Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) Greg S. Weaver - Futures ...

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52of constituent agencies contribute to thisproblem. Until such a system has beendeveloped, information sharing, laterallyand vertically, will be less than optimal. Areport of the Commission on theIntelligence Capabilities of the UnitedStates Regarding Weapons of MassDestruction suggests that the FBI,because of its dual role as aninvestigative and intelligence agency, isparticularly well-suited to become thepoint through which intelligence isshared, provided that the long-standingpractice of “stovepiping” information anda general sense of mistrust areameliorated (Office of the Director ofNational Intelligence, 2005). Since 9/11,the FBI has, in fact, assumed a greaterintelligence function, in part because theBureau falls under the purview of theOffice of the Director of NationalIntelligence. As a member of and inconjunction with the Joint Terrorism TaskForce (JTTF) units establishedthroughout the country, its potential asan information conduit to other agencieshas increased (Johnson, 2003; MarkleFoundation, 2003; Markle Foundation,2006). Additionally, it is suggested thatbecause of the law enforcement role ofthe FBI, the concerns over collectinginformation on U.S. citizens and theircivil liberties will not be ignored (Office ofthe Director of National Intelligence,2005).As mentioned previously, a longstandingbias in the intelligencecommunity is that OSINT is inferior toclassified or “high side” material. Also,for a number of reasons, there has beena tendency to overclassify or to restrictthe availability of intelligence. This “needto know” approach limits the distributionof material that may be of benefit to anumber of agencies. It is apparent thatclear guidelines are necessary tofacilitate the sharing of both open sourceand sensitive/classified information. Justas the definition of law enforcementsensitive differs across jurisdictions andagencies, so, too, does the question overwho can have access to this information(Markle Foundation, 2003; McNamara,2007). It has been suggested that animportant change lies in moving from aphilosophy of “need to know” to one of“responsibility to provide” information tothose agencies that need it (Office of theDirector of National Intelligence, 2007).Another step in addressing theseconcerns lies in increasing the use of andaccess to OSINT. The Markle Foundation(2003) recommends that the emphasisshould be placed on creating distributableproducts whose access can be restrictedas more sensitive or even classifiedinformation is added, as opposed toautomatically restricting this informationat the onset. The dissemination of OSINTcan be regulated via guidelinesestablished beforehand, so developmentof consistent and usable policies isimportant. For example, the use of avirtual private network (VPN) dedicated toOSINT could greatly enhance theintelligence capabilities of variousagencies and departments. Because theinformation contained in them is notclassified per se, it is not necessary tohold a security clearance in order toaccess it.Conclusion:“Where do we go from here?”Clearly, a number of challenges mustbe addressed in order to better useOSINT. However, it accomplishes little tolament what has not been done in thepast or to recommend unrealisticmeasures that are not feasible within theexisting intelligence system. Perhaps oneway to move forward is to acknowledgeand learn from mistakes of the past. Thefollowing discussion takes this approach.
53In Sharing the Secrets: Open SourceIntelligence and the War on Drugs,Holden-Rhodes (1997) offers acompelling, yet controversial, account ofhow “round five (p. 2)” of the War onDrugs beginning in the 1980s washindered by a lack of coordination,cooperation, and information sharingbetween various departments, agencies,and the military. The alleged underutilizationof OSINT is central to theseclaims. For example, Holden-Rhodescontends that OSINT can providevaluable information on drug traffickingand distribution.In Holden-Rhodes opinion, one of thefactors contributing to the failure of theWar on Drugs occurred years earlier.From 1969-74, the Nixon administrationcharacterized anti-drug efforts as anissue of national security. However,local, state, and federal law enforcementagencies have a prominent role indomestic drug issues, and itsrelationship vis-a-vis the military iscomplex. Poorly defined goals andunrealistic expectations led to politicalwrangling in a number of areas, andpolicy suffered. During the 1980s andbeyond, the emphasis on anti-drugefforts resulted in large increases inavailable funding. According to Turner(1999), various agencies anddepartments scrambled to secure theirshare of the figurative financial pie. Thiscompetition resulted in a lack ofcooperation between agencies, bothhorizontally (federal) and vertically(federal-state-local).The “national security versus crime”debate is apparent in terrorism policy aswell (for a recent review, see LaFree &Hendrickson (2007)), and there is nodearth of compelling arguments insupport of either position. A detaileddiscussion is not needed to recognizethat at times, the similarities between thewar on drugs and the developing policiesrelated to the global war on terror areunnerving. In essence, the author arguesthat the War on Drugs has beenineffective in large part because arational, unified strategy is lacking.Furthermore, without a clearly definedsystem of command and control, theobjectives at hand can be lost. He agreeswith Wilson (1983, p. 49) who asserts thata rational policy must clearly identifygoals and objectives and be geared torecognize the ones that are attainable(and those that are not) and what level ofinfluence the government has tomanipulate those goals or conditions toachieve the desired results. In short, the“Global War on Terror” falls on thecollective shoulders of a number ofagencies and departments, andcooperation is of utmost importance.REFERENCESBest, R. A., Jr. (2001). Intelligence andlaw enforcement: Counteringtransnational threats to the U.S. (CRSReport for Congress #RL30252).Washington, D.C.: CongressionalResearch Service.deBorchgrave, A., Sanderson, T., &MacGaffin, J. (2006). Open sourceinformation: The missing dimension ofintelligence (Report of the CSISTransnational Threats Project).Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press.Deflem, M. (2006). Europol and thepolicing of international terrorism:Counter-terrorism in a globalperspective. Justice Quarterly, 23,336–359.Evans, S. (2005). Law enforcement andDelphi: An exercise in strategicintelligence research. Low IntensityConflict & Law Enforcement, 13, 70–79.Gunaratna, R., & Chalk, P. (2002). Jane’scounter terrorism (2 nd ed.). Surrey,U.K.: Jane’s Information Group.
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