focus on life sciences - Chemical & Engineering News - American ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

GOVERNMENT & POLICYbell.” Anyone seeking the information,for any purpose, could readily find it, hepointed out.And while research journals and federalagencies are under no obligation to followNSABB’s recommendations, the advisoryboard and its decisions do carry weight inthe scientific community. The board wascreated in light of a recommendation inthe 2004 National Research Council report,“Biotechnology Research in an Age ofTerrorism.”NSABB members came to the tableto discuss the H5N1 papers withdiffering opinions, recalled memberArturo Casadevall, a professor ofmicrobiology at Albert Einstein Collegeof Medicine. Initially, he said,he was opposed to the recommendationfor publishing only redactedversions of the research papers.But “the process is deliberative andpeople can change their minds,” hesaid. “I changed mine.”But other NYAS panel membersare alarmed by the NSABB recommendation,which they see as aneffort to shut down productive linesof research and censor experimentalresults.“WE NEED TO specifically address the situationof H5N1,” said Peter Palese, chair ofthe department of microbiology at MountSinai School of Medicine. The Fouchier andKawaoka research groups, he said, “are passagingan H5N1 virus in ferrets. This is perfectlylegitimate,” and many other groupshave done similar work, he noted, referringto the experimental method in which viraladaptation is achieved by repeated passagein cells or in naive animal hosts. He said theexperiments are necessary because theyhelp researchers identify the very mutationsthey should be monitoring in wildstrains of the virus that could signal onsetof a human pandemic.Palese went on to question the casefatality rate of H5N1 infection in humans,which is estimated to be in the range of50 to 80%. He explained that this rate iscalculated only from documented cases ofhuman H5N1 infection as defined by WorldCYNTHIA GOLDSMITH/CDCHealth Organization (WHO) guidelines.The overwhelming majority of infections,including those that do not result in deathor that create asymptomatic H5N1 carriers,are not likely to be reported to WHO, hesaid. These undocumented infections occurin poor, rural areas where medical care,including access to advanced laboratory diagnostics,is not likely. Because the numberof nonlethal cases is being underreported,Palese said, “the case fatality rate is muchlower than what WHO is putting out.”The questioning of thecase fatality rate by Paleseled to a testy exchangewith NSABB memberOsterhelm, who accusedPalese of putting forwardfalse information. “Thestudy you continue to cite is the worstone of all,” Osterhelm said, referring to aJanuary Proceedings of the National Academyof Sciences article cowritten by Palese andMount Sinai School of Medicine colleagueTaia T. Wang, titled “H5N1 influenzaViruses: Facts, Not Fear” (DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1121297109 ).Casadevall chimed in on the exchangeand said, “The [fatality] numbers areunbelievable no matter any way you lookat it. When these things [the experimentalviruses] get out and combine with existingstrains, the situation becomes completelyunpredictable.”Palese continued to draw fire when heDUAL USE A colorizedTEM image showsH5N1 (gold) avian fluvirus growing amongkidney cells (green).questioned the use of ferrets in the experiments.“People are equating transmissionin ferrets with ease of transmission inhumans,” he said. The animals are indeeda model, he continued, but the implicationsfor human disease are unknowableat this time. “In fact, the ferret is much toosensitive” to make good predictions abouthuman infection, Palese said. “An animalmodel is just that—a model.”“But then what would be a good model,sir?” fellow panelist Laurie Garret, a seniorfellow at the Council on ForeignRelations and a former journalistwho has written extensively onemerging diseases, shouted acrossthe table.A visibly shaken and angry Paleseresponded: “These are not conclusiveexperiments, they are notcompelling, and we are using them toshut down a lot of science.”Other panelists also raised questionsabout how to advance importantbut risky research. Jasny tried to get ata root question: “What is it that causesvirus to jump from species to species—to become more virulent?” Getting theanswer to this and other importantquestions in virology requires dualuseresearch, she said. “Any kind ofresearch can have risk associated withit—it doesn’t mean we ignore the risk.How do we move ahead?”Panel member Alan S. Rudolph,director of the joint science and technologyoffice for the government’sChemical & Biological Technologies Directorate,noted concerns about including internationalperspectives on the research—some of which did occur outside the U.S.