltit;-tGgHAllii".t-.ii"if iia iiiiii tr'"annual meetingof the American Hist6rical Association.Applicants must be activelv working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history.Meinbership in SHAFR is iequired.Procedqres: Self-nominations arc expected. Please download and complete the application found on the SFIAFR web oaeeat http:/ /www.shafr.orgl . ro becohsidered for thj zolit;;ard;ilmlh;ri.;-";'f;;;ilfi;ili#;[;r-Jilii,i!riJ3"by Oitober 1, 2009. Subirit materials to fellowships@shaf..o*. 'Within eight months of receiving the awarrd each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a briefr€poft on now the nrnds werc spent. such Eports will be consiclered for publication in passport._@_The Lawrence Gelfand - Armin Rappaport Dissertation FellowehipSFIAFR established this fellowship to [gnor Lawrence Gelfand founding member and former SHAFR president andArmin Rappaport, founding editcir of Diplomatic History.The Gelfand-RapPaPort Fellowship of up to $4,000 is intended to defray the costs of dissertation researrch travel.The fellowship isivl'arded annually at sHAFR'luncheo" neia aning ttie;r;;a^ati;;;'itii;American HistoricatAssociation. -Applicants rnust be activelv working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of U.S. for€ign relations history.Meinbership in SFIAFR is ftquired.Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application found on the SFIAFR web paseat http:/ /www.shafr.o_rgl. To be coirsidired fo.r the 20to award, nominatid;;'dsdi;;h;;;;;;rt;;i"-rib" ;Ai"e'by October 1, 20@. Subinit materials to fellowshipsGhafr.org.Samuel Flagg Bemie Dissertation Ree€arch GrantsThe Samuel F. Bemis Research Grants arc intended to promote dissertation research by graduate students. A limitedlgfj_.lgfll[gf-r-qing amo-unts (gmerally, up td $2,000) willbe awarded annualtiiii t Lip a;h;tffi;;;-6;idomestrc or lntemauonal travet nec€ssary to conduct rcsearch on significant scholarly prolectsiAPPlicants must b€ actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of U.5. foreign relations history.Page48possport April2}(9

Membership in SHAFR is required.Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application found on the SHAFR web paeeat http: / /www-shalr.qrgl . To beSghsidered fo.r.the_2010-award, nominations an'd supporting miteriatJ m"st Ue ,eceiiJ8-by October 1, 2009. Submit materials to fullowships@shafr.org.Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SFIAFR Business Office a briefrcport onhow the funds were spent. Such reports will be cons'iclered for publication in Passport.William Applenan Williame funior Faculty Research GranteThe William Appleman Williams Junior Faculty Research Grants are intended to Dromote scholarlv research bv untenuredcollege and uniiersity faculty and others who are within six years of the Ph.D. aniC who are workihe as prcfeslionalhistoiians. Grants anl limited to sdrolars working on the firsf research monosraph. A limid numbdr of'erants of varvincamounts (generally up to 92,000) will be awardd annually to help defrav thi c6sts of domestic or intemitional travelnecrssary to "conduct iesearch on significant scholarly proibcts. M6mbersfup in STIAFR is required.Plocedures: Self-nominatiors are expected. Please download and complete the application found on the SFIAFR web oaceat http:/ /www.shafr.org/ . To be cohsidered for the 2010 award, nomfrrations an^d supportine materialC muii Ue receii'e8by Oatober 1, 2m9. Submit materials to williams-fellowshipe@shafr.org.Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a briefrcport onhow the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in Passport.6. Recent Publicationg of Interest4ppelbaum, Paeicia, Kingtlom to Commune: P,otestant Pacifst Culture behoeen Wotlil War I awl the Vietnam Eru (NorttCirolina, 2009).Bakalian Anny, and Mehdi Bozorgmehr, Ba&lash th|: Mitldle EasVn awl Muslim Americans Resporul (Califomia 20@).Blanco, John D., Frontier Constitutions: Christianity and Colonial Empire in the Nineteenth-Century Philippines (Califomia,20wt.Blumenthal, David and fames A. M orcie, The Heart of Pmoer: Health and Politics in the Ooat Offce (Califomia, 2009).Brewer, Susan, W?iy America Fights: Patriotism antl War Propaganda from the Philwines to lraq (Oxford, 2009).Browry Archie, Seurn Years that Changeil the Workl: Perestroika in Perspectiw (Oxfond, 2009).Burke-Gaffney, Brian, The