Fateful Triangle

Washington’s “Peace Process”8881989, when he explained to Peace Now leaders that the U.S. hadgranted Israel time to suppress the Intifada by force, diverting attentionby meaningless diplomatic maneuvers (see p. 845). These policiesachieved much success, extended with Rabin’s “closure” of theterritories, a crushing blow to the staggering Palestinian economyFrom the early days of the Intifada, if not before, it was becomingclear that the PLO leadership was losing its popular support in the occupiedterritories. Local activists from secular nationalist sectors, while stillrecognizing the PLO as the sole agent for negotiations, spoke with opencontempt of its corruption, personal power plays, opportunism, anddisregard for the interests and opinions of the people it claimed torepresent. By all indications, the disaffection increased in the years thatfollowed, while the fundamentalist opposition that Israel had initiallynurtured gained popular support, feeding on this growing discontent andon the demoralization as Rabin’s program was implemented, withconstant U.S. support at all levels: economic, diplomatic, andideological.With its popular support in decline and its status deteriorating in theArab world, the PLO became more tolerable to U.S.-Israeli policymakers,particularly as the growing fundamentalist movement evoked memoriesof the resistance that had driven Israel out of much of Lebanon. 4Informal Israel-PLO contacts were increasingly reported. These reachedtheir culmination with the August 1993 Oslo agreement, whichbypassed the delegations engaged in the official “peace process,” andindeed also excluded the PLO, apart from Arafat and a few closeassociates.The agreement was welcomed with great acclaim, marred only byskepticism as to whether it could hold. “America’s own greatestinterest,” the twin goals of “enhanced security for Israel and a durableregional peace,” both “seem closer to achievement this morning thanClassics in Politics: The Fateful TriangleNoam Chomsky