SELF-BLINDNESS AND SELF-AWARENESS - Philosophy

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Self-Blindness and Self-AwarenessBut if commonsense intuitions like these support the Distinct Existence Thesis, why dophilosophers endorse constitutive theories? One reason can be found in a well-knownargument presented by Sydney Shoemaker in a number of papers. Shoemaker argues that ifa person's psychological states were ontologically independent from her beliefs about them itwould be possible for someone to suffer from a condition he calls "self-blindness”. Aperson suffers from self-blindness just in case she can know about her psychological statesin only a third-personal way. But, Shoemaker argues, the possibility of self-blindness isabsurd so a person’s psychological states cannot be fully distinct from her beliefs aboutthem. The impossibility of self-blindness is taken by many to show that some sort ofconstitutive view must be true.My purpose in this paper is to defend the Distinct Existence Thesis. I shall do so byarguing in the following two sections that even if self-blindness is impossible the bestexplanation for this need not deny the Distinct Existence Thesis. Shoemaker's argument ismotivated by his conviction that first-person access is epistemically unique. He thinks that ifthe Distinct Existence Thesis were true our first-personal way of accessing psychological stateswould have to be based on contingent causal relations. But, in that case it would no longerbe epistemically distinctive; it would too greatly resemble perceptual knowledge. In sectionthree, I offer an alternative account of the epistemic entitlement to first-person access thatdoes not base its justification on causal relations. We should not deny that first-person accessis epistemically distinct but I do not believe this means we must abandon the simple thoughtembodied by the Distinct Existence Thesis. In the final section of the paper, I return to thecommonsense intuitions that favor Distinct Existence Thesis in order to develop them morefully. I argue that the thesis is preferable to constitutive theories because it allows us to makesense of our fallibility concerning our own psychological states. Since it seems clear that we4
Self-Blindness and Self-Awarenesscan be mistaken about many of our own psychological states, we should avoid theories thatprohibit our fully understanding these sorts of errors.IAccording to Shoemaker, “a self-blind creature would be one which has the conception ofthe various mental states, and can entertain the thought that it has this or that belief, desire,intention, etc., but which is unable to become aware of the truth of such a thought except ina third-person way.” 9Self-blindness is supposed to be analogous to color-blindness. Just asa person who is color-blind can learn information about color in a non-standard way,through reading a book about colors for instance, a person who is self-blind can learn abouther own beliefs, desires, and intentions in a non-standard way, which is to say a completelythird-personal way. 10Instead of having first-person access to her own psychological states,the self-blind person will have to make observations of her behavior in order to know whatshe believes, wants or feels. Moreover, just as the color-blind person does not suffer from acognitive or conceptual deficiency, self-blindness is "supposed to be perceptual or quasiperceptual,rather than cognitive or conceptual." 11 Shoemaker argues that if the DistinctExistence Thesis were true, self-blindness would be possible. It would be possible forsomeone to have the same kinds of psychological states any of us do without having any ofthe normal first-person access that we do. 12Although Shoemaker tailors his argument to many different types of psychologicalstates, each variation rests on a type of thought experiment that asks us to try to imagine a9 (1988) pg. 115.10 Cf. Bilgrami (2006) and Peacocke (2008).11 (1988) pg. 118.12 (1994)5
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