Nagasaki Foreign Settlement: A Short History (Hawai'i,20fD),Call, Steve, Se ing Air Pnter: Military Aviation and American Popular Culture Affer Work! War II (lexas A&M, 2009).Casey, Shauq The Making of a Catholic Prestulent: Kenneily rr. Nrion I 950 (Oxfond, 2008).Chirl Ko-lir1 The CoJden Triangle: Instule Southeas, Asia's Drug Trade (CorrclL 2C/Jg).Contreras, fosep[ In the Shadou of the Giant The Ameriunization ol Moilern Merico (Rutgers, 2009).Csordas, Thomas J., d., Transnational Transcendence Es*ys on Religion and Globalization (Califomia, 2009).They Seroed-Fmm IFK to George W. Bnsh (Simon& Schuster2OO9).Derby, Laurm, 1?a Dictator's Seduction: Politics and the Popular Imagination in the Era ofTrujillo (Duke, 2009).Dev1i, Faisal, The Tenorist in Surch of Humanity: Militant Islam awl Global Politia (Columbia, 2009).Drrur, Timothy J., Bloclading the Boriler and Human Rights: The El Paso Operation that Remade Immigration Enforcement (fexas,2009).Franco, Massimo, Parallel Empires: The Vatican and the United States--Tzlo Centuri* of Alliance and Conllict (Randorn House,2009).Gage, Beverly, Th e Day Wdll Stree, Exploded: A Story of America in its First Age oJ Tenor (Oxfotd,2Bl.Gunrl Giles, and Carl Guti6rrez-Jones, &; Americ arul the Misslnping of a New Workl Onler (Califomia 2009).Gum, T. feremy, Sp iritual Weapons: The Cold War and the Forging of an Americon National Religion (Praeger, 2008).Hagopian, Patriclg The Vietnam War in American Memory: Veterans, Memorials, and the Politics of Healing (Massachusetts,2009):Hamerow Theod ote 5., Why We Watcherl: Europe, Amoica, and the Holocarst W. W. Norton, 2008).HodgsoO Godfrey, The Myth of American Exceptionalisrn (Yale, 2009).Possport Apdl 2009 Page 49

Honigsbery Peter ,an, Orr Ndt ion Unhingeil: The Humon Consequences of the Wdr on ?ror (California, 2009).Home, Alistair, Kissinger: 7973, the Crucial Year (Simon& Schuster, 2009).Khalidi, Rashid, s moing crisis: Tlrc Cold wor and Americatt Hege,nony in the Mitk e East (BeacoD 2009).Khlevniuk, Oeg V., trans. Nora Seligman Favorov, Mas ter of the House: Stalin and. His Inner Circle (Ya\e,2009).Kim{nage, Michael, The Consertmtiae Tunr: Lionel Trilling, Wltittaker Chambers, and ttr Ltsmns of Anti-Cotnmurlsrl (Harvard,20G). -Kudo, Akira, ed. /apa n and Gernany: TztD btecomers on the World Stage, 1890-1945 (Hawai'i, m@\Mann, f ames, The Rebelliott of Ronald Rcagan: A History of the End ol the Cokt War (Yikjng 2OB).McCrossen, Afexi s, Iand of Necasity: Consutner Culture in the lJnited States-Mexico Borderlands (Duke 2009).\{il!er, fames Edward, The United States and the Making of Modern Greece: History dnd Pozoer,1950-1974 (North Carolin420fD).Murphy, Andrew R., Prodigal Nation: Moral Decline and Divine Punishment ftom Nao England ro 9/11 (Oxford, 2008).Nancg Susao Hmo the Arabian Nights Inspired the American Dram,1790-7935 (North Carolina, 2009).O,'Connor, Peter, The English-Ianguage Press Nefilorks ol East Asia, 197845 (Hawai'|200g).Olmsted, Kathryn 5., Real Enemies: Conspiracy Theories and American Democracy, World War I to 9111 (Oxford,2009l.Qlgllivan, Christopher D., Sumner Welles, Poshoar Planning, and the Quest hr a Nau World Order, 7937-7943 (Columbia,2008).Radosh, Ronald, and Allis Radoslr, A Safe Haaen: Harry S. Truman and t!rc Fountlittg of Israe! (Harper,2009\,Ro-berts,PriscillaH.,andRichardS.Robet|f..ThomasBarclay(1728-179:CottsulhFmnce,DiplonatinBarbary(l2008).Rodman, P.eter _W. , Presidential Comtnand: Pozoer, Itadership, ant! the Making of Foreign Policy from Richard Nixon to George W.Bash (Random House, 2009).Rougeau, Vinc€nt D, Christians in the American Enpire: Faith and Citizenship fu the Nrru Workl Onter (Aford, 2008).Rovner, Ed.gardo Sden1, The Cuban Connection: Drug Trafickiug, Smuggling, onr! Gamblhtg in Cuba lrom the 1920s to theRewlution (North Carolina, 2009).Sasgen, Peter, Slalkhrg the Red Bear: The True Story of a U.S. Cokl War Submarine's Cwert Operations Againsthe Sooiet lJnion(St.llartin's, 2009). -Schoultz, L,ars, That Infemal Little Cuban Republic: The atnited States and the Cuban Ranlution (North Carolina, 2009).Schwenkel, Christina, The American War in Contemporary Vietnam: Transnational Retnembrance and Repr*entatiou (lndiana,20fp).Sloan, fohn W, FDR antl Reagan: Transformatioe Presidents with Clashing Vrsions (Kansas, 2008).Stokke Olav Trre UN and Dmelopment: From Aid to Caperation (lndiana,20f,fl.Tanaka Yuki, and Marilyn B. Young eds., Bombhtg Ciailians: ATzoentieth-Ctntury History (New Press, 2008).Tyler, Patriclg A World of Trouble: The White House dntl the Middle East-from tlv Cold War to the Wdr ott Tefior (Fanar, Strausaird Giroux,2008). -West, Elliott, Trre lrs t Indian War: The Nez Perce Story (Oxtord,2Dl.Wuthnow, Robert, Boutulless Faith: The Global Outreach of American Churches (California, 2009).Page fl)Pdsst'ort April 2009

