8concern for the way clergy and congregations impact persons and the public. It is amongthe most compelling writing available about what sorts of clergy education actually leadto clergy excellence in pubic ministry.The book surely has shortcomings, yet to point some of them out only makesclear how very much this study gets right. First, the constraints of the studyunfortunately limited the duration of their site visits—two and a half to three days barelyallow for a more complex picture to emerge, especially when so much evidence is basedon self-reporting either through survey, interview, or focus groups. Similarly, as theythemselves note, much clergy education takes place outside the bounds of accreditedgraduate theological schools and to have some attention to formation through thosealternative channels would have given an important counterpoint. Lastly, while theymake good use of a developmental model of learning skillful action so obviously relevantto a practice model in discussing pedagogies of performance, they miss an opportunity tofully press such embodied cognition back through all the pedagogies. For the reader whohas eyes to see, such an implication is clearly present, and especially in the conclusionswhere the most important contributions of the book are highlighted.Getting the Epistemology RightTo this reader, the most significant aspect of the study for clergy education (andas well the professions generally) lies in the way Foster et. al. fundamentally discredit thetraditional theory/application model so influential in the academy, the professionalschools generally, and seminary education specifically. Following William Sullivan’slead, they believe what is needed is something like phronesis, that is, an “epistemology of
9practical reason.” 7 Foster et. al. use an epistemology of practical reason to recast “allforms of seminary education as inherently involved in the cultivation of clergy practice”through experience and learning in practical action. 8 In doing so, Foster et. al. callfor—and show robust examples of—education of the head, heart, and hands across thecurriculum and not simply in specialized settings for learning performance andprofessional practice.The positivist theory-application model imagines professional programs that cantrain excellent professionals, filled with all the current theory of the profession, and sendthem out to practice in any and all situations where they gradually learn the skill ofapplying their reservoir of knowledge. When asked in a survey, 80% of former studentssaid there were significant gaps in their preparation for actual ministry practice. Toooften, in such cases, novice clergy either reject the abstract theology for rough and readyplans of action prepackaged for them by a multi-billion dollar religious publishing marketor painfully struggle to make sense of the relation of theory to practice on their own.The practice model at the heart of <strong>Educating</strong> <strong>Clergy</strong>, however, understands thatthe situational character of practical knowledge strongly suggests that the professionalschool must form practitioners who are aware of what it takes to become competent intheir chosen domain and equip them with the reflective capacity and motivation to pursue7 Sullivan, Work and Integrity, 246.8 Foster et. al. <strong>Educating</strong> <strong>Clergy</strong>, 377. Also see phenomenological critique of cognitivist thinkingin Hubert L. Dreyfus and Stuart E. Dreyfus, Mind over Machine: The Power of Human Intuitionand Expertise in the Era of the Computer (New York: The Free Press, 1986 as well as the work ofembodied cognitivists who put phenomenology in conversation with neuroscience in such keyworks as Shaun Gallagher, How the Body Shapes the Mind (New York: Oxford, 2005) and in thework of various leaders in professional education such as Terry Atkinson and Guy Claxton, eds,The Intuitive Practitioner: On the Value of Not Always Knowing What One is Doing (Berkshire,UK: Open University Press, 2000) or Patricia Benner, Expertise in Nursing Practice: Caring,Clinical Judgment, and Ethics (New York: Springer, 1998).