U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Oversight of the Permit to ...

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BackgroundSection 809(g) of the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2004 (Public Law108-293) requires the Office of Inspector General to submit an annual report on itsevaluation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) current targetingsystem for international intermodal cargo containers. This is our sixth audit on selectedaspects of DHS’ targeting system. This year, we are focusing our efforts on determiningwhether CBP’s permit to transfer (PTT) process has effective controls in place to ensurethat the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) secures and inspects all identifiedhigh-risk containers.CBP is responsible for targeting and conducting cargo examinations on cargo destined toenter United States commerce. In 2009, approximately 9 million containers arrived in theUnited States. To manage the potential security threats presented by this large volume ofmaritime cargo, CBP employs a multi-layered approach, including analyzing andreviewing shipment information and targeting and inspecting high-risk cargo. CBPrequires carriers to provide shipment information about the contents of their cargocontainers to determine the level of risk associated with the cargo. CBP uses theAutomated Targeting System (ATS) to review this information, which includes thecountry of origin, type of merchandise, and destination, to determine if the shipmentposes a high risk to the United States and should be examined prior to release. CBPallows importers up to 15 days after the arrival of their shipment to provide additionalshipping information.Cargo terminals have limited storage space and constantly receive new shipments.Therefore, title 19 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) § 19.45 allows carriers to movecargo from the place of arrival using PTT once the application has been approved by theport director. The CFR does not provide specific policy and procedures on how portsshould implement the PTT process. As a result, each port director has established localpolicies and procedures based on port logistics and needs. In 2009, approximately176,000 containers were moved using the PTT process. Recent terrorist events such asthe recent incidents concerning air cargo highlight the need for continued strengtheningof controls to protect the integrity of the nation’s cargo security efforts. As cargocontainers move through the supply chain, including the PTT process, each point oftransfer increases the risk of vulnerabilities. The security of each transfer and thetrustworthiness of each party involved within the PTT process are critical to the overallsecurity of the supply chain.Results of ReviewCBP does not have a centralized PTT process. Each of the six ports we visited processedPTTs differently using varying methods to mitigate risks including special queries inATS and the Automated Manifest System, as well as advanced targeting units who targetcargo needing an examination. Our audit tests did not identify significant deficiencies inthe PTT processes at the ports we reviewed.1
We reviewed a random sample of 68 high and low risk PTTs for the first and secondquarter of FY 2010. Additionally to ensure high risk PTTs were properly inspected priorto release, we reviewed a sample of 295 high risk PTTs and a targeted sample of 60 otherhigh risk cargo containers processed in July 2010.For each stage, we tested various key internal controls, such as port policies andprocedures, determined whether PTT data requests and authorizations were properlyprocessed and verified that all high-risk cargo identified in our sample received theappropriate examination. We interviewed CPB Office of Field Operations personnel atCBP headquarters in Washington, D.C., and CBP supervisors and officers at the ports wevisited. We also interviewed non-CBP supervisors and employees working in varioustypes of warehouses, including container examination stations, container and foreigntrade zones, and customs bonded warehouses.This report does not contain any recommendations.Management Comments and OIG AnalysisWe obtained written comments on a draft of the report from the U.S. Customs and BorderProtection’s Office of Internal Affairs Assistant Commissioner, James Tomsheck,responsible for taking corrective action. CBP generally concurs with the content of thereport and offered no technical or general comments. We have included a copy of thecomments in Appendix B.2
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