Vol. 56, Issue 1 - Howard University School of Law

Cognitive Foreign Policytime off. 246 During those eight months, approval ratings hovered between50 and 60%, 247 but immediately following the 9/11 attacks, ratingssoared to above 90%. 248 While Bush portrayed himself duringthe election as an ordinary country boy, who lacked national experienceand was proudly not an insider to Washington, after 9/11, he apparentlyneeded to task career officials in the FBI, CIA, Pentagon,and other security related agencies with direction. Senator RobertByrd noted that Bush came to office after a virtual tie election, butwith 9/11 there was “shock, trauma, and fear among the Americanpeople; the surge of patriotism; and the sense of common danger: allof these quickly catapulted this rather inarticulate, directionlessman . . . to [an august] level of power.” 249Historical polls reveal that leaders reap short-term populace supportby responding to perceived foreign crises and may use force toboost domestic support. 250 History and recent experience illustratesthat conflict abroad virtually always increases executive power athome. 251 There is a “rally around the flag” phenomenon. 252 Emphasizingsecurity threats and using force may avail Republicans byusurping attention from issues most pressing to Democrats, such ashealth care, minimum wage proposals, and other social issues. 253246. See David W. Moore, Public Critical of Bush’s Vacation Plans, GALLUP (Aug. 7, 2001),http://www.gallup.com/poll/4774/Public-Critical-Bushs-Vacation-Plans.aspx.247. Id.248. Historical Bush Approval Ratings, U. MINN., http://www.hist.umn.edu/~ruggles/Approval.htm (last updated June 20, 2008).249. ROBERT C. BYRD, LOSING AMERICA 20 (2004). Irene Zubaida Khan, The 2007-2008Mitchell Lecture: The Rule of Law and the Politics of Fear: Human Rights in the Twenty-FirstCentury, 14 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 3 (2008) (“Playing on people’s fears allows the politicalleaders to consolidate their power, to create false certainties and to escape accountability.”).250. See PAUL BRACE & BARBARA HINCKLEY, FOLLOW THE LEADER 107 (1992); Karl R.DeRouen, Jr., The Indirect Link: Politics, the Economy, and the Use of Force, 39 J. CONF. RES.671, 672 (1995).251. Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs,102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 546 (2004) (citing PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 291 (Desmond Lee trans.,1995); ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 346 (T.A. Sinclair trans., 1988)); see also William MichaelTreanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power to Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 695, 747-48(1997).252. JOHN E. MUELLER, WAR, PRESIDENTS AND PUBLIC OPINION 267 (1973); see also JohnE. Mueller, Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson, 64 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 18, 21(1970); Barbara Norrander & Clyde Wilcox, Rallying Around the Flag and Partisan Change: TheCase of the Persian Gulf War, 46 POL. RES. Q. 759, 759 (1993).253. See Michael Doran, The Closed Rule, 59 EMORY L.J. 1363, 1391-93 (2010). An October2003, Pew Research Center polls discovered that nearly 70% of Republicans believed that thebest way to ensure peace is by military strength and 85% of Republicans believed going to war inIraq was the correct decision, while only 39% of Democrats believed it was the correct decision.See William A. Galston, Political Polarization and the U.S. Judiciary, 77 UMKC L. REV. 307, 311(2008); see also Alan Abramowitz & Kyle Saunders, Why Can’t We All Just Get Along? The2012] 43