3TAPS, INC.'S ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM Case No. CV-12 ...

123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627283taps, craiggers, and JeBoom will continue to sustain injury and damages, and competition willcontinue to decrease in the Relevant Market.223. The injuries to 3taps, competitors, consumers, and competition described herein arethe types of injuries that the antitrust laws are designed to prevent because they are a direct resultof craigslist illegal, anticompetitive scheme to exclude competitors from the market.224. 3taps is entitled to injunctive relief and treble damages.3TAPS’ ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIMCOUNT III(Sherman Act § 2 claim for monopolization and attempted monopolization of the real-timesearch market and related submarkets)225. 3taps repeats and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1through 195 as if fully set forth herein.226. Section 2 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 2) prohibits, inter alia, the willfulmonopolization of any part of the trade and commerce among the States, as well as attempts tomonopolize any part of the trade and commerce among the States.227. craigslist has monopoly power in the Relevant Market for the search of indexedclassified ad content, and it has maintained this power through anticompetitive behavior.228. craigslist has engaged in an anticompetitive scheme, including filing serial shamlitigation and threatening such litigation, copyright misuse, imposing improper Terms of Use onusers, and ghosting and other misconduct, to acquire, enhance, and/or maintain this monopolypower in the Relevant Market for search of indexed classified ad content in violation of Section 2of the Sherman Act.229. If for any reason, craigslist is deemed not to have monopoly power in the RelevantMarket or Submarkets for search of indexed classified ad content, there is a dangerous probabilitythat craigslist will acquire such power.230. craigslist’s anticompetitive scheme has given it the power to control pricing andexclude competition in the Relevant Market.231. Upon information and belief, network effects have resulted in high barriers to entryfor any potential new entrant into the Relevant Market. These barriers to entry are evidenced by69CASE NO.: 12-CV-3816-CRB