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Constitutional “Property” and Reserve Creation: Seybold Revisited

Constitutional “Property” and Reserve Creation: Seybold Revisited

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14 MANITOBA LAW JOURNAL VOL 32 NO 1By s. 91 of the British North America Act, 1867, the Parliament of Canada has exclusivelegislative authority over "Indians <strong>and</strong> l<strong>and</strong>s reserved for the Indians." But this did notvest in the Government of the Dominion any proprietary rights in such l<strong>and</strong>s, or anypower by legislation to appropriate l<strong>and</strong>s which by the surrender of the Indian title hadbecome the free public l<strong>and</strong>s of the province as an Indian reserve, in infringement ofthe proprietary rights of the province. 47With respect to Lord Davey, the <strong>Seybold</strong> reasons are not an apex of pith <strong>and</strong> substancejurisprudence. Unlike in the Fisheries Case this case has no clear reasoningfor why s. 91(24) is not about property. As explained above, the matter is not assimple as saying that s. 109 is about property <strong>and</strong> s. 91 is not. The actual characterof s. 91(24) ought to have been interrogated as was s. 91(12) in the FisheriesCase.Lord Davey in <strong>Seybold</strong> cites with approval the indivisible Crown doctrine asstated in St. Catherines Milling, yet no consequence appears to flow from this. 48The analysis assumes rather than decides that the interest the Indians have intheir Indian Act reserves is so great as to be in pith <strong>and</strong> substance relating to s.109. It omits any discussion of whether the creation of IR 38B merely regulatesuses of l<strong>and</strong>s, something which is permissible under the Fisheries Case even if s.91(24) is not “proprietary” in any way. Even if the conclusion that it goes to theheart of s. 109 is to be implied, there is no mention of whether the creation ofreserves for Indians on public l<strong>and</strong>s is the very “essence of” s. 91(24). The reasoningin <strong>Seybold</strong> is so sparse that it is impossible to reconcile with the other cases ons. 109. The issue has been treated as a settled one ever since. The federal governmentmust ask permission to create reserves on full s. 109 l<strong>and</strong>s.The approach used in <strong>Seybold</strong> is highly problematic. At the most basic level,the problem is that the case ignores the consequences of Crown indivisibility.Lord Davey appears to treat the use of public l<strong>and</strong>s by Canada as an infringementof the “proprietary rights” of the provincial legislature. In fact, the rights ofthe provincial legislature are not accurately thought of as “proprietary” becausethe l<strong>and</strong> is vested in the Crown simpliciter.The question asked by Lor d Davey is the wrong question. Lord Davey asksthe question “who owns the l<strong>and</strong> in question” <strong>and</strong> assumes that jurisdiction toexercise the prerogative of reservation flows exclusively from that ownership in awatertight manner. In the lower courts the same approach was used, with theSupreme Court of Canada fussing over whether the federal legislature was granting“proprietary” rights that it did not have. The Supreme Court of Canadacomplained that the “proprietary right of the province attaching upon thesel<strong>and</strong>s cannot be at the same time lodged in the Dominion so as to enable Can-4748<strong>Seybold</strong>, supra note 40 at para.12 (Davey L.J.).Ibid. at para. 3.

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