The Chechen Resistance: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow

IntroductionIf we choose to ignore the earlier stages of Chechen resistance against Russian rule, then wemust look to the military campaigns of 1994-96 as the start of the current stage of the Russo-Chechen war. It was during this time of armed conflict when the foundations of thecontemporary resistance movement were formed.Since both were former Soviet officers, Dzhokhar Dudaev, the first president of Chechnya, andAslan Maskhadov, the commander in chief of the General Council of the Military Forces of theChechen republic of Ichkeria, initially worked to create military structures similar to that of theUSSR. Over time, however, the benefits of guerrilla warfare in facing one of the largestconventional militaries in the world have been demonstrated. This approach to warfare hasprevented Russia from exploiting its numerical advantage and has confused their forces byutilizing non-standard fighting techniques.Chechens started to break with the organizational structure initially set up and supported byPresident Dudaev very early on in the 1994-96 campaign. This is what allowed them tosuccessfully resist against the occupation of all of Chechnya by Russian forces, as well as to beable to act decisively throughout the course of the war. Bands of guerrillas formed in ruralregions, city neighborhoods, and villages. They acted autonomously, with only nominal highlevelcoordination between them in 1995. Only in 1996 did Aslan Maskhadov successfullymanage to start coordinating the Chechen forces, which helped to account for such seriousundertakings as the capture of Grozny. The capture of the capital was a seminal event that endedthis particular campaign and would have been impossible for uncoordinated groups to achieve.In the interwar period of 1997-99 President Maskhadov once again tried to form a conventionalarmy, but this force once again rapidly metamorphosed into the already familiar guerrilla form.This was most evident during the first real confrontation with the Russian military on TerekRidge in autumn of 1999. This, along with Chechen Defense Minister Magomed Khanbiev’sfailure to form a battle-worthy conventional force proved that the army had to adapt to theprevailing conditions, and led Maskhadov to completely change his viewpoint and radicallyoverhaul the organizational structure of his forces. It took two years to do this during the harshconditions of the Russian occupation, but the change was finally completed by July-August of2001 in the Nozhai-Yurt region of Chechnya when all the important high and mid-rankingmilitary commanders met for the first time after the abandonment of Grozny.Leaders of the Chechen ResistanceFollowing the charismatic Maskhadov, who had been elected in accordance with the rules ofEuropean democracy and had been confirmed as president by EU representatives, the presidencywas occupied for a short time by the young and relatively unknown Abdul-Khalim Sadulaev. Hewas the representative of a new generation of Chechen leaders who managed not only to becomethe leader of the Chechen resistance, but the leader of the entire resistance in the North Caucasus.He successfully combined the roles of a young fighter and a knowledgeable theologian, and thusavoided relying upon Middle Eastern emigrants. This fortuitous combination of skills allowedhim to be the first man since the death of Sheikh Mansur in 1794 to be the sole leader of theentire region, which is a region well known for rejecting most such leaders. Sadulaev combinedyouth and education, being a linguist who loved ancient philosophy and was a universallyrespected self-taught theologian. While Makhadov was seen by non-Chechen combatants as2