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Guggenheim Credit Allocation Fund GGM - Guggenheim Investments

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loan to restructure the residential mortgage loan or otherwise delay the foreclosure process. See “Risks—MBSRisks—Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Risk.”Sub-prime mortgage market risk. The residential mortgage market in the United States has experienceddifficulties that may adversely affect the performance and market value of certain mortgages and MBS.Delinquencies and losses on residential mortgage loans (especially sub-prime and second-lien mortgage loans)generally have increased recently and may continue to increase, and a decline in or flattening of housing values(as has recently been experienced and may continue to be experienced in many housing markets) mayexacerbate such delinquencies and losses. Borrowers with adjustable rate mortgage loans are more sensitive tochanges in interest rates, which affect their monthly mortgage payments, and may be unable to securereplacement mortgages at comparably low interest rates. Also, a number of residential mortgage loanoriginators have experienced serious financial difficulties or bankruptcy. Largely due to the foregoing, reducedinvestor demand for mortgage loans and MBS and increased investor yield requirements caused limitedliquidity in the secondary market for certain MBS, which can adversely affect the market value of MBS. It ispossible that such limited liquidity in such secondary markets could continue or worsen. If the economy of theUnited States deteriorates further, the incidence of mortgage foreclosures, especially sub-prime mortgages, mayincrease, which may adversely affect the value of any MBS owned by the <strong>Fund</strong>.The significance of the mortgage crisis and loan defaults in residential mortgage loan sectors led to theenactment of numerous pieces of legislation relating to the mortgage and housing markets. These actions, alongwith future legislation or regulation, may have significant impacts on the mortgage market generally and mayresult in a reduction of available transactional opportunities for the <strong>Fund</strong> or an increase in the cost associatedwith such transactions and may adversely impact the value of RMBS.During the mortgage crisis, a number of originators and servicers of residential and commercial mortgage loans,including some of the largest originators and servicers in the residential and commercial mortgage loan market,experienced serious financial difficulties. Such difficulties may affect the performance of non-agency RMBS andCMBS. There can be no assurance that originators and servicers of mortgage loans will not continue to experienceserious financial difficulties or experience such difficulties in the future, including becoming subject to bankruptcyor insolvency proceedings, or that underwriting procedures and policies and protections against fraud will besufficient in the future to prevent such financial difficulties or significant levels of default or delinquency onmortgage loans. See “Risks—MBS Risks—Sub-Prime Mortgage Market Risk.”Stripped MBS risk. Stripped MBS may be subject to additional risks. The yield to maturity on an interest onlyclass is extremely sensitive to the rate of principal payments (including prepayments) on the underlyingmortgage assets, and a rapid rate of principal payments may have a material adverse effect on the <strong>Fund</strong>’s yieldto maturity from these securities. Conversely, the principal only class securities tend to decline in value ifprepayments are slower than anticipated. See “Risks—MBS Risks—Stripped MBS Risk.”CMO risk. There are certain risks associated specifically with collateralized mortgage obligations (“CMOs”).CMOs are debt obligations collateralized by mortgage loans or mortgage pass-through securities. Undercertain market conditions, such as those that occurred during the recent downturn in the mortgage markets,the weighted average life of certain CMOs may not accurately reflect the price volatility of such securities.CMOs issued by private entities are not obligations issued or guaranteed by the U.S. Government, itsagencies or instrumentalities and are not guaranteed by any government agency, although the securitiesunderlying a CMO may be subject to a guarantee. Therefore, if the collateral securing the CMO, as well asany third party credit support or guarantees, is insufficient to make payments when due, the holder couldsustain a loss. Inverse floating rate CMOs are typically more volatile than fixed or floating rate tranches ofCMOs. Many inverse floating rate CMOs have coupons that move inversely to a multiple of an index. Theeffect of the coupon varying inversely to a multiple of an applicable index creates a leverage factor. See“Risks—MBS Risks—CMO Risk.”13

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