Apple iOS 4 Security Evaluation

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Unique to iOSDynamic Code Signing EnforcementStronger defense against remote native codeinjection than DEP/NX/W^XKernel is secured against user mode codeEven the superuser (root) has to exploit thekernel in order to run kernel mode code
On JailbreakingModern jailbreaks require multiple exploits to defeat the layeredprotections in iOS1 BootROM exploit required for tethered jailbreak1 BootROM, 1 Incomplete Code Signing, and 1 Kernel exploitrequired for untethered jailbreak1 Safari, 1 Kernel exploit required for remote temporary jailbreak1 Safari, 1 Kernel, 1 Incomplete Code Signing exploit for remoteuntethered jailbreak (i.e. JailbreakMe)Jailbreaking essentially reduces iOS security to level of Android
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Apple iOS 4 Security EvaluationDino
Page 3 and 4:
AcknowledgementsiPhone jailbreak de
Page 5 and 6:
OverviewIntroductionASLRCode Signin
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Security ConcernsSensitive data com
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Persistence Attack GraphPrivileged
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Security ConcernsHow hard is it to
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ASLR with PIEExecutable Heap Stack
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Partial vs. Full ASLRPIEMainExecuta
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PIE in Real-World Apps?
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Bottom LineAll built-in apps in iOS
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Security ConcernsCan this applicati
Page 23 and 24: Mandatory Code SigningCode Signing
Page 25 and 26: Provisioning ProfilesThe Provisioni
Page 28 and 29: Distribution ModelsOn-Device Develo
Page 30 and 31: Code Signing InternalsAppleMobileFi
Page 32 and 33: MAC Hook API Description AMFI Usage
Page 34 and 35: Ad-Hoc Code SignatureExecutable=/De
Page 36 and 37: Code Signing Verificationvnode_chec
Page 38 and 39: Bypassing Code SigningIncomplete Co
Page 40 and 41: csopsint csops(pid_t pid, uint32_t
Page 42: CS Status FlagsFlag Value Descripti
Page 45 and 46: # ldid -e /Applications/MobileSafar
Page 47 and 48: Dynamic Code SigningThe dynamic-cod
Page 49 and 50: Sandboxing
Page 51 and 52: Sandboxing in iOSBased on same core
Page 53 and 54: Built-in Sandbox ProfilesBackground
Page 55 and 56: App Home DirectorySubdirectory.app/
Page 57 and 58: Mach Bootstrap ServersAll Mach task
Page 59 and 60: Bottom LineRemote exploits are most
Page 61 and 62: Security ConcernsWhat sensitive dat
Page 63 and 64: Encryption LayersEntire filesystem
Page 65 and 66: Data ProtectionCoverageIn iOS 4, DP
Page 67 and 68: Passcode KeyPasscode Key is derived
Page 69 and 70: Bottom Line6-character alphanumeric
Page 71 and 72: FindingsThird-party applications wi
Page 73: iOS vs. Android/BlackBerryHow does
Page 77 and 78: Hardware AdviceiPhone 3G and earlie
Page 79 and 80: One more thing...
Page 81: previewhobbyOne more thing...
Page 86 and 87: $99
Page 88 and 89: iOS Fuzz Farm• 4 x Apple TVs, swi
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Apple iOS 4 Security Evaluation

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