<strong>USAID</strong> STRATEGY ON DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GOVERNANCEVII. BUILDING <strong>DRG</strong> KNOWLEDGETHROUGH EVALUATION ANDRESEARCHTo implement this strategy, <strong>USAID</strong> reaffirms its commitmentto generate, analyze, and disseminate rigorous,systematic and publicly accessible evidence in all aspects of<strong>DRG</strong> policy, strategy and program development, implementationand evaluation. This commitment is consistent with the <strong>USAID</strong>Evaluation Policy and the recommendations of the NationalAcademy of Sciences’ (NAS) 2008 report, Improving DemocracyAssistance: Building Knowledge through Evaluations and Research.The NAS report in particular made recommendations on developing<strong>USAID</strong> as a learning organization that focused broadly onfour areas. 381. Increasing the use of impact evaluations, surveys, and othersystematic research methods in <strong>DRG</strong> program developmentand evaluation;2. Increasing the rigor and diversity of qualitative methods;3. Developing more transparent, objective, and widelyaccepted mid-level indicators of <strong>DRG</strong> impact; and4. Strengthening <strong>USAID</strong>’s capacity for independent research,evaluation and knowledge accumulation and disseminationrelated to <strong>DRG</strong> assistance.<strong>USAID</strong> has made evidence-based decision-making a priority inthe <strong>DRG</strong> sphere in recent years. The considerable progressmade to date suggests that much more can and should be donein constructing a foundation of evidence-based knowledge onwhich <strong>DRG</strong> policies, strategies, and programs can be built andsustained.Promoting an evidence-based approach to <strong>DRG</strong> programmingand evaluation is highly challenging; political change is often nonlinear,and frequently the result of complex causal variables. Evendemocratic institutions and processes are not always transparent.The data needed for <strong>DRG</strong> program development and evaluationoften are not collected or disseminated by host governments inthe way that such data are routinely collected by governments inthe economic, health and education sectors. In addition, authoritarianismcreates incentives for individuals to falsify or hide their actualpreferences. Critical data frequently must be generated by <strong>USAID</strong>and its partners in the first instance. Moreover, changes in some<strong>DRG</strong> outcomes often occur incrementally, requiring longer timelinesfor evaluation to avoid missing the impact of incremental buteffective <strong>DRG</strong> programs, or prematurely assessing programs thatinitially show progress but are ultimately ineffective.Against this backdrop, <strong>USAID</strong> will take the following steps todevelop knowledge and build evidence in the <strong>DRG</strong> sector:■ Pursue rigorous research and evaluations in support of anambitious but carefully prioritized agency-wide <strong>DRG</strong> learningagenda;■ Apply rigor in both quantitative and qualitative methods;■ Use systematic and rigorous impact evaluations of <strong>DRG</strong> programswhenever feasible; 39■ Develop cross-disciplinary studies to establish a better understandingof the relationship between <strong>DRG</strong> and otherdevelopment priorities;■ Strengthen relations with academic institutions, think-tanks andother government organizations engaged in <strong>DRG</strong>-relatedresearch; and■ Develop better methods to synthesize, analyze, integrate andutilize the considerable <strong>DRG</strong>-related knowledge that is generatedthroughout <strong>USAID</strong>’s many bureaus and field Missions.38Committee on Evaluation of <strong>USAID</strong> Democracy Assistance Programs, Improving Democracy Assistance: Building Knowledge through Evaluation and Research (Washington,DC:The National Academies Press, 2008), See http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12164&page=R139Impact evaluations measure the change in a development outcome that is attributable to a defined intervention.They are based on models of cause and effect and requirea credible and rigorously defined counterfactual to control for factors other than the intervention that might account for the observed change. Impact evaluations in whichcomparisons are made between beneficiaries that are randomly assigned to either a treatment or to a control group provide the strongest evidence of a relationshipbetween the intervention under study and the outcome measured. <strong>USAID</strong>, Evaluation: Learning from Experience (Washington, DC: <strong>USAID</strong>, 2011).34
<strong>USAID</strong> STRATEGY ON DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GOVERNANCEVIII. MOVING FORWARD:OPERATIONALIZING THE <strong>DRG</strong>STRATEGYRecognizing the value and importance of <strong>DRG</strong> to fulfillthe Agency’s development objectives, the ObamaAdministration has made several changes to strengthen<strong>USAID</strong>’s <strong>DRG</strong> capacity and engagement:■ The Center of Excellence for Democracy, Human Rights andGovernance (<strong>DRG</strong> Center) was created, with new teams onHuman Rights, Cross-Sectoral Programs, and Learning;■ <strong>USAID</strong> has increased its emphasis on citizen participation forgreater accountability through supporting activities such asthe Open Government Partnership and the recentlylaunched Grand Challenge for Development MAVC;■ <strong>USAID</strong> established new initiatives to prevent atrocities andfight human trafficking as part of larger USG efforts in theseareas; and■ <strong>USAID</strong> has emphasized the importance of country systemstrengthening through the Implementation and ProcurementReform Initiative and has developed tools, such as the PublicFinancial Management Risk Assessment Framework(PFMRAF), which includes both public financial managementand democratic accountability components. Together thesefacilitate increased use of government-to-government assistance,where appropriate, and reliance on partner-countryprivate sector and civil society program implementers.This strategy applies to all <strong>USAID</strong> bureaus and Missions andcovers policy and operations in Washington, D.C. and the field.On an ongoing basis, this strategy will inform the work of individualsand units throughout <strong>USAID</strong>, particularly when it comesto integrating this strategy into the Program Cycle. To meaningfullyelevate and integrate democracy, human rights andgovernance at <strong>USAID</strong>, and in order to institutionalize thisstrategy, additional specific responsibilities are entrusted to<strong>USAID</strong> bureaus, Missions and independent offices.The Office of the Administrator will:■ Increase <strong>DRG</strong> prominence within <strong>USAID</strong>’s structure andprocesses by supporting the enhancement of humanresources and, programming as described below;■ Use the influence of the Administrator’s office to forcefullyengage within <strong>USAID</strong>, the interagency, and our donor andimplementing partners to advance the objectives of thisstrategy; and■ Direct the technical bureaus and Missions to integrate <strong>DRG</strong>principles and practices across <strong>USAID</strong>’s development portfolio,particularly the Presidential Initiatives.The DCHA Assistant Administrator will:■ Establish a Deputy Assistant Administrator-level steeringcommittee to oversee <strong>DRG</strong> strategy implementation withsupport from the <strong>DRG</strong> Sector Council. The steering committeewill brief the Administrator, Deputy Administrator andDCHA Assistant Administrator annually on the status of<strong>DRG</strong> strategy implementation; and■ Advocate for adequate resources, staff and policy attentionfor <strong>DRG</strong> within <strong>USAID</strong> and the interagency.The DCHA/<strong>DRG</strong> Center will:■ Assume, in collaboration with regional bureaus and theOffice of Human Resources, a more significant and formalizedrole in the placement of <strong>DRG</strong> field officers, and workwith human resources to explore options to strengthen<strong>DRG</strong> field officers’ competencies and capacity;■ Enhance the <strong>DRG</strong> Center’s role in the development ofstrategies and programs, whether managed in the field or inWashington, D.C. by:35
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