“The problem extends well beyondour borders,” Rudolph said. He notedthat quite a lot of activity on the H5N1experiments is starting to happen abroad,including a closed-door meeting at WHOheadquarters in Geneva scheduled for Feb.16 and 17. No agenda has been posted, butthe invitation-only conference is likely totouch on data sharing and other issues,including the possibility of distributingthe mutated experimental viruses to otherresearchers.“Any kind of research can haverisk associated with it—it doesn’tmean we ignore the risk.”WWW.CEN-ONLINE.ORG 12 MARCH 2012GARRETT N OTED that international viewson how to handle this research may be verydifferent than the consensus in the U.S.She said it is important to note that, whenpeople discuss what is ultimately a healthcare issue, the U.S. is often criticized in the
international community. The U.S. insistenceon intellectual property protectionsfor prescription drugs, she said, is oftenseen as an uncaring obstacle to health carefor people in the developing world.As for H5N1, Garrett pointed out anewspaper editorial in Indonesia that hailsFouchier as a hero for achieving breakthroughson H5N1 research that could leadto new protections for people in a countrywith potentially huge reservoirs of the virusin domesticated birds.NSABB’S RECOMMENDATION to redactinformation prior to publication of thepapers, however, comes a bit late, severalpanelists noted. This is because theFouchier and Kawaoka papers—includingmethodology and results—have alreadybeen discussed at a meeting in Malta lastyear. What’s more, the eyes of many expertsin influenza research have seen thepapers during peer review. Some panelistsestimated that about 1,000 people aroundthe world have read the papers or have directknowledge of the work, leading to furtherspeculation about the value of at least“We need to maintain the integrityof the scientific process.”some limited censorship of the data now.If the papers do appear in Science andNature in redacted form, which seems allbut certain, the panelists agreed that sharingthe full data sets and deciding whichresearchers are qualified to receive themwill be fraught with difficulty.“We need to maintain the integrity ofthe scientific process,” said panelist VéroniqueKiermer, executive editor for Natureand the Nature journals. She said the rolesof serendipity, interdisciplinary attention,and other factors in scientific research cannotbe underestimated for sparking “thingsthat can be field-changing.” In any systemto limit distribution of the redacted datasets, “we need to be very careful about howto establish these criteria and decide whothese people will be,” she said.So far Nature has made no public statementabout its plan for the H5N1 paperunder its control. Science Editor-in-ChiefBruce M. Alberts has stated his supportfor the NSABB recommendation but hasalso suggested that the journal wait for acredible plan for data sharing from the U.S.government before publishing the paper itcontrols.As the forum concluded, the panelistsremained split in their opinions. Allseemed to agree that biology was at anothercrossroads, especially with the growingbody of research in synthetic biology,and that responsibility for the safety andwelfare of the general public should be ofparamount concern.“But we can’t be wrong,” said Osterhelmof the H5N1 research. “There’s no goingback. We have no choice but to act on thisone.”Palese asked perhaps the ultimate questionabout H5N1 and any dual-use research:“Where do you stop being afraid?” ◾Reprinted from C&EN, Feb. 20, 2012Don’t Miss C&EN’s Life Sciences Focused IssuesC&EN Editorial CalendarFrom display advertising to cover tips, deliveryour message alongside our life sciences-specificeditorial content for high-impact exposure.June 4June 18July 23August 6September 3September 17October 22November 5December 3NanotechnologyCancer Drug ResearchDiagnosticsBiobased ChemicalsPharmaceutical ChemistryBiofuels & EnergyLife SciencesPharmaceutical PartneringProteomics & GenomicsInterested in receiving a printcopy of C&EN? Contact ElaineJarrett at jarrett@acs.org toreceive a complimentary copy.Visit cen-online.org/advertisefor information about C&EN’sadvertising opportunities.WWW.CEN-ONLINE.ORG 13 MARCH 2012
Page 3: CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS1155—1
Page 6 and 7: NEWS OF THE WEEKRoche hopesto expan
Page 8: NEWS OF THE WEEKChung’s team used
Page 13: GOVERNMENT & POLICYNEW YORK ACADEMY
Page 17 and 18: Mayo’s view is backed by a coalit
Page 19 and 20: to ensure that they work, and the s
Page 21 and 22: SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGYCOURTESY OF MAR
Page 23 and 24: workhorse lab bacterium Escherichia
Page 25 and 26: SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGYPICTURING BIOLO
Page 27 and 28: BEHIND AMUSHROOMSCOURGEScientists s

focus on life sciences - Chemical & Engineering News - American ...

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?