Horizons - United States Special Operations Command

U.S. Navy Chief Engineman Edward Young speaks with a foreign naval officer on a pier in Dakar, Senegal, Feb. 4, 2009, aboard theamphibious transport dock ship USS Nashville (LPD 13). Nashville is in Senegal for Africa Partnership Station (APS) 2009, an internationalinitiative developed by Naval Forces Europe and Naval Forces Africa, which aims to work cooperatively with U.S. and international partners toimprove maritime safety and security on the African continent. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class David Holmes)7: Attack the RootCauses of the Problemto Achieve LongerLasting SolutionsStakeholders’ frustrated needs andgrievances often fuel the sources androot causes for support to irregularactors. Full understanding of thesefactors may require detailed analysisof regional history, ethnicity, culture,politics and religion. Improvedgovernance will usually bring aboutmarginalization of irregular actors to apoint where they are destroyed,co-opted or reduced to irrelevance innumbers and capability. U.S. militaryintervention may cease when successis assured, but before it is actuallyachieved.8: Establish SecurityUnder the Rule of LawWithout a secure environment,implementing permanent reformsis problematic and can lead tospreading disorder. To establishlegitimacy, Commanders seekto transition security activitiesfrom combat operations to lawenforcement, as quickly as feasible.When insurgents are seen ascriminals, they lose public support.Using a legal system establishedin-line with local culture and practicesto deal with such criminals, enhancesthe host nation government’slegitimacy. The violence levelmust be reduced enough forpolice forces to maintain orderprior to any transition; otherwise,counterinsurgency (COIN) forces willbe unable to secure the populace andmay lose the legitimacy gained by thetransition.9: Prepare for a LongTerm CommitmentAt the strategic level, gaining andmaintaining U.S. public support forcommencing military operationsis crucial, however, experienceshows that the typical timeframe forpolitical and public support is threeto five years. The irregular threat’sprimary battle is against the hostnation government, not the UnitedStates; however, U.S. support can becrucial to building public faith in thatgovernment’s viability. The Americanpublic will not actively support thehost nation government unless theyare convinced that the military’sdeployed forces have the means,ability, stamina, and will to win.16 Horizons – Helping sHape tHe Future oF soF