justice. This right requires that any <strong>in</strong>terference with or <strong>in</strong>trusion upon the human body can only be undertaken <strong>in</strong> accordance withpr<strong>in</strong>ciples of fundamental justice. 10C. Discarded Tissue AdmittedWith respect to the mucous filled tissue that had been <strong>discarded</strong> <strong>in</strong> the wastebasket at the police station, the majorityconcluded that the seizure was also a violation of Stillman’s right to privacy. Nevertheless they admitted the <strong>evidence</strong>,as it was not conscriptive, that is, the police did not force, or even request, a mucous sample from Stillman. Althoughthe police acted surreptitiously <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> disregard of his explicit refusal to provide them with a sample, the violation ofhis rights with respect to the tissue was not serious. The seizure did not <strong>in</strong>terfere with his bodily <strong>in</strong>tegrity, nor did itcause him any loss of dignity. It was discoverable <strong>and</strong> the adm<strong>in</strong>istration of justice would not be brought <strong>in</strong>todisrepute if the <strong>evidence</strong> obta<strong>in</strong>ed from the tissue were admitted:In contrast to the hair samples, teeth impressions <strong>and</strong> buccal swabs, the police did not force, or even request, a mucous sample from theappellant. He blew his nose of his own accord. The police acted surreptitiously <strong>in</strong> disregard for the appellant's explicit refusal to providethem with bodily samples. However, the violation of the appellant's Charter rights with respect to the tissue was not serious. The seizuredid not <strong>in</strong>terfere with the appellant's bodily <strong>in</strong>tegrity, nor cause him any loss of dignity. In any event, the police could <strong>and</strong> would haveobta<strong>in</strong>ed the <strong>discarded</strong> tissue. They would have had reasonable <strong>and</strong> probable grounds to believe that the tissue would provide <strong>evidence</strong><strong>in</strong> their <strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>and</strong> therefore would have sealed the garbage conta<strong>in</strong>er <strong>and</strong> obta<strong>in</strong>ed a search warrant <strong>in</strong> order to recover itscontents. Quite simply, it was discoverable. In my view, the adm<strong>in</strong>istration of justice would not be brought <strong>in</strong>to disrepute if the <strong>evidence</strong>obta<strong>in</strong>ed from the mucous sample were to be admitted. 11Although the majority of the Court (5 judges) found that there was a Charter violation, they supported theadmission of the <strong>evidence</strong> from the tissue, as the violation was not one that would br<strong>in</strong>g the adm<strong>in</strong>istration of justice<strong>in</strong>to disrepute. The rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g four judges did not believe there was a Charter violation at all, as Stillman hadvoluntarily <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tentionally <strong>discarded</strong> the tissue <strong>in</strong>to the washroom wastebasket <strong>in</strong> full view of the officers. By do<strong>in</strong>gso, they concluded, he had ab<strong>and</strong>oned the tissue <strong>and</strong> lost any expectation of privacy he may have had <strong>in</strong> regard to it:In my view, the police action <strong>in</strong> tak<strong>in</strong>g the tissue did not violate s. 8 of the Charter. The tissue was not obta<strong>in</strong>ed as a result of a search ofthe appellant. Nor was it seized from him; he had <strong>discarded</strong> it. To put it another way, the appellant had ab<strong>and</strong>oned any privacy <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong> the tissue that he may have had. The police may f<strong>in</strong>d <strong>and</strong> use a gun thrown away by a killer as <strong>evidence</strong> aga<strong>in</strong>st the killer. In my view,so may they f<strong>in</strong>d <strong>and</strong> use a tissue that he has <strong>discarded</strong>. The purpose of s. 8 is to protect the person <strong>and</strong> property of the <strong>in</strong>dividual fromunreasonable search <strong>and</strong> seizure. This purpose is not engaged <strong>in</strong> the case of property which the accused has <strong>discarded</strong>. 