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Peter H. Huang Harold E. Kohn Chair Professor of Law James ...

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Emotional Impact Analysis<br />

progress in a document known as the Economic Report <strong>of</strong> the President. 197 The CEA has a staff, which<br />

“includes about 20 academic economists, plus four permanent economic statisticians.” 198 Another<br />

example <strong>of</strong> the privileging <strong>of</strong> economics in law is that “[i]n the last few decades, the law and economics<br />

movement has had a tremendous impact on legal studies.” 199<br />

Psychologist Daniel Kahneman believes that psychologically informing economics is likely to be<br />

more influential and effective than attempting to displace economics from law and public policy; 200 and<br />

makes this observation:<br />

there are really two disciplines that are in charge, and they’re the economists and the<br />

lawyers. And the economists, in particular, are the gatekeepers, the academic<br />

gatekeepers <strong>of</strong> the policy world. They do the research, they interpret the research, and so<br />

everything goes through them in terms <strong>of</strong> what actually gets implemented. … and this<br />

situation is one that is not going to change soon. 201<br />

Thus, EIA would redress a number <strong>of</strong> shortcomings <strong>of</strong> CBA as financial and securities regulators<br />

currently practice it. EIA would simply replace or supplement a dominant form <strong>of</strong> economic analysis in<br />

policymaking, namely CBA with a broader, more accurate brand <strong>of</strong> psychologically informed economics.<br />

III. Cost-Benefit Analysis in SEC Rulemaking<br />

A. Does the SEC Engage in Cost-Benefit Analysis?<br />

As a general empirical and factual matter, SEC rulemakings <strong>of</strong>ten contain sections with<br />

apparently extensive CBA. A casual perusal <strong>of</strong> many SEC proposed and final rules finds a larger<br />

percentage <strong>of</strong> pages in them devoted to discussing CBA than one might expect. For example, the final<br />

version <strong>of</strong> the above-mentioned controversial mutual fund governance rule (requiring independent board<br />

chairs and 75 percent <strong>of</strong> board members being independent) contained a section “III. Discussion,” which<br />

197<br />

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/eop/.<br />

198<br />

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Council_<strong>of</strong>_Economic_Advisors.<br />

199<br />

EMMA COLEMAN JORDAN & ANGELA P. HARRIS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE: RACE, GENDER, IDENTITY, AND<br />

ECONOMICS, at v (2005).<br />

200<br />

See e.g., Russel B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, <strong>Law</strong> and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality<br />

Assumption from <strong>Law</strong> and Economics, 81 CA. L. REV. 1051 (2000).<br />

201<br />

Daniel Kahneman, Does Psychology Have Anything To Say to Policy Makers?, 1 (Oct. 3, 2003), available at<br />

http://www.gallup.hu/pps/2003/kahneman_transscript.pdf.<br />

32

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