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Values, Virtues, and John Paul II - the St. Paul Center for Biblical ...

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of moral reasoning, Nietzsche proclaimed that goodness is not something objective thatattracts <strong>the</strong> human will, but ra<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> creative will's projection of value on somethingelse. Thus values are anchored not in objective reality, but in <strong>the</strong> subjective will. AsNietzsche understood it, Bloom continues, "men in our current decrepitude could take iteasy if <strong>the</strong>y believed God, nature, or history provides values."As <strong>the</strong> disastrous consequences of our pervasive ethical relativism become more <strong>and</strong>more apparent, <strong>the</strong>re is evidence of a growing frustration with values whose only claim tovalidity is personal preference <strong>and</strong> taste. Yet <strong>the</strong> road to recovery is still uncertain. In <strong>the</strong>face of <strong>the</strong> present crisis it seems <strong>the</strong>re are two possible paths to take in our approach tovalues: ei<strong>the</strong>r to ab<strong>and</strong>on discourse on values in favor of more traditional ethicallanguage, or to assert <strong>the</strong> objective foundation of values <strong>and</strong> hence a system by which<strong>the</strong>y can be compared, evaluated, <strong>and</strong> judged.The consensus seems to favor <strong>the</strong> abolition of "values." Never<strong>the</strong>less, a convincingargument can also be made <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong> second option. While discussion on virtues indeedmust be vigorously reintroduced into <strong>the</strong> public <strong>for</strong>um, it doesn't necessarily follow thatvirtues must be promoted to <strong>the</strong> exclusion of values-as we can see if we examine <strong>the</strong>approach that Pope <strong>John</strong> <strong>Paul</strong> <strong>II</strong> has taken towards values.Allan Bloom is thoroughgoing in his analysis of Nietzsche's philosophy of values, but <strong>the</strong>practical conclusion he draws is fatally flawed. The proposal to jettison "values" fromphilosophical <strong>and</strong> ethical lexicon reflects an erroneous underst<strong>and</strong>ing of <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>and</strong>role of words. All words run <strong>the</strong> risk of being manipulated, but <strong>the</strong>y can also beredeemed. In culture wars, as in philosophical debate, words are often like towns along<strong>the</strong> battle front: <strong>the</strong>y offer a strategic position <strong>and</strong> must be fought <strong>for</strong> <strong>and</strong> defended, <strong>and</strong>not relinquished as soon as <strong>the</strong> enemy advances. Along with "values," Bloom stigmatizessuch words as "au<strong>the</strong>nticity," "commitment," <strong>and</strong> "decision," all of which havethoroughly legitimate <strong>and</strong> worthwhile uses. These terms need to be rehabilitated <strong>and</strong>purified, not discarded-else every word claimed by a philosophical or psychologicalschool would have to be declared unsuitable <strong>for</strong> meaningful discourse. By this logic wecould no longer speak of freedom after Sartre, of tolerance after Voltaire, or of socialjustice after liberation <strong>the</strong>ology.Though Bloom brought to <strong>the</strong> <strong>for</strong>e suspicions about "values" terminology, doubts hadbeen raised decades be<strong>for</strong>e <strong>the</strong> appearance of The Closing of <strong>the</strong> American Mind. In 1953<strong>the</strong> philosopher Leo <strong>St</strong>rauss published Natural Right <strong>and</strong> History, in which he ablydemonstrates <strong>the</strong> incoherence of Max Weber's fact-value distinction. Ten years later<strong>St</strong>rauss lamented <strong>the</strong> relativism ushered in by <strong>the</strong> social sciences <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir methods in apaper on <strong>the</strong> behavioral sciences. This "new political or social science," says <strong>St</strong>rauss,rests on "sociological or psychological <strong>the</strong>ories" that exclude an objective base. "Byteaching <strong>the</strong> equality of all values, by denying that <strong>the</strong>re are things which are intrinsicallyhigh <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs which are intrinsically low as well as by denying that <strong>the</strong>re is an essentialdifference between men <strong>and</strong> brutes, it unwittingly contributes to <strong>the</strong> victory of <strong>the</strong> gutter."

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