The Last WordA s I wdte these words in February 2009,A the daily newspapers are reportingI Ievidence of doom and gloom in theU,S. economy. For about five weeks straight,it seems that the business section of mv localpaper, tIre Cotumhrs Drbpatch, has prinled thesame sad headline: X CORITTORATION SFIEDSY JOBS, with only the X and Y changing andwith Y followed by a comma and three zeroes.My university is discussing possrble budgetcuts, which is alarming enough, but I alsohear from friends around the countrv that Iam among the fortunate ones who hive notyet experienc€d actual cuts.In this climale of doom and gloom, I am very pleasedto be able to say ftat SFIAFR is weathering the storm indecent shape. While our investment portfolio has taken ahuge hit in the last 15 months, falling by some 30 percentin actual value, we have also dramatically increased ourrevenue sourtes in that same time period and thus havebeen able to laundr a series of new initiatives designed toexpand our membership broaden our readr into publicdiscourse and educatiorl and continue our long legary ofpromoting excellence in researcfu especially by graduabestudmts. At its meeting in New York in January, C-ouncildecided that we were in a position to maintain the newprcgrams evm in tirnes of economic malaise.Some higtrlighe:) In 200&t SHAFR launched two new, yearJongdissertation fullowships valued at 92Q000 eadr. Thisprogram enables two fellows to devote the academicyear to completion of their doctoral degrees without thepressure of teaching or other employment. This programwill continue in 20091O widr ttre winners notified onapproximately May 1 and announced at dre SHAFRconfermce in June.) In 2fi)8, we launched the armual Summer Institute, aweek-long workshop on a significant topic in U.S. for€ignrclations history. Bob McMahon and I were fortunateto co.host the 2008 Institute, focusing onVietnam and Iraq in comparative perspectiveand including 12 engaged and thoughtfulparticipanc. Jeremi Suri and Fredrik logevallwill co-host the 2009 program on the themeof 'Tuming Points in the Cold War." Councilvoted to extend this program through2012 and appointed a committee to solicitapplications from prospective hosts for the201O 2011, 2012 Institutes.) Council also launched a bold andambitious effort to boost the membership anddiversify the scope of research in the field by generouslysubsidizing cavel to the next three annual meetings by .scholars who would add diversity to the program andwho have not previously attended SFIAFR conferences,Consequently, the 2009 Program Committee, chaired byPauI Kramer, rcceived a record number of session andpaper proposals and is planning a record-setting meetingin June 20$).) Under the leaderstrip of our new Web Editor BrianEtheridge (Louisiana Tedr), SHAFR's web+ite wasreconceptualized and redesigned from top to bottomin fanuary 2(X)9. The site now featur€s blogs and op-edessays designed to prcvide commentary on current eventsin historical perspective and to introduc€ inter€stedr€aders to our Society. Early data on "hits" and "uniquevisitors" suggesb that the initiative is giving SFIAFR acollective voice in the shaping of public discourse onvital issues of our day. On a related note, our Dircctor ofSecondary Educatioo John Tully (Central C-onnecticut), issoliciting teadring plans on select topics in our field andmaking them freely available to secondary school teadrersaround the world.The vibrancy of SHAFR continues to gratify, even in thehard times through which many of us seem to be sliding.PeEr L. Hahn is Executioe Dircctot of SH/-IR and Professorof History at The Ohio State Unioersity.Passpor, April 2009 Page 51

PasspottMershon Center forInternational Security StudiesThe Ohio State Univ6raity1501 Neil AvenueColumbus, OH 43201passport@oeu.eduNON-PROFIT ORG.U.S. POSTAGEPAIDHANOVER,PALTSSLPermit No. 4For more SHAFR information,visit us on the web at www.shafr.org