12As a result of these f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs the Supreme Court ordered a new trial <strong>in</strong> which the hair samples <strong>and</strong> dentalimpressions were to be excluded, while the mucous sample from the tissue was to be admitted. Ultimately, at the retrial,Stillman was still convicted of murder<strong>in</strong>g Bischoff.As noted above, there were really three issues <strong>in</strong> Stillman. The first was the right of the police to seize bodilysamples <strong>in</strong>cident to a lawful arrest. The second was the sanctity of the body <strong>and</strong> the ma<strong>in</strong>tenance of human dignity.The issue third was the use of ab<strong>and</strong>oned bodily samples. While I will briefly touch on the first two issues, I submitthat it is the use of <strong>discarded</strong> or ab<strong>and</strong>oned bodily samples that will has the greatest impact on our privacy <strong>and</strong> thema<strong>in</strong>tenance of human dignity <strong>in</strong> the future.III. CUSTODIAL SEIZURESA. Gum Trick #1As noted above, Stillman is probably the lead<strong>in</strong>g case from the Supreme Court regard<strong>in</strong>g the use of <strong>discarded</strong> items bya suspect for DNA analysis. Although this case dealt with <strong>discarded</strong> items while <strong>in</strong> police custody, the generalstatement made by the Court with respect to ab<strong>and</strong>oned property is helpful <strong>in</strong> determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g what police can do <strong>in</strong> thepublic arena. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the Court:Where an accused who is not <strong>in</strong> custody discards an item offer<strong>in</strong>g potentially valuable DNA <strong>evidence</strong>, the police may ord<strong>in</strong>arily collect<strong>and</strong> test the item without any concern about consent, s<strong>in</strong>ce, <strong>in</strong> the circumstances, the accused ab<strong>and</strong>oned the item <strong>and</strong> ceased to have areasonable expectation of privacy <strong>in</strong> it. 1310111213Ibid. at paras. 87-89.Ibid. at para. 128.Ibid. at pp. 223.Ibid. See also para. 55.
While the Court stated the situation would be different for a person who was <strong>in</strong> custody, the issue of whether theyhad ab<strong>and</strong>oned an item <strong>and</strong> rel<strong>in</strong>quished any privacy <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> it would have to be determ<strong>in</strong>ed on a case by casebasis.In R. v. Nguyen, the Ontario Court of Appeal was confronted with just such an issue when they had to determ<strong>in</strong>eif the use of trickery by the police to obta<strong>in</strong> a DNA sample from a suspect who was <strong>in</strong> custody was lawful.In Nguyen, the accused also refused to provide his DNA. The police, however, contrived a plan to obta<strong>in</strong> a sampleby hav<strong>in</strong>g two female officers share a piece of gum <strong>and</strong> then offer a stick to the accused. Nguyen was free to decl<strong>in</strong>e,but if he did take the gum he was also free to dispose of it any way he saw fit (ie: swallow it or throw it <strong>in</strong> the garbage).He took the gum <strong>and</strong> eventually threw it <strong>in</strong> the garbage where the police retrieved it. The question was, was thetrick of offer<strong>in</strong>g gum to an accused <strong>in</strong> the expectation that it will be <strong>discarded</strong>, objectionable as an act of elicitation bythe State caus<strong>in</strong>g subversion of a constitutional right. The Court ruled that it was not, hold<strong>in</strong>g that the trick wasentirely passive <strong>and</strong> by offer<strong>in</strong>g gum, police created opportunity but noth<strong>in</strong>g more.While the Court found that there had been a Charter violation, they unanimously supported the admission ofthe <strong>evidence</strong> from the gum as it was “non-conscriptive”. As such, it would not br<strong>in</strong>g the adm<strong>in</strong>istration of justice <strong>in</strong>todisrepute. The Court subsequently affirmed the trial judge’s rul<strong>in</strong>g that:The ploy is not objectionable. The trick was entirely passive. The passive element was analogous to plac<strong>in</strong>g an undercover officer <strong>in</strong> a cellwith an accused for no purpose but to listen, thereby opportunity for the accused to speak to someone is provided. By offer<strong>in</strong>g gum,police created opportunity. Whether anyth<strong>in</strong>g resulted depended on the accused. His actions follow<strong>in</strong>g acceptance were entirely of hisown volition. The choice to accept, chew <strong>and</strong> discard the gum closely parallel McLachl<strong>in</strong> J.'s (as she then was) statement <strong>in</strong> Hebert at page42:If the suspect speaks, it is by his or her own choice, <strong>and</strong> he or she must be taken to have accepted the risk that the recipient may <strong>in</strong>formpolice.Police resort to this trick is not disqualified as a dirty trick, one "that shocks the community." DNA <strong>evidence</strong> has a potential forimpactive trial consequences relat<strong>in</strong>g to identification. It would be more probable that public consciousness would be shocked if upon acharge of first degree murder no further <strong>in</strong>vestigative attempt was made to marshal such significant <strong>evidence</strong>. 14B. Cigarette Butts from the Interview RoomA similar situation arose <strong>in</strong> R. v. Fash, a case from the Alberta Court of Appeal regard<strong>in</strong>g the use of <strong>discarded</strong> cigarettebutts for DNA analysis by a suspect while deta<strong>in</strong>ed, but who was subsequently released from police custody. As was thecase <strong>in</strong> Stillman <strong>and</strong> Nguyen, the accused had refused to provide DNA samples. However, unlike those <strong>cases</strong>, the Courtdid not f<strong>in</strong>d any Charter violation because the accused was not <strong>in</strong> custody, <strong>and</strong> was free to leave the police station afterhis <strong>in</strong>terview. As such, the accused “could have prevented the police from tak<strong>in</strong>g possession of [the cigarette butts] by putt<strong>in</strong>gthem <strong>in</strong> his pocket <strong>and</strong> tak<strong>in</strong>g them with him or refra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g from smok<strong>in</strong>g ... the accused <strong>discarded</strong> the cigarette butts <strong>and</strong> had noreasonable expectation of privacy <strong>in</strong> them.” 15In Commonwealth v. Bly, 16 <strong>in</strong> the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court determ<strong>in</strong>ed that the defendant lacked anexpectation of privacy <strong>in</strong> the cigarette butts <strong>and</strong> a water bottle that he had ab<strong>and</strong>oned <strong>in</strong> a detention centre <strong>in</strong>terviewroom. The court held that the police did not act improperly <strong>in</strong> collect<strong>in</strong>g DNA <strong>evidence</strong> from those items afterquestion<strong>in</strong>g the defendant on unrelated offences. The items had been collected by the police pursuant to a ruse wherethey had placed cigarettes <strong>and</strong> a water bottle <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>terview room, <strong>in</strong> the hope, unbeknownst to the defendant (whohad decl<strong>in</strong>ed to provide a blood sample), of collect<strong>in</strong>g DNA <strong>evidence</strong>.In response to the defendant’s argument “that the method used by the Commonwealth <strong>in</strong> obta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g his knownDNA sample constituted a non-consensual seizure”, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the defendant’s failure toretrieve the cigarette butts when leav<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>terview room (or request to go back <strong>and</strong> collect them) constituted a17“wholesale failure to manifest any expectation of privacy <strong>in</strong> the items whatsoever”.14151617R. v. Nguyen, [2002] O.J. No. 3 (C.A.), at pp. 19. Also see R. c. Macryllos, [2007] J.Q. no. 11429 (Q.S.C.).R. v. Fash (sub nom R. v. D.F.M.), (1999) 244 A.R. 146 (C.A.), leave to appeal SCC dismissed March 29, 2001, 281 A.R. 272 (note). Also see R.v. Arp, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 339, aff’<strong>in</strong>g (1997) B.C.A.C. 286, aff’<strong>in</strong>g [1995] B.C.J. No. 882, where cigarette butts were also collected from a police<strong>in</strong>terview room for DNA analysis. The Supreme Court noted the practice at paras. 17, 18 & 19 without adverse comment (although thedefence had conceded the issue <strong>in</strong> the Court below).Commonwealth v. Bly (2007), 448 Mass. 473 (Mass. S.J.C.).Ibid. Also see State v. Christian (2006), Docket No. 6-518/04-0900; 723 N.W.2d 453, <strong>in</strong> which a unanimous Iowa State Court of Appealsupheld the warrantless seizure of a water bottle <strong>and</strong> fork used by the suspect dur<strong>in</strong>g his <strong>in</strong>terview with the Iowa City Police. The Court heldthat “by leav<strong>in</strong>g the water bottle <strong>and</strong> the fork [but tak<strong>in</strong>g his other property with him], Christian demonstrated he was not <strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong> keep<strong>in</strong>g either … heab<strong>and</strong>oned [them] … <strong>and</strong> therefore had no reasonable expectation of privacy <strong>in</strong> either … In the absence of any def<strong>in</strong>itive authority to the contrary, we areunable to say Christian had a subjective or objective expectation of privacy <strong>in</strong> the DNA shed on the items